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Abstract 
The author reviews research showing that repetitive thought (RT) can have constructive or 
unconstructive consequences. The main unconstructive consequences of RT are: (a) depression; 
(b) anxiety; (c) difficulties in physical health. The main constructive consequences of RT are: (a) 
recovery from upsetting and traumatic events; (b) adaptive preparation and anticipatory 
planning; (c) recovery from depression; d) uptake of health-promoting behaviors. Several 
potential principles accounting for these distinct consequences of RT are identified within this 
review: (a) the valence of thought content; (b) the intrapersonal and situational context in which 
RT occurs; (c) the level of construal (abstract versus concrete processing) adopted during RT. Of 
the existing models of RT, it is proposed that an elaborated version of the control theory account 
provides the best theoretical framework to account for its distinct consequences.  
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Constructive and Unconstructive Repetitive Thought 
Repetitive, prolonged and recurrent thought about one’s self, one’s concerns and one’s 
experiences is a mental process commonly engaged in by all people (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, 
& Shafran, 2004). Such thinking bridges many topics within psychology: social cognition, 
emotion, motivation, self-regulation, goal attainment, stress, psychopathology, and mental 
health. Examples of such thinking include worry, rumination, perseverative cognition, emotional 
processing, cognitive processing, mental simulation, rehearsal, reflection, and problem solving 
(e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004; Wyer, 
1996). Across these constructs, there is considerable similarity and overlap in theoretical 
conceptualizations and operational definitions. However, because these constructs have emerged 
in distinct research domains, they are usually not equated with one another and have rarely been 
considered together. Moreover, research has shown that these constructs have diverse outcomes, 
such that repetitive thought (RT) can have both unconstructive and constructive consequences. 
For example, on one hand, within the cognitive processing literature, RT about symptoms and 
upsetting events has been conceptualized as necessary for people to come to terms with traumatic 
and upsetting events (Horowitz, 1985; Pennebaker, 1997; Rachman, 1980; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 
2004). On the other hand, RT about symptoms and upsetting events has been found to predict 
future depression (Ingram, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Pyszczynski 
& Greenberg, 1987) and poor recovery from traumatic and upsetting events.  
Accounting for the discrepant consequences of RT is critical in understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of RT, as well as of obvious applied and clinical value, in terms of 
improving recovery from traumatic events and reducing vulnerability to anxiety and depression. 
Nonetheless, there have been few systematized attempts to account for the distinct constructive 
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and unconstructive outcomes of RT (for initial suggestions see Harvey et al., 2004; Martin & 
Tesser, 1996; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004b; Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden & Shortridge, 2003). Thus, 
the first aim of the current article is to address this omission by reviewing and organizing the 
extensive literature on the distinct consequences of RT in a coherent way. The second aim is to 
identify principles and/or mechanisms that could explain the distinct consequences of RT. The 
third aim is to discuss existing models of RT in the light of this review to determine which theory 
best accounts for the extant literature on RT. I first define the constructs used in this review, 
including the generic construct “repetitive thought” (RT), as well as more specific examples and 
classes of RT considered in this article. I then evaluate the evidence relevant to making a 
distinction between constructive and unconstructive consequences of RT, before summarizing 
and abstracting the key factors that emerge from this review to account for these distinct 
consequences of RT. Finally, I examine which of the existing models of RT best account for this 
data.  
What is meant by repetitive thought (RT)? 
This review focuses on a number of thought processes that that have been highlighted as 
important in the wider literature relevant to self-regulation, psychopathology, and mental and 
physical health. A property common to all of these constructs is the process conceptualized by 
Segerstrom et al., (2003, p.3) as “repetitive thought” (RT), defined as the “process of thinking 
attentively, repetitively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world”, which was proposed to 
form “the core of a number of different models of adjustment and maladjustment”. As the rest of 
this section makes clear, these different classes of RT encompass a wide range of 
conceptualizations, associated with both unconstructive and constructive consequences.  
Depressive Rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) 
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 Nolen-Hoeksema defined depressive rumination as “behaviors and thoughts that focus 
one's attention on one's depressive symptoms and on the implications of these symptoms” 
(Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, p. 569) and as “passively and repetitively focusing on one’s symptoms 
of distress and the circumstances surrounding these symptoms” (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & 
Larson, 1997). Nolen-Hoeksema’s Response Styles Theory (RST; 1991; 2000; 2004) 
hypothesized that depressive rumination is a particular response style to depressed mood, which 
is causally implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. Depressive rumination is 
typically assessed on the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991), which asks participants to endorse how much they ruminate in response to sad or 
depressed mood (e.g., When you feel sad, down or depressed how often do you: "Think 'Why do 
I always react this way?'"). A related questionnaire is the Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS; 
Conway, Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000), which assesses tendency to engage in RT when feeling 
sad, down or blue (e.g., “I repeatedly analyze and keep thinking about the reasons for my 
sadness”). 
Rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996) 
 Rumination was defined as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around a common 
instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring 
the thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p.7). Within this conceptualization, rumination is RT on a 
theme related to personal goals and concerns, which can have either constructive or 
unconstructive consequences, depending on whether the RT helps or hinders the progress 
towards the unattained goal that triggered the rumination. It is assessed using the Global 
rumination scale (e.g. “When I have a problem, I tend to think of it a lot of the time”, McIntosh 
& Martin, 1992). 
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Worry  
 Worry has been defined as “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and 
relatively uncontrollable”, and as “an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an issue 
whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes” 
(Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & Depree, 1983, p. 9). Worry typically involves RT about 
future potential threat, imagined catastrophes, uncertainties, and risks (e.g., “What if they have 
an accident?”). It is conceptualized as an attempt to avoid negative events, prepare for the worst 
and to problem solve and is linked to unconstructive outcomes including increased negative 
affect, interference with cognitive function and disruptions to physiological processes (Borkovec, 
Ray, & Stober, 1998). However, worry is also proposed to serve a number of constructive 
functions when it is objective, controllable, and brief (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994): (a) an alarm 
function that interrupts ongoing behavior and directs attention to an issue demanding immediate 
priority; (b) a prompt function, keeping an individual aware of potential unresolved threats and 
(c) a preparation function, motivating an individual to prepare for difficulties and to adopt 
adaptive behaviors that reduce potential threat. The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (see Davey, 
1993 for discussion of this and other measures; PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 
1990), assesses predisposition to worry (e.g., “I am always worrying about something”). 
Perseverative Cognition 
 Perseverative cognition has been defined as “the repeated or chronic activation of the 
cognitive representation of one or more psychological stressors” and is hypothesized to be a core 
feature of worry, rumination and other forms of RT (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006; 
Brosschot, Pieper, & Thayer, 2005; Pieper & Brosschot, 2005). Perseverative cognition is 
hypothesized to involve repeated cognitive representations of a psychological problem or crisis, 
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which acts to prolong the immediate psychological and physiological responses to such life 
events and daily stressors, such that the body’s systems associated with stress (e.g., 
cardiovascular, hypothalamic pituitary adrenal and immune systems) become chronically 
activated, leading to the development of disease (Brosschot et al., 2006; Schwartz et al., 2003).   
Cognitive and Emotional Processing 
 Cognitive processing has been defined as the process of actively thinking about a 
stressor, the thoughts and feelings it evokes and its implications for one's life and future (Bower, 
Kemeny, Taylor, & Fahey, 1998; Greenberg, 1995), thus falling within the definition of RT 
(Silver, Boone, & Stone, 1983). Cognitive processing accounts propose that RT about upsetting 
events, for example in the form of persistent intrusions about the event, is part of the process of 
attempting to resolve the discrepancy between stressful events and core beliefs and assumptions 
(Greenberg, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; Mccann, Sakheim, & Abrahamson, 1988; Mcintosh, Silver, 
& Wortman, 1993). Such accounts hypothesize that in response to a stressful experience, people 
think repetitively about their experience in order to work it through, make sense of it, and 
integrate it into their beliefs and assumptions about the world (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; 
Horowitz, 1986; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989). Similarly, RT is hypothesized to be 
a central process in the development of post-traumatic growth, defined as “the experience of 
significant positive change arising from the struggle with a major life crisis” (Calhoun, Cann, 
Tedeschi, & McMillan, 2000; see also Calhoun & Tedeschi, 1998; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). 
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) proposed that major traumatic events challenge or destroy key 
aspects of individual’s beliefs and goals, producing emotional distress, which in turn produces 
RT in order to resolve the distress, leading to personal growth.  
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Emotional processing has been defined as volitional efforts to acknowledge and 
understand the significance of one’s emotions and is operationalized as persistent focus and 
analysis of feelings (e.g., “I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling”)(Stanton et al., 2000; 
Stanton, Kirk, Cameron, & Danoff-Burg, 2000). Emotional processing has been associated with 
both constructive outcomes, such as better adjustment, and unconstructive outcomes, such as 
increased distress.  
Planning, Problem solving and Mental Simulation 
 RT can also take the form of cognitive coping strategies, such as anticipatory coping, 
planning, rehearsal and problem-solving. Problem solving has been conceptualized as involving 
several stages: definition or appraisal of the problem, generation of alternative solutions, 
selection of alternatives, implementing the chosen solution and evaluating its effectiveness 
(D'Zurilla & Goldfried, 1971), each of which could involve RT. Plan rehearsal involves 
envisioning the steps or strategies one could use to achieve a desired outcome and often involves 
repetitive mental rehearsing of future actions and situations. Similarly, mental simulation has 
been defined as the imaginative and imitative mental construction and representation of some 
event or series of events (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998; Taylor & Schneider, 1989). 
Repeated mental simulation can be an important process in planning, coping and self-regulation, 
via rehearsal of likely future events or by replaying past events (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Mental 
simulations can also take the form of “painful ruminations that plague many people suffering 
from depression or reacting to trauma” (Taylor et al., 1998, p. 431), for example, an individual 
repetitively replaying a memory of a car accident.  
Counterfactual Thinking 
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 Counterfactual thinking is the generation of imagined mental representations of 
alternative versions of the past (Roese, 1997; upward if better than what actually happened, e.g., 
“If only I had studied more, I would have done better”; downward if worse than reality, e.g., “If I 
had turned left, I would have crashed”). Repeated counterfactual thinking is often prompted by 
negative affect and in response to difficult events (Roese & Olson, 1993). Upward 
counterfactuals can have unconstructive consequences, such as exacerbating shame, guilt, 
anxiety, sadness and regret (Mandel, 2003; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1993; 
Niedenthal, Tangney, & Gavanski, 1994; Sanna, 1997), and constructive consequences, such as 
generating inferences about the causes of previous difficulties, guiding effective preparative and 
preventive behavior (Mandel & Lehman, 1996; Roese, 1997). 
Defensive Pessimism 
 Defensive pessimism is characterized by (a) setting low expectations about future 
outcomes and (b) a “thinking through” process, called reflectivity/reflection, in which 
individuals extensively reflect on and rehearse possible “worst-case scenarios” of what could go 
wrong prior to an event, and then imagine how these negative outcomes might be prevented 
(Cantor & Norem, 1989; Norem & Cantor, 1986a; Norem & Cantor, 1986b; Norem & Chang, 
2002; Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Norem & Illingworth, 2004; Spencer & Norem, 1996). 
Defensive pessimism is conceptualized as strategically serving: (a) a self-protective goal of 
preparing for possible failure and (b) a motivational goal of increasing effort to enhance the 
possibility of doing well (Sanna, 1996; Sanna, 2000; Showers, 1992; Showers & Ruben, 1990). 
Reflection 
 Reflection has been defined as chronic self-consciousness that involves playful 
exploration of novel, unique or alternative self-perceptions, motivated by curiosity and 
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pleasurable, intrinsic interest in philosophical thinking (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The 
construct of reflection developed as an attempt to explain the “self-absorption paradox”, which 
reflects the fact that private self-consciousness is positively associated with both increased self-
knowledge, assumed to facilitate psychological adjustment, but also with increased 
psychological distress and psychopathology. Noting that private self-consciousness was 
correlated with both neuroticism and openness to experience, Trapnell and Campbell (1999) 
hypothesized that the self-absorption paradox could be explained if there was a neurotically-
motivated, threat-avoidant form of chronic self-focus, labeled “rumination”, which contributes to 
psychopathology, and a contrasting form of chronic self-focus, motivated by epistemic curiosity, 
labeled “reflection”, which would be associated with increased self-knowledge. The Rumination-
Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) distinguishes between reflection 
(e.g., “I love analyzing why I do things”) and rumination, defined as RT about the self prompted 
by threats, losses, or injustices to the self. 
Mind wandering 
 Mind wandering has been defined as “a shift of attention from a primary task toward 
internal information, such as memories” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p. 946). Mind 
wandering can be persistent and repetitive, and as such fits within RT. Mind wandering has 
unconstructive consequences in terms of reduced attention to external task-related information 
and interfering with performance on tasks that require substantial controlled processing 
(Smallwood et al., 2004; Teasdale et al., 1995). However, it is hypothesized to facilitate problem 
solving by repeated working over unresolved current concerns (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). 
Post-event Rumination 
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 Post-event rumination (also called “post-event processing”, “post-mortem thinking”) has 
been defined as “repetitive thoughts about subjective experiences during a recent social 
interaction, including self-appraisals and external evaluations of partners and other details 
involving the event” (Kashdan & Roberts, 2007, p. 286). Post-event rumination is hypothesized 
to contribute to the development and maintenance of social anxiety (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997).  
Positive Rumination 
 Positive rumination has been defined as “the tendency to respond to positive affective 
states with thoughts about positive self-qualities, positive affective experience, and one’s 
favorable life circumstances that might amplify the positive affect” (Johnson, McKenzie, & 
McMurrich, in press). Positive rumination is hypothesized to be a process that may contribute to 
the dysregulation of positive affect in individuals vulnerable to mania and hypomania. The 
Responses to Positive Affect Questionnaire (RPA; Feldman, Joorman, & Johnson, in press) 
assesses how much an individual ruminates in response to positive mood (e.g.,  When you feel 
happy, excited, or enthused how often do you: "Think about how happy you feel”). 
Habitual Negative Self-Thinking 
 Habitual negative self-thinking is negative self-thinking that has become a mental habit, 
defined as having “a history of repetition, characterized by a lack of awareness and conscious 
intent, mentally efficient, and sometimes difficult to control” (Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, 
Trafimow, & Woolf, 2007). The Habit Index of Negative Thinking (HINT; Verplanken et al., 
2007) assesses the self-reported experience of the frequency, awareness, automaticity and control 
of negative thinking.   
Overview 
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From this brief summary, it is clear that RT is a process common to a number of 
important constructs in the realms of psychopathology and self-regulation, which has been 
hypothesized to have both constructive and unconstructive consequences. Throughout this 
article, I will use the construct RT as the generic label to represent the constructs reviewed 
above, in preference to other labels such as worry and rumination, because this construct is: (a) 
more inclusive than other conceptualizations, encompassing the full range of constructs reviewed 
above; (b) not wedded to a particular theoretical viewpoint, unlike, say, rumination, which is 
typically associated with RST; (c) less likely to cause confusion than other terms that already 
have multiple conceptualizations and meanings (e.g., rumination); (d) uncontaminated with prior 
assumptions as to whether it is constructive or unconstructive, unlike rumination, whose clinical 
usage typically reflects pathological processes; (e) highly correlated with measures of worry and 
rumination, which in turn are highly related to each other, suggesting the value of examining 
more generic conceptualizations of thought process (Feldman & Hayes, 2005; Fresco, Frankel, 
Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Harrington & Blankenship, 2002; Hong, 2007; Muris, 
Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; 
Verplanken et al., 2007; Watkins, 2004b; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005).  
 Studies included in the review  
A computerized search using key word terms was conducted to identify relevant 
publications for this review. The search, intended to search for studies investigating RT, included 
the following terms (using wild cards, such as ruminat* for ruminate, rumination, ruminator, 
ruminative): repetitive thought, worry, rumination, perseverative cognition, mental simulation, 
cognitive processing, emotional processing, reflection, problem solving, defensive pessimism, 
mind wandering, counterfactual entered into a number of academic databases (e.g., Web of 
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Science-Science Citation Index Extended and Social Science Citation Index, PsycINFO, 
MEDLINE) from the beginning point of each database through the middle of 2007. The Social 
Science Citation Index was also searched for references citing seminal articles (e.g., Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; 2000). In addition, reference lists of the obtained articles as well as numerous 
review articles and chapters (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1989; 1996) were reviewed for relevant 
articles.   
Studies were included in this review if they reported either constructive or unconstructive 
consequences associated with RT. Constructive consequences were defined in terms of beneficial 
and positive outcomes and products, including (but not limited to) reduced negative affect, 
increased positive affect, decreases in anxiety and depression, improved physical or mental 
health, improved performance (e.g., better academic grades and exam results), helpful cognitions 
and behaviors (e.g., generating plans, active behavioral problem solving, information seeking) 
and improved cognitive functioning (e.g., improved memory recall, better concentration), with 
unconstructive consequences defined in terms of the reverse, detrimental and negative outcomes.  
Three principal types of studies were considered: (a) cross-sectional designs in which a 
measure of RT was found to be correlated with a measure of positive or negative outcome; (b) 
prospective longitudinal designs that assessed extent of RT at an initial assessment point (T1) 
and examined whether it predicted a dependent variable (e.g., depression) at a later date (T2), 
typically controlling for the dependent variable at T1; (c) experimental designs that manipulated 
degree and/or nature of RT and measured potential consequences, and, thus could determine 
whether RT had a causal effect on the measured dependent variable. The latter two designs were 
given greater weight in the review because they demonstrate that the dependent variable is a 
consequence of RT, through indicating either a direct causal role of RT (experimental), or a 
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predictive function for RT antecedent to the dependent variable (longitudinal). Throughout, the 
review will be organized by type of study, and, where appropriate, by whether the consequences 
are main effects of RT or moderated by interactions with other factors. It is worth noting at the 
outset that the literature on the unconstructive consequences of RT is better developed than the 
literature on the constructive consequences of RT. 
Repetitive Thought with Unconstructive Consequences 
The main findings that emerge from reviewing this literature are that RT is implicated in: 
(a) vulnerability to depression; (b) vulnerability to anxiety; (c) difficulties in physical health. 
Table 1 summarizes the relevant articles, reporting the design, sample, measures and main 
findings. The section on RT and depression is the largest because of the extensive research on 
depressive rumination. 
Repetitive Thought and Vulnerability to Depression 
Cross-sectional Studies  
 In cross-sectional studies using the RSQ, depressive rumination is found to be: (a) 
elevated in currently depressed patients, formerly depressed patients, and women relative to men 
(Riso et al., 2003; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998); (b) associated with depressive symptoms in 
adults (Eshun, 2000; Ito et al., 2003; Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, & Sham, 2003; Richmond, 
Spring, Sommerfeld, & McChargue, 2001; see review by Thomsen, 2006), children (Abela, 
Vanderbilt, & Rochon, 2004; Ziegert & Kistner, 2002) and adolescents (Kuyken, Watkins, 
Holden, & Cook, 2006). Moreover, depressive rumination partially accounts for the 2:1 rates of 
depression in women relative to men: once statistically adjusted for, there is no difference 
between men and women in rates of depression (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Grant et al., 
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999). 
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Measures of forms of RT other than depressive rumination are also positively and 
significantly correlated with depression, including a general tendency towards RT (e.g., global 
rumination scale, Harrington & Blakenship, 2002; McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Segerstrom et al., 
2000, Study 1), worry (PSWQ, Meyer et al., 1990; Segerstrom et al., 2000, or self-rating, 
Borkovec et al., 1983), rumination on sadness (Conway et al., 2000), rumination as 
operationalized by Trapnell and Campbell (1999), content-independent perseverative thinking 
(Ehring, 2007) or RT measured on the Measure of Mental Anticipatory Processes (MMAP, 
Feldman & Hayes, 2005). The MMAP assesses trait disposition to respond with various forms of 
RT when faced with an “important, difficult and stressful problem”, including Stagnant 
Deliberation (e.g., “Whenever I think about the problem, I often wind up getting stuck”), 
Problem Analysis (e.g., “I think about why this problem is happening”), Plan Rehearsal (e.g., “I 
mentally visualize the steps involved in solving the problem”) and Outcome Fantasy (e.g., “I 
fantasize about it all just going away”). Both Stagnant deliberation and Outcome fantasy were 
positively correlated with worry (PSWQ), depressive rumination (RSQ) and depression 
symptoms. Likewise, mind wandering, as measured by thought sampling during a task, is 
consistently associated with self-reported dysphoria across a wide range of tasks including word 
learning (Smallwood et al., 2003; Smallwood, O'Connor, Sudberry, Haskell, & Ballantyne, 2004; 
Smallwood, O'Connor, Sudberry, & Obonsawin, 2007), sustained attention (Smallwood et al., 
2004), and word fragment completion (Smallwood, O'Connor, & Heim, 2005).   
Prospective longitudinal studies  
 Main effect of RT. Prospective longitudinal studies have found that the RSQ predicts: (a) 
the future onset of a major depressive episode across a range of follow-up periods in initially 
non-depressed individuals (Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Spasojevic & Alloy, 
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2001 using the same sample as Just & Alloy 1997, found that rumination mediated effect of 
other risk factors on onset of depression); (b) depressive symptoms across a range of follow-up 
periods in initially non-depressed individuals, after controlling for baseline symptoms (Abela, 
Brozina, & Haigh, 2002; Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Hong, 2007; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 1994; Nolen-
Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007; Sakamoto, Kambara, & Tanno, 2001; Schwartz & 
Koenig, 1996; Smith, Alloy, & Abramson, 2006); (c) depressive symptoms in patients with 
clinical depression, after controlling for baseline depression (Kuehner & Weber, 1999; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000; Rohan, Sigmon, & Dorhofer, 2003), although one non-replication should be 
noted (88 college students with recent onset major depressive episode, follow-up after 6 mths; 
reported in both Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 2001, Lara, Klein, & Kasch, 2000). 
It is worth noting one limitation of the RSQ: RSQ items are multidimensional, such that 
rumination assessed on the RSQ overlaps conceptually with a number of other constructs 
including depressive symptoms (Roberts et al., 1998; Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2003), negative affectivity-neuroticism (Kasch, Klein, & Lara, 2001; Watson & Clark, 1984), 
and cognitive reactivity (Scher, Ingram, & Segal, 2005; Segal et al., 2006; Segal, Gemar, & 
Williams, 1999; Van der Does, 2002), each of which could potentially account for RSQ 
predicting prospective depression. However, this concern is offset by convergent evidence that 
other measures of RT predict depression. First, other measures of depressive rumination predict 
future depressive mood: (a) diary studies in which participants recorded their moods and 
responses to their moods every day for at least two weeks, for both undergraduates (Nolen-
Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993) and patients with seasonal affective disorder (Young 
& Azam, 2003); (b) ratings of interview transcripts for rumination about the recent death of their 
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partner from AIDS in gay men (Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, & Larson, 1997); (c) experience 
sampling methodology in which momentary ruminative self-focus reported in response to 
randomly timed beeps on an electronic watch predicted negative affect at the subsequent 
recording point (on average 1.5 hrs later), after controlling for T1 negative affect (Moberly & 
Watkins, in press).  
 Second, forms of RT other than depressive rumination predict future levels of depression 
in prospective longitudinal studies including: (a) the Rumination to Sadness Scale in depressed 
patients with 7-month follow-up (Raes et al., 2006); (b) the Emotion Control Questionnaire-
Rehearsal subscale with 8 week follow-up (Rector & Roger, 1996); (c) Stagnant deliberation and 
Outcome fantasy scales on the MMAP predicted depression symptoms 13 weeks later in first 
year law students, after controlling for initial levels of depression (Feldman & Hayes, 2005); (d) 
habitual negative self-thinking predicted depressive symptoms 9 months later, after controlling 
for baseline depression, negative life events, and dysfunctional attitudes in 1,102 Norwegian 
citizens (Verplanken et al., 2007); (e) with a 8-month follow-up, rumination about negative 
content predicted future depression and mediated the effects of depressive rumination in 
predicting depression (Ito, Takenaka, & Agari, 2005; Ito, Takenaka, Tomita, & Agari, 2006). 
Effect of RT moderated by context. Several studies report moderating relationships 
between depressive rumination and intrapersonal variables in predicting future depression. First, 
within the Temple-Wisconsin Cognitive Vulnerability to Depression (CVD) project, in which 
undergraduates selected for high and low risk on negative cognitive style were followed up for 
2.5 years, an interaction of negative cognitive style and stress-reactive rumination significantly 
predicted the rate, number, and duration of major depressive episodes, even after controlling for 
level of depression at T1 (Just & Alloy, 1997; Robinson & Alloy, 2003; for other CVD studies 
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see; Smith et al., 2006; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001). Stress-reactive rumination assessed the 
tendency to ruminate about negative inferences following stressful events by adapting the RSQ 
(e.g., “Think about how the stressful event was all your fault”). Negative cognitive style was 
assessed by the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), which indexes 
the endorsement of maladaptive, perfectionistic beliefs about the contingencies necessary to 
demonstrate self-worth, (e.g., “If I do not do well all the time people will not respect me”) and by 
the Cognitive Style Questionnaire, which assesses attributions about the internality, stability and 
globality of events and inferences about the consequences of events for self-worth. Stress-
reactive rumination predicted future episodes of major depression in individuals with high levels 
of negative cognitive style, but not in individuals with low levels of negative cognitive style.  
Second, trait depressive rumination, self-esteem, and stressful life events interacted in 
predicting maintenance of depression over a 6-week period in mildly depressed undergraduates 
(Ciesla & Roberts, in press). Depressive rumination predicted depression at follow-up only 
among participants with both low self-esteem and a high level of stressful life events. Third, 
depressive rumination interacted with baseline depression symptoms to predict future depression 
(Nolan, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1998; Roelofs, Muris, Hulbers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2006). Moreover, 
one study found that depressive rumination interacted with stressful life events to predict future 
depression, indicating that situational context can moderate the effects of rumination (Morrison 
& O'Connor, 2005). Thus, across these studies, the unconstructive consequences of depressive 
rumination only occurred in individuals with more negative self-beliefs, more pessimistic 
attributions, more depressed mood or negative life events. 
Effect of RT moderated by thought content. Factor analyses of the RSQ have identified 
distinct subtypes of depressive rumination: Brooding versus Reflective Pondering (Treynor et al., 
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2003); Dwelling on the Negative versus Active Cognitive Appraisal (Fresco et al., 2002); 
Symptom-focused rumination versus Introspection versus Self-Blame (Roberts et al., 1998). 
Across these distinctions, the subtypes linked to more unconstructive consequences (Brooding, 
Dwelling on the Negative, Self-Blame) all share a common theme as reflected in scale items, i.e., 
negative, self-critical, evaluative (e.g., “Why can’t I handle things better?”), judgmental, and 
comparative thinking about the self (e.g., “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?”). 
The evidence is strongest for the distinction between Brooding and Reflective Pondering, which 
was found when the RSQ was factor analyzed once the items referring to symptoms of 
depression were removed. Brooding is characterized by “moody pondering” (Treynor et al., 
2003, p.251), whereas reflective pondering is characterized by items such as “Analyze recent 
events to understand why you are depressed” and was interpreted “as a purposeful turning 
inward to engage in cognitive problem solving to alleviate one’s depressive symptoms” (p. 256). 
Brooding measured at T1 predicted both increased concurrent depression and increased future 
depression assessed one year later, even after controlling for depression levels at T1, whereas 
reflective pondering measured at T1 predicted increased concurrent depression but reduced 
future depression assessed one year later (Treynor et al., 2003). In adolescents, brooding but not 
reflective pondering predicted the development of depressive symptoms over time (Burwell & 
Shirk, 2007). Furthermore, in patients with major depression, brooding but not reflective 
pondering was significantly correlated with an attentional bias towards sad facial expressions 
relative to neutral facial expressions, as assessed on a facial dot-probe task, after controlling for 
level of depressive symptoms (Joormann, Dkane, & Gotlib, 2006). These results suggest that 
thought valence and content during RT may moderate its consequences, with the negative, self-
critical thinking typical of brooding more maladaptive. 
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Limitations. A general limitation of these longitudinal prospective studies is that many 
studies have not factored prior episodes of the relevant disorder (e.g., prior major depression, as 
opposed to depressive symptoms) into the analyses. As such, the possibility that past major 
depressive episodes is a common factor linking RT and prospective depression cannot be ruled 
out. For example, if RT is the result of “scarring” from a previous episode then this relationship 
could explain why RT is associated with increased risk for future depression. 
Experimental studies 
 Main effect of RT. Studies that experimentally manipulated RT in the form of worry, by 
asking participants to briefly worry about a self-chosen concern, found that worry increases 
depressed mood in normal participants (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Behar, Zuellig, & 
Borkovec, 2005; Borkovec et al., 1983; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; see review in 
Borkovec et al., 1998) and produces a short-term increase in negative intrusive thoughts, relative 
to relaxation or visual imagery or no instruction conditions (Borkovec et al., 1983; Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 1995; York, Borkovec, Vasey, & Stern, 1987). Experimental studies have also 
demonstrated that trait predisposition towards RT increases emotional reactivity to negative 
mood inductions and mood challenges, particularly when participants are provided with a delay 
period that allows the opportunity to ruminate (Conway et al., 2000; Thomsen, Jorgensen, 
Mehlsen, & Zachariae, 2004). 
Effect of RT moderated by intrapersonal context. Moreover, a series of studies provide 
convergent evidence that RT in the form of depressive rumination plays a causal role in a range 
of unconstructive outcomes associated with depression, including exacerbating negative affect 
and increasing negative cognition (for further details see Table 1). These studies used a 
standardized rumination induction, in which participants are instructed to spend 8 minutes 
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concentrating on a series of sentences that involve rumination about themselves, their current 
feelings and physical state and the causes and consequences of their feelings (e.g., “Think about 
the way you feel inside”; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993). As a control condition, a distraction induction is typically used, in which participants are 
instructed to spend 8 minutes concentrating on a series of sentences that involve imagining visual 
scenes that are unrelated to the self or to current feelings (e.g., “Think about a fire darting round 
a log in a fire place”).  
 Compared to the distraction induction, the rumination induction is reliably found to have 
negative consequences on mood and cognition. Critically the differential effects of these 
manipulations are only found when participants are already in a dysphoric mood before the 
manipulations, indicating a moderating role for intrapersonal context. Under these conditions, 
compared to distraction, rumination exacerbates negative mood (Lavender & Watkins, 2004; 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), increases negative thinking (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), increases negative autobiographical memory recall (Lyubomirsky, 
Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998), reduces the specificity of autobiographical memory 
retrieval (Kao, Dritschel, & Astell, 2006; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2004; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000, see Williams et al., 2007 for discussion), 
increases negative thinking about the future (Lavender & Watkins, 2004), impairs concentration 
and central executive functioning (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003; Watkins & Brown, 
2002), impairs controlled memory retrieval (Hertel, 1998) and impairs social problem solving 
(Donaldson & Lam, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, 
Caldwell, & Berg, 1999). Likewise, when they ruminated after a negative mood induction, 
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dysphoric individuals recalled more negative memories, whereas non-dysphoric individuals 
recalled more positive memories (Joormann & Siemer, 2004). This pattern of results has been 
found for both dysphoric, non-clinical participants and for depressed patients (e.g., Donaldson & 
Lam, 2005; Lavender & Watkins, 2004; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2004; Rimes & Watkins, 
2004; Watkins & Brown, 2002; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), suggesting that the effects 
generalize to clinical samples. 
 Extending the role of intrapersonal context, Ciesla and Roberts (in press) found that the 
effect of trait predisposition towards depressive rumination (RSQ) on subsequent emotional 
response was moderated by dysfunctional attitudes and self-esteem, such that following a 
negative mood induction, higher levels of trait rumination were associated with higher levels of 
dysphoric affect after an 8-minute no-task delay period in participants with low self-esteem or 
high dysfunctional attitudes but not in participants with high self-esteem or low dysfunctional 
attitudes. Moreover, self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes interacted with the rumination 
versus distraction manipulations after a sad mood induction to predict later levels of dysphoria, 
such that individuals with lower self-esteem and more dysfunctional attitudes had elevated 
dysphoric mood, with this effect stronger in the rumination condition than in the distraction 
condition (Ciesla & Roberts, in press).  
 Markman and Miller (2006) further extended the moderating effect of level of depression 
on the consequences of RT to forms of RT other than depressive rumination. A sample of 
students with a range of depressive symptoms (non-depressed, ND; mild-to-moderately 
depressed, MD; severely depressed, SD) generated upward counterfactuals about a recent 
negative academic outcome (Markman & Miller, 2006). There was a greater reduction in 
negative evaluation of the event following RT for the ND and MD participants than for the SD 
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participants. Further, MD participants generated a greater proportion of counterfactuals focusing 
on specific controllable behaviors relative to uncontrollable, enduring qualities of the self than 
the ND and SD participants. In turn, the SD participants generated more counterfactuals 
involving characterological self-blame than the ND and MD participants. Thus, RT was 
unconstructive in the SD group but constructive in the MD depressed group. 
 Effect of RT moderated by concrete vs. abstract processing during RT. The effect of trait 
predisposition towards RT on emotional reactivity is moderated by the thinking style adopted by 
participants. Increasing trait predisposition towards RT (as assessed on the Action Control Scale-
Preoccupation, Kuhl, 1994, sample item “When I am in a competition and have lost every time, 
the thought that I lost keeps running through my mind”) was correlated with slower emotional 
recovery following a prior failure experience (Watkins, 2004a) and greater emotional reactivity 
to a subsequent failure experience (Moberly & Watkins, 2006), but only in participants 
manipulated into adopting an abstract, evaluative mindset focused on the causes, meanings, and 
implications of events. Watkins (2004a) randomly allocated participants to expressive writing 
about a previously induced failure in either an abstract, evaluative way (e.g., “Why did you feel 
this way?”) or a concrete, experiential way (e.g., “How did you feel moment-by-moment?”). At 
higher levels of preoccupation, levels of negative mood 12 hours after the failure were greater, 
but only in individuals who wrote in the abstract, evaluative way, and not in individuals who 
wrote in the more concrete, experiential way. Moberly and Watkins (2006) trained participants to 
repetitively think about emotional scenarios, either imagining the concrete details of what is 
happening in each scenario or evaluating the causes, meanings and implications of each scenario, 
prior to an unanticipated failure experience. After the failure experience, higher levels of trait 
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preoccupation were significantly correlated with lower levels of positive affect, but only for 
participants in the evaluative condition and not for participants in the concrete condition. 
 Limitations. A limitation of many experimental studies comparing rumination vs. 
distraction is the lack of a no-intervention control making it impossible to determine whether the 
distinct consequences are due to active negative effects of rumination and/or active positive 
effects of distraction. However, selecting an appropriate control condition is difficult in 
dysphoric participants: a passive control condition that involves “doing nothing” may simply 
allow naturally occurring rumination to continue (e.g., Hertel, 1998), whereas any active control 
condition may act as a distraction. Nonetheless, a number of other experimental manipulations of 
RT, for example of worry, also included a no-intervention control and replicated the finding that 
RT increased depression, consistent with RT having an active detrimental effect.  
Summary of RT and vulnerability to depression 
This review reveals that there is an extensive body of findings suggesting that RT is 
involved in the onset and maintenance of depression, with both depressive rumination and a 
range of other types of RT predicting future depression in longitudinal prospective studies, and 
increasing negative affect when experimentally induced. Thus, there is convergent evidence 
across numerous studies utilizing different populations, different measures (RSQ, interview, self-
report), different study designs, and different forms of RT, all of which are consistent with the 
hypothesis that RT is a process underpinning the onset and development of depression.  
Repetitive Thought and Vulnerability to Anxiety 
Cross-sectional studies 
 In non-clinical samples, RT is significantly and positively correlated with increased 
levels of concurrent trait and state anxiety, whether assessed as worry (e.g., Davey, Hampton, 
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Farrell, & Davidson, 1992; Meyer et al., 1990; Siddique, LaSalle-Ricci, Glass, Arnkoff, & Diaz, 
2006), stagnant deliberation, outcome fantasy, problem analysis (Feldman & Hayes, 2005), 
global rumination (Harrington & Blakenship, 2002), rumination about a traumatic event (Steil & 
Ehlers, 2000), or emotional processing (Stanton et al., 2000).  
 Moreover, RT is a key element of a number of anxiety disorders (Chelminski & 
Zimmerman, 2003; Harvey et al., 2004): generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), social anxiety, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Chronic worry is a central and defining characteristic of 
GAD (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Hoyer, Becker, & Margraf, 2002). Within social 
anxiety, post-event rumination has been identified as an important process: Compared to low-
anxious controls, individuals with high social anxiety and patients with a diagnosis of social 
anxiety demonstrate significantly more post-event RT following social interactions, performing 
mental “post-mortems” on how the interaction went and how they performed (Abbott & Rapee, 
2004; Edwards, Rapee, & Franklin, 2003; Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett, 2005; Mellings & 
Alden, 2000; Perini, Abbott, & Rapee, 2006; Rachman, Gruter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997).  
 RT has also been implicated as an important process in the development of PTSD. Ehlers 
and colleagues have conceptualized RT about a traumatic event as a causal mechanism in the 
development of PTSD. Using brief self-report measures of RT about an identified traumatic 
event (e.g., “Do you go over and over what happened again and again?”), they have found RT to 
be elevated in patients with PTSD compared to non-clinical controls (e.g., Ehlers, Mayou & 
Bryant, 1998). Likewise, in survivors of physical assault, the frequency of counterfactual 
thoughts was positively correlated with PTSD symptoms such as intrusions about the negative 
event (El Leithy, Brown, & Robbins, 2006), and for women who had experienced recurrent 
Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought 26 
miscarriage, upward counterfactual thinking was positively correlated with anxiety (Callander & 
Brown, 2007). Similarly, counterfactual thinking following uncontrollable and traumatic events, 
such as sudden infant death, is associated with a greater level of distress (Davis, Lehman, 
Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995). 
Prospective longitudinal studies 
 In non-clinical samples, RT has been found to predict: (a) elevated levels of self-reported 
anxiety in undergraduates following their midterm exams, after controlling for baseline anxiety 
(Sarin, Abela, & Auerbach, 2005; Segerstrom et al., 2000); (b) prospective increases in anxiety 
for law students before and after their first semester final exams (Siddique et al., 2006); (c) 
prospective increases in anxiety over 1 month (Hong, 2007), over 6-8 weeks (Calmes & Roberts, 
2007), and over 9 months (Verplanken et al., 2007); (d) the onset and severity of post-traumatic 
stress symptoms following traumatic events such as the Lomo Prieta earthquake of 1989 (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Furthermore, following traumatic events, RT about the trauma 
predicts the persistence of PTSD in prospective longitudinal studies from 6 months to 3 years 
later, for road accidents (Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 2003; 
Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001; Mayou, Bryant, & Ehlers, 2001; Mayou, Ehlers, & Bryant, 
2002; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002), assaults (Halligan, Michael, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; 
Michael, Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005), and in ambulance workers (Clohessy & Ehlers, 
1999).  
Experimental studies 
Main effects of RT. In experimental studies, RT has been found to increase anxiety, 
whether the RT consists of brief periods of worry about self-chosen concerns (Andrews & 
Borkovec, 1988; Borkovec et al., 1983; Behar et al., 2005; McLaughlin et al., 2007), or a 
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rumination manipulation that exacerbates pre-existing anxious mood (Blagden & Craske, 1996). 
When university students were asked to describe a distressing event that occurred in the last 2 
years and then randomly allocated to rumination (prompts like “Why has this event happened to 
me?”) or distraction (a word generation task), rumination resulted in a greater increase in 
negative affect and higher levels of intrusive memories than distraction (Ehring, Szeimies, & 
Schaffrick, 2007), suggesting a potential causal role for rumination in the development of post-
traumatic symptoms. 
Effect of RT moderated by interpersonal and situational context. Kashdan and Roberts 
(2007) found that there was an interactive effect of intrapersonal and situational context on the 
consequences of post-event rumination for next-day negative affect following a social situation. 
Unacquainted undergraduates engaged in 45 min interactions with randomly paired opposite-sex 
partners, working through questions structured to induce either personal self-disclosure (e.g., 
“What is your most treasured memory?”) or to mimic small-talk (“What is the best TV show 
you’ve seen?”). For individuals with higher levels of trait social anxiety, post-event rumination 
for the 24 hrs post-event was associated with increases in negative affect following personal 
disclosure, but associated with decreases in negative affect following small-talk (Kashdan & 
Roberts, 2007). There was no interaction between rumination and situation in predicting negative 
affect for individuals with lower levels of social anxiety. Thus, in a situational context that was 
more personally revealing, and, presumably, more meaningful and threatening for individuals 
high in social anxiety, post-event rumination had more negative consequences. 
Effect of RT moderated by concrete vs. abstract processing during RT.  In an analogue 
study of post-traumatic stress symptoms, undergraduates watched a distressing film showing the 
aftermath of motor vehicle accidents, known to induce negative affect and intrusions, and were 
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then randomly allocated to abstract rumination, concrete rumination or distraction (Ehring et al., 
2007). Across time, abstract rumination resulted in slower recovery of negative affect than 
concrete rumination or distraction. Moreover, concrete rumination resulted in fewer negative 
intrusions than abstract rumination and distraction, which did not differ from each other. Thus, 
these results suggest that abstract rumination may be particularly unconstructive following 
exposure to a distressing event. 
Repetitive Thought and Impaired Physical Health 
Consistent with the perseverative cognition hypothesis (Brosschot et al., 2006), RT 
correlates with indices of poor physical health and prospectively predicts health-related 
outcomes.  
Cross-sectional studies 
First, RT is associated with increases in cortisol secretion, which is an index of activation 
of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis, whether assessed as worry (Schlotz, Hellhammer, 
Schulz, & Stone, 2004) or Rehearsal (Roger & Najarian, 1998). Second, high trait worry is 
associated with suppression of the expected increase in natural killer immune cells when 
experimentally exposed to a fearful situation (Segerstrom, Glover, Craske, & Fahey, 1999) and 
with reduced natural killer immune cells in response to a naturally-occurring trauma 
(Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998). Third, RT is associated with dysregulated 
cardiovascular function: worry is associated with reduced heart rate variability and increased 
heart rate (Borkovec & Hu, 1990; Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; Brosschot & 
Thayer, 2003; Lyonfields, Borkovec, & Thayer, 1995); RT (Rehearsal) is associated with 
delayed heart rate recovery following a challenging task (Roger & Jamieson, 1988; Roger & 
Najarian, 1989). Reduced heart rate variability is an index of parasympathetic activity and a risk 
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factor for increased mortality, specifically associated with hypertension and cardiovascular 
disorders (Stein & Kleiger, 1999). Fourth, high levels of depressive rumination are associated 
with delay in presenting the symptoms of breast cancer to a healthcare professional 
(Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang, & Chung, 2006) and RT is associated with more physical 
symptoms in women undergoing a breast cancer prevention trial (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & 
Shortridge, 2003). Fifth, RT has also been implicated in the development of insomnia (Gross & 
Borkovec, 1982; Harvey, 2000; Nelson & Harvey, 2002). Insomnia is associated with increased 
pre-sleep worry (Harvey, 2000), and RT is associated with poorer sleep quality and longer time 
to fall asleep (Thomsen, Mehsen, Christensen, & Zachariae, 2003). 
Prospective longitudinal studies 
 Increased RT prospectively predicts: (a) increased heart disease over a 20 year follow-up 
doubling the risk for high worriers compared to low worriers (Kubzansky et al., 1997); (b) 
increased somatic health complaints in high school students, with the use of a controlled worry 
period reducing subsequent somatic complaints (Brosschot & van der Doef, 2006); (c) higher 
levels of fatigue over a 10 month follow-up (Andrea et al., 2004); (d) slower recovery and 
impaired wound healing following surgery for hernias (Broadbent, Petrie, Alley, & Booth, 
2003); (e) fewer natural killer (NK) cells in the months after the Northridge earthquake 
(Segerstrom et al., 1998); (f) slower clearing of psoriasis in response to psoralen-UV-A (PUVA) 
photochemotherapy (Fortune et al., 2003); (g) reduced functional status and reduced grip 
strength 1 year after the diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis (Evers, Kraaimaat, Geenen, & Bijlsma, 
1998); and (h) self-reported physical health problems 1 year later in 20-35 year olds and 
increased health care utilization over the subsequent year in 70-85 year olds (Thomsen et al., 
2004b; Thomsen et al., 2004a).  
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Experimental studies  
 Consistent with the hypothesis that RT plays a causal role in poor physical health, 
experimental manipulations of RT have been shown to influence health-related indices. First, 
experimental induction of rumination about a previous emotionally stressful task results in 
increased blood pressure (BP) and delayed recovery of BP whereas distraction facilitates BP 
recovery (Glynn, Christenfeld, & Gerin, 2002). Second, trait anger rumination predicts 
prolonged elevated BP after recalling an angry event (Schwartz et al., 2000) or after an anger 
provocation (Suchday, Carter, Ewart, Larkin, & Desiderato, 2004). High sustained BP is a risk 
factor for many diseases including cardiovascular disease and diabetes. Third, compared to 
distraction, ruminating about a mid-session exam resulted in more pre-sleep intrusive thoughts 
and poorer ratings of sleep quality for high-trait ruminators but not for low-trait ruminators 
(Guastella & Moulds, 2007). Fourth, Nelson and Harvey (2002) gave patients with insomnia a 
speech threat just prior to bedtime. Thinking about giving the speech in images produced more 
initial distress and self-reported arousal but shorter sleep onset latency than worrying about the 
speech verbally. 
Repetitive Thought with Constructive Consequences 
There is also a growing literature indicating how RT can be adaptive, functional and 
beneficial, although, as noted earlier, the constructive consequences of RT have been less 
investigated than the unconstructive consequences of RT. The relevant studies are summarized in 
Table 2. The main emergent findings are that RT is implicated in: (a) successful cognitive 
processing and recovery from upsetting and traumatic events; (b) adaptive preparation and 
planning for the future; (c) recovery from depression; and (d) uptake of health-promoting 
behaviors. 
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Repetitive Thought and Successful Cognitive Processing of Stress, Loss and Trauma 
Cross-sectional studies 
Main effects of RT. A number of studies have found that following stressful or traumatic events, 
RT in the form of cognitive processing is associated with acceptance and recovery. People who actively 
think about the trauma and its implications are more likely to find meaning or experience growth than 
people who do not dwell on the trauma (Bower et al., 1998; Calhoun et al., 2000; Tedeschi & Calhoun, 
2004; Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 2002). Extent of RT after a traumatic or stressful event was positively 
associated with more post-traumatic growth, as indexed by self-reported increases in relating to others, 
discovering new possibilities, discovering personal strength, and increased appreciation of life (Calhoun 
et al., 2000). For example, RT immediately after a child’s death was associated with posttraumatic growth 
in bereaved parents, whereas more recent RT was not, and, in older adults, growth attributed to the 
struggle with their most stressful events was associated with frequency of rumination across all traumatic 
events (Calhoun, Tedeschi, Fulmer & Harlan, 2000 and Tedeschi, Calhoun & Cooper, 2000, both cited in 
Tedeschi et al., 2004). Similarly, RT, defined as recurrent event-related thoughts that help one understand, 
resolve and make sense of trauma-related events, was correlated with competency beliefs about ability to 
handle problems arising from the trauma in children evacuated because of Hurricane Floyd (Cryder, 
Kilmer, Tedeschi, & Calhoun, 2006).  
Effects of RT moderated by thought content. Segerstrom and colleagues (2003) examined 
the nature of RT and its role in adjustment in women who were exposed to a stressful situation 
through being identified as being at high risk for breast cancer. In previous undergraduate 
studies, (Segerstrom et al.,  2003, studies 1 and 2), multidimensional scaling across large samples 
of structured measures of ruminative thinking and sampled thoughts concerning rumination had 
revealed that RT could be described on 2 independent structural dimensions: valence of content 
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(negative versus positive) and purpose. As thought content became more negative, affect was 
rated as more negative. The purpose dimension reflected the goals motivating rumination, with 
two extremes of purpose: searching for new ideas and experiences versus solving problems and 
improving certainty and predictability. Solving was defined as “trying to narrow down, to make 
sure, to make plans or to declare knowledge” (p. 24). Examples included causal statements, 
summary statements, statements of definite consequences, and planning. Searching was defined 
as “exploring, considering possibilities, or expressing confusion”. Examples included 
expressions of uncertainty, generating options, indecision or confusion, listing multiple 
possibilities, and learning new perspectives or ways. In the breast cancer study, the valence of 
thought content during RT predicted concurrent affect and well-being: less negative content 
during RT was associated with less negative affect, more positive affect, better overall mental 
health, less anxiety, and fewer physical symptoms (Segerstrom et al., 2003). Furthermore, there 
were also interactions between valence and purpose on affect and ratings of physical health: 
when the valence of RT content was positive, a searching purpose was associated with decreased 
positive affect and decreased ratings of physical health, but when the valence of thought content 
was negative, a searching purpose was associated with increased positive affect and increased 
ratings of physical health. This pattern of results suggests that during RT about negative content, 
RT with a searching, exploring purpose is associated with more constructive outcomes than RT 
with a solving, making sure purpose. 
Prospective longitudinal studies 
In a prospective study examining outcomes for HIV-seropositive men who had 
experienced an AIDS-related bereavement, RT about the bereavement was associated with 
finding more meaning in the loss over the next 2-3 years, which in turn was associated with 
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better immune responses and reduced AIDs-related mortality over a 7 year follow-up (Bower 
et al., 1998). Finding meaning was operationalized as a major shift in values, priorities or 
perspectives in response to the loss. RT about bereavement was a necessary although not a 
sufficient condition for discovery of meaning and improved physical health. Discovery of 
meaning included developing new personal growth goals, an enhanced sense of living in the 
present and the development of new perspectives, such as life is precious, which is consistent 
with the concept of “finding benefit”. Finding benefit is defined as considering positive 
meanings of the traumatic event and positive benefits or value learnt as a result of the event, 
and is increasingly hypothesized to be an important contributor to successful cognitive 
processing of upsetting events (Affleck & Tennen, 1996; King & Miner, 2000; Moskowitz, 
Folkman, Collette, & Vittinghoff, 1996). There is growing evidence from prospective 
longitudinal studies that finding benefit predicts better future psychological adjustment and 
more adaptive responses to negative life events than simply trying to understand and make 
sense of the event (Davis, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Larson, 1998; Stein, Folkman, Trabasso, & 
Richards, 1997; Taylor, Wood, & Lichtman, 1983; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Tugade, 
Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004).   
Experimental studies 
Experimental studies of expressive writing, in which repeated writing about distressing events is 
found to have more beneficial consequences for psychological and physical health than repeated writing 
about a neutral event, provide broad evidence consistent with a constructive effect for (at least a 
constrained form of) RT following distress (Foa, Molnar, & Cashman, 1995; Klein & Boals, 2001; 
Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker, Mayne, & Francis, 1997; Pennebaker & Seagal, 1999; Sloan & Marx, 
2004; Smyth, True, & Souto, 2001). For example, when undergraduates completed journals for one 
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month, those who wrote about cognitions and emotions related to a stressful event had a greater increase 
in self-reported post-traumatic growth than those who wrote only about emotions related to a stressful 
event or who wrote factually about media events (Ullrich & Lutgendorf, 2002). As described earlier, 
Ehring et al., (2007) found experimental evidence that concrete RT about a distressing film resulted in 
fewer intrusions about the film compared to abstract RT or distraction.  
Limitations 
It is important to acknowledge that this cognitive processing and posttraumatic growth 
literature has two major limitations: (a) the majority of studies are only cross-sectional; (b) the 
principal outcome measures are self-report, leading to questions as to whether reported 
benefits can be taken at face value or reflect inaccurate, biased or defensive perceptions 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 2004; Zoellner & Maercker, 2006). 
Repetitive Thought Contributes to Adaptive Preparation and Anticipatory Planning 
There is convergent evidence that RT contributes to anticipatory planning and adaptive 
self-regulation, consistent with the hypothesis that RT can facilitate preparatory and adaptive 
behaviors designed to reduce potential threats (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994).  
Cross-sectional studies 
RT is associated with better academic and workplace performance, and correlated with 
constructive problem-solving and creativity. First, worry is associated with better workplace 
performance but only for more able individuals (Perkins & Corr, 2005). Second, after controlling 
for trait anxiety, worry is correlated with increased report of active behavioral problem-solving 
and seeking more information in response to a recent stressful event (Davey et al., 1992). Third, 
diary measures indicate that a large proportion of worry reflects problem-solving attempts, which 
are often successful (Szabo & Lovibond, 2004; Szabo & Lovibond, 2006). Fourth, for survivors 
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of physical assault, upward counterfactual fluency, assessed in terms of the number of different 
upward counterfactual thoughts generated about the trauma, was correlated with the generation 
of behavioral plans (El Leithy et al., 2006). Fifth, reflectivity, operationalized as the number of 
themes and ideas produced when generating actions, outcomes and consequences for coping 
plans to hypothetical but common problem situations, is positively correlated with better 
subsequent academic performance for individuals who preferentially use the defensive 
pessimism strategy but negatively correlated with academic performance for individuals who 
preferentially use an optimistic strategy, characterized by high expectations and little reflection 
prior to a task (Cantor, Norem, Niedenthal, Langston, & Brower, 1987). Sixth, the reflective 
pondering subscale from the RSQ is significantly positively correlated with self-rated creative 
interests and objectively measured creative fluency, originality and elaboration (Verhaeghen, 
Joormann, & Khan, 2005). Unfortunately, brooding was not assessed so it is not known whether 
the relationship between RT and creativity is unique to reflective pondering or not.  
Prospective longitudinal studies 
 After controlling for trait anxiety, worry prospectively predicts better academic 
performance during the first year of law school (Siddique et al., 2006). Upward counterfactuals 
have also been found to produce useful intentions for future behavior and predict better 
subsequent performance on anagram tasks and academic courses (Nasco & Marsh, 1999; Roese, 
1994; Spellman & Mandel, 1999). 
Experimental studies 
 Effect of RT moderated by thought content and intrapersonal context. On a laboratory 
arithmetic task, during a lab-based social interaction, or when pursuing their personal goals 
during an experience sampling methodology study, defensive pessimists performed better (e.g., 
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more arithmetic solutions, talking for longer, more positive ratings by other participant in 
conversation) and experienced less negative affect and more positive self-relevant thoughts when 
manipulated to repetitively focus on possible negative outcomes, compared to no reflection or to 
focus on positive outcomes (Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Showers, 1992). In contrast, there was 
little effect on performance of manipulating reflection in optimists. Similarly, defensive 
pessimists performed best on a dart-throwing task when they imagined what could go wrong and 
ways to correct these problems and performed significantly worse when they engaged in 
relaxation imagery or imagined a flawless performance (Spencer & Norem, 1996). Thus RT on 
negative outcomes was constructive for defensive pessimists but not for optimists. 
Effect of RT moderated by concrete vs. abstract processing during RT. There is evidence 
that the focus of attention during repetitive mental simulations influences the effectiveness of 
planning and self-regulation (Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin & Armor, 1998). 
For example, students who repeatedly imagined the process of how to take steps towards 
obtaining a high exam grade studied more and obtained better grades than students who 
repeatedly imagined the outcome of obtaining a high grade or students who simply monitored 
their studying with no mental simulation (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Taylor et al., 1998). This effect 
of process simulation versus outcome simulation on exam performance was mediated by a 
reduction in anxiety and by increases in planning. Similarly, repeated imagining of an ongoing 
stressful event, how it happened and its associated emotions produced more positive affect and 
greater report of active coping after one week than imagining having resolved the situation or not 
imagining the event at all (Rivkin & Taylor, 1999). Likewise, process simulations help to reduce 
the planning fallacy, in which participants tend to underestimate the time taken to complete tasks 
(Taylor et al., 1998). Similarly, prompting RT focused on causal attributions and abstract 
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evaluations (using a set of questions such as “Why did this problem happen?”) impaired social 
problem solving in a recovered depressed group, who performed as well as never-depressed 
participants in a no-prompt control condition, whereas prompting RT focused on the concrete 
process of how to proceed (using a set of questions such as “How are you deciding what to do 
next?”) ameliorated the problem-solving deficit normally found in a group of currently depressed 
patients (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). Again, RT focused on planning, induced by working 
through a list of the concrete (who, what) steps necessary to plan a charity fundraiser resulted in 
less dysphoric mood, better concentration and more efficient performance on a subsequent 
reading task than the standard rumination manipulation in dysphoric participants (Lyubomirsky 
et al., 2003, Study 1).  
Repetitive Thought Predicts Recovery from Depression 
Prospective longitudinal studies 
Main effect of RT.  RT prospectively predicts reduced levels of depression, whether in: 
(a) currently depressed patients receiving pharmacotherapy (Yamada, Nagayama, Tsutiyama, 
Kitamura, & Furukawa, 2003, RT = rating of extent "absorbed in thought about the dysphoric 
mood itself, its cause, and possible results when feeling down or depressed"); (b) a community 
sample (Treynor et al., 2003, reflective pondering on RSQ); (c) first year law students (Feldman 
& Hayes, 2005; Plan Rehearsal).  
Effect of RT moderated by intrapersonal context. Depressive rumination interacted with 
self-esteem and dysfunctional attitudes in predicting response in patients with major or minor 
depression to a group psychoeducational treatment for depression (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002). In 
participants with low self-esteem or high dysfunctional attitudes, increased trait rumination was 
associated with worse treatment outcomes, whereas for participants with moderate levels of self-
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esteem or low levels of dysfunctional attitudes, increased trait rumination predicted lower levels 
of depression symptoms post-treatment, even when controlling for symptoms pre-treatment.  
Experimental studies 
Effect of RT moderated by concrete vs. abstract processing during RT. There is evidence 
from experimental studies suggesting that RT can have constructive consequences on aspects of 
cognition implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. A series of studies have 
adapted the standardized rumination induction (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Importantly, 
all variants retain the key elements of the original rumination manipulation, namely, repetitive 
focus on self, symptoms and mood, but with instructions to adopt different styles of processing 
when focusing on the self. Thus, in depressed patients, a rumination induction encouraging more 
concrete, experiential processing, in which participants were instructed to “focus attention on the 
experience of” feelings, mood and symptoms, was compared to a rumination induction 
encouraging more abstract and evaluative processing, in which participants were instructed to 
“think about the causes, meanings, and consequences” of feelings, mood, and symptoms 
(Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; 2004). Compared to abstract, evaluative rumination, experiential 
rumination reduced negative global self-judgments such as “I am worthless” (Rimes & Watkins, 
2005), improved social problem solving (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a), and increased specificity 
of autobiographical memory recall (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). 
These cognitive processes are implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression (Williams 
et al., 2007). These findings suggest that RT focused on the direct experience of moods and 
feelings reduces patterns of cognitive processing implicated in increased vulnerability for 
depression, relative to RT focused on the causes, meanings and consequences of moods and 
feelings. It is important to note that both variants of rumination involve focus on negative 
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content: both repetitively focused attention on the feelings and symptoms of patients with current 
depression
1
.  
Repetitive Thought Contributes to the Uptake of Health-Promoting Behaviors 
There is some preliminary evidence that RT is implicated in health-promoting behaviors. 
First, increased worry about physical health predicted prospective attempts to quit smoking in 
smokers over the following 8 months (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 2003). High worry was especially 
associated with a quit attempt in smokers with both high self-efficacy and beliefs that denied or 
rationalized away the risks associated with smoking. However, in ex-smokers with low self-
efficacy and high denial beliefs, worry predicted a relapse back into smoking. Second, in a meta-
analysis of 12 prospective studies that measured worry about breast cancer at baseline and 
subsequent breast self-examination or utilization of mammography, a small but reliable positive 
association was found between worry about breast cancer and screening behavior, with increased 
worry associated with greater probability of undertaking screening (Hay, McCaul, & Magnan, 
2006). 
Properties of Constructive and Unconstructive Repetitive Thought  
Reviewing the extant literature, it therefore appears that RT can be both helpful and 
unhelpful. It is important to acknowledge that sometimes RT has predominantly either 
constructive or unconstructive outcomes, but that at other times RT may simultaneously have 
both constructive and unconstructive outcomes, for example, posttraumatic growth can occur 
alongside increased distress (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). What then determines whether RT has 
constructive consequences and/or unconstructive consequences? Examining the literature 
reviewed, a number of properties emerge that potentially account for the distinct consequences of 
RT. These properties reflect both structural aspects of RT, such as the valence of thought content 
Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought 40 
during RT, and process aspects, such as the level of construal (concrete vs. abstract processing) 
adopted during RT
2
.  
Valence 
Unsurprisingly, valence is important in determining the consequences of RT, both in 
terms of thought content (positive versus negative) and the cognitive-affective systems of the 
individual engaged in RT (e.g., positive versus negative mood; optimism versus pessimism). For 
example, RT about the acceptance of a paper that has had much work invested in it will have a 
very different and more positive affective quality than RT about the same paper if it was 
rejected. 
There is considerable evidence that the valence of thought content is a major factor in 
determining whether RT is helpful or unhelpful. First, Segerstrom et al’s (2003) structural 
analysis of RT identified the valence of thought content as an important dimension within RT, 
with more negative content associated with worse overall mental health, more anxiety, and more 
physical symptoms. Second, Martin and Tesser (1996) identified that rumination contains several 
subclasses or modes, including RT about positive content or about negative content. Third, in a 
large meta-analysis of the self-focus literature, attention to negative aspects of the self was 
strongly related to increased levels of negative affect, whereas attention to positive aspects of the 
self was related to lower levels of negative affect (Mor & Winquist, 2002). Moreover, depressive 
rumination was more strongly related to negative affect than nonruminative self-focus. Thus, RT 
focused on negative aspects of the self would have more negative consequences than RT focused 
on positive aspects of the self. Fourth, depressive rumination, the form of RT most convincingly 
implicated in causing unconstructive consequences, is conceptualized in terms of response to 
negative mood, and indexed by a measure (RSQ) that explicitly involves focuses on negative 
Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought 41 
content, with items characterized by thinking about feelings and symptoms when feeling sad, 
down and depressed. 
Fifth, the result that “finding benefit” during RT has more constructive consequences 
(e.g., Bower et al., 1998) is consistent with the valence of thought content influencing outcomes: 
finding benefit involves a focus on positive content when repetitively thinking about the difficult 
or traumatic event. Consistent with this, the measure of RT used in the posttraumatic growth 
literature includes items that focus on positive gains (e.g., “I try to think of some good things that 
happened to me after the flooding”; Calhoun et al., 2000; Cryder et al., 2006). Sixth, the more 
pathological consequences found for Brooding could be a result of its particularly negative 
thought content, focused on self-evaluative analysis and self-critical judgment (Treynor et al., 
2003). A number of commentators have suggested that brooding is characterized by self-
evaluative, self-critical and self-judgmental analysis, consistent with more negative valence 
(Gortner, Rude, & Pennebaker, 2006; Joormann et al., 2006; Mathews, 2006; Treynor et al., 
2003; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Seventh, when the items of the 
RSQ were altered to de-emphasize evaluative, self-critical judgments, this non-judging 
Reflection scale was uncorrelated with depression symptoms, unlike the standard Reflection 
scale which was significantly correlated with depression. Thus, changing the negative 
judgmental quality of these items reduced their relationship to depression (Rude, Maestas, & 
Neff, 2007). Eighth, whilst rumination about negative content predicted depression in an 8-
month longitudinal study, rumination about depression was no longer a significant predictor of 
depression after controlling for negative rumination (Ito et al., 2006). Thus, the effects of 
rumination appear to depend upon whether it is focused on negative or non-negative content.   
Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought 42 
Ninth, the consequences of problem solving are known to depend on the valence of the 
problem orientation adopted. A positive orientation encompassing confidence in one’s ability to 
solve the problem is associated with better outcomes than a negative orientation characterized by 
reduced self-confidence, reduced optimism and more extreme views of the severity and 
intractability of the problem (Belzer, D'Zurilla, & Maydeu-Olivares, 2002; D'Zurilla, Chang, 
Nottingham, & Faccini, 1998; D'Zurilla & Nezu, 1990; D'Zurilla & Nezu, 1999; Elliott, Sherwin, 
Harkins, & Marmarosh, 1995; Maydeu-Olivares & D'Zurilla, 1996; Shewchuk, Johnson, & 
Elliott, 2000). Thus, the valence of thought content during RT appears to be a key determinant of 
whether RT has constructive or unconstructive consequences. 
 One mechanism by which valence may moderate the consequences of RT is by 
determining the direction of action for the magnifying effects of RT on mood and cognition. It 
has been hypothesized that RT exacerbates the preexisting mood state and amplifies the 
reciprocal relationships between existing cognition and mood (Ciesla & Roberts, in press; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). It is argued that repetitive focus on affect and cognition serves to make them 
more salient, and to further elaborate, consolidate and strengthen them. Consistent with this RT 
amplification hypothesis: (a) a considerable body of research indicates that self-focus amplifies 
the effect of negative mood on thinking (Ingram, 1990; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987) and of negative thoughts on mood (Mor & Winquist, 2002); (b) depressive 
rumination is more strongly related to negative affect than nonruminative self-focus, indicating 
additional effects of RT (Mor & Winquist, 2002); (c) compared to distraction, rumination 
exacerbates pre-existing anxious mood (Blagden & Craske, 1996), pre-existing anger (Rusting & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998) and increases anger in response to a provocation (Bushman, 2002; 
Bushman, Bonacci, Pedersen, Vasquez, & Miller, 2005). Thus, for negatively valenced 
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cognitions, RT would amplify the negative consequences of these negative cognitions and 
exacerbate existing negative mood, resulting in more unconstructive outcomes. 
With this amplification hypothesis in mind, it is worth noting that, whilst in the majority 
of cases more negative valence during RT will be associated with more unconstructive 
consequences, positive valence during RT could possibly lead to unconstructive consequences in 
individuals vulnerable to hypomania and mania. Recent theories of bipolar disorder have 
hypothesized that repeated dwelling on positive affect could amplify positive mood and 
associated behavioral activation, fuelling the spiral of mood and cognition up into hypomania 
(Johnson et al., in press). Consistent with this hypothesis, compared to controls with no history 
of mood disorders and individuals with major depression, individuals diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder endorsed elevated emotion-focused rumination in response to positive affect. Moreover, 
positive rumination was associated with hypomanic symptoms (Johnson et al., in press). 
Although preliminary, these findings suggest a link between excessive positive rumination and 
bipolar disorder: future research will need to examine its causal relationship with mania 
symptoms.  
Intrapersonal and Situational Context in which Repetitive Thought Occurs: Valence and Ability 
The context in which repetitive thinking occurs is also an important determinant of the 
consequences of RT. Key elements of context are (a) the prevailing valence of the cognitive-
affective system of the individual engaged in RT, in terms of mood state, self-beliefs, and 
dispositional traits; (b) the situation and environment in which RT occurs. Both contexts can 
range from negatively valenced (e.g., intrapersonal: dysphoric mood, negative expectations, low 
self-esteem; situational: stressful, traumatic events) to positively valenced (intrapersonal: 
positive mood, positive expectations, high self-esteem; situational: successful, rewarding events), 
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and both will often determine the valence of thought content during RT. For example, when an 
individual has low self-esteem or is in a dysphoric mood, negative thoughts, memories and 
expectations become more easily accessible and available, as illustrated by the phenomenon of 
mood-congruent memory (Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale, 1988).  Similarly, a negative, 
stressful environment will activate negative thoughts and increase the likelihood of negative 
mood. Thus, by extension, in the context of a negative valenced intrapersonal or situational 
context, RT about this negative context (which is itself negatively valenced) would further 
amplify the effect of that context on mood and cognition. 
There is good evidence that the prevailing valence of an individuals’ cognitive-affective 
system determines whether RT is helpful or unhelpful. First, there is extensive evidence that 
dysphoric mood and/or depressed symptoms is a setting condition for depressive rumination to 
produce unconstructive consequences: (a) the experimental literature repeatedly finds that there 
is no maladaptive effect on mood and cognition of manipulating rumination compared to 
distraction in individuals who are not already in a dysphoric mood (e.g., see review by Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004b); (b) the effects of ruminative style on delay in presenting symptoms of breast 
cancer to a healthcare professional was moderated in part by the experience of positive mood at 
the time of symptom discovery (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005); (c) rumination exacerbated the 
predictive effects of baseline depression on depression 6 months later, but did not predict 
prospective depression in the absence of depression (Roelofs et al., 2006). Second, in a similar 
way, there is evidence that the consequences of worry are moderated by the levels of trait 
anxiety: worry is associated with more active coping and greater information-seeking (Davey et 
al., 1992) and predicts better prospective performance (Siddique et al., 2006) once levels of 
associated trait anxiety are held constant, suggesting that worry may be more constructive when 
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levels of anxiety are low but becomes more problematic as trait anxiety increases. Trait anxiety 
is associated with poor problem-solving confidence (Davey et al., 1992), which in turn is 
implicated in the content of worrying becoming more negative and more catastrophic, resulting 
in less constructive consequences (Davey, Jubb, & Cameron, 1996). Davey et al. (1992, p.145) 
hypothesize that “pathological worrying is generated by a problem-focused cognitive style being 
thwarted by a lack of confidence in the solutions being generated”. Thus, an intrapersonal 
context characterized by ongoing negative affect, whether depressed mood or trait anxiety, will 
lead to more negative content during RT, and, thereby, more unconstructive consequences.   
Third, a number of studies find that the ability of RT to predict depression is moderated 
by the degree of negative self-related beliefs, with dysfunctional attitudes and self-esteem 
moderating the extent to which rumination prospectively predicts (a) the onset of depressive 
episodes (Robinson & Alloy, 2002); (b) worse treatment outcome (Ciesla & Roberts, 2002). 
Likewise, the effects of experimentally manipulating rumination were moderated by the negative 
self-related beliefs held by individuals (Ciesla & Roberts, in press). Similarly, the effects of 
worry on smoking behavior are moderated by levels of self-efficacy (Dijkstra & Brosschot, 
2003). Thus, there is a good evidence to suggest that negative representations of the self and 
maladaptive beliefs about what is required to be a worthwhile person moderate whether RT is 
constructive or unconstructive. In the absence of dysphoric mood or negative self-beliefs, RT 
focused on the self need not be negative; however, in the presence of negative mood or negative 
self-beliefs, RT focused on the self is likely to involve negative content. As suggested by Ciesla 
and Roberts (2002, p. 447) “the process of turning’s one attention inward may be particularly 
caustic if one’s thoughts are dominated by self-deprecating and perfectionistic cognitions”.  
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Similarly, there is good evidence that situational context can influence the effects of RT. 
First, Morrison and O’Connor (2005) found that depressive rumination interacted with reported 
stress to predict social dysfunction six months later. Second, trait rumination was predictive of 
depression at 6-week follow-up only among initially mildly depressed undergraduates who had 
both low self-esteem and a high level of stressful life events (Ciesla & Roberts, in press). Third, 
for individuals with higher levels of social anxiety, but not for individuals with low levels of 
social anxiety, post-event rumination was associated with increases in negative affect following 
personal disclosure, but associated with decreases in negative affect following small-talk 
(Kashdan & Roberts, 2007).  
Another aspect of context that influences the consequences of RT is an individual’s 
ability and expertise. Greater competence, ability, practice and expertise in the domain of 
concern are hypothesized to produce more constructive outcomes during RT. First, the defensive 
pessimism literature finds that RT is associated with constructive outcomes when RT is 
congruent with an individuals’ preferred strategy, such that defensive pessimists find RT focused 
on negative outcomes an adaptive strategy but optimists do not. Moreover, studies of defensive 
pessimism have explicitly selected participants on the basis of a history of success in the studied 
domain, whether academia or social interactions (e.g., Grade Point Averages > 3.0 and reporting 
generally performing well in the past, Norem & Cantor, 1986), such that, by definition, all 
defensive pessimists have been successful in the domain under study. Thus, the benefit of RT for 
defensive pessimists occurs within the context of a reasonably high level of experience and 
ability. Second, in a sample of financial sector managers, worry is correlated with better 
workplace performance for more able individuals but worry is correlated with worse workplace 
performance for less able individuals, indicating the value of ability in moderating the role of RT 
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(Perkins & Corr, 2005). Third, the more constructive consequences of RT for individuals with 
high self-esteem and high self-efficacy, may, in part, reflect greater objective ability, as well as 
more positive subjective perceptions of the self. Fourth, RT about the traits necessary to be a 
good tennis player was negatively correlated with the quality of play in inexperienced players, 
but not in experienced players, suggesting that RT has less unconstructive consequences for 
those with more expertise in the relevant domain (Wicklund & Braun, 1987). Thus, there is some 
evidence that personal ability and expertise may influence the consequences of RT. 
Level of Construal adopted during repetitive thought 
Whilst valence is a major factor in determining the consequences of RT, it cannot explain 
all observed findings. In particular, RT focused on negative content has been found to have 
constructive consequences in studies of depressive rumination (Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins 
& Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; 2004) and of defensive pessimism (Cantor & 
Norem, 1989; Norem & Cantor, 1986a; Norem & Cantor, 1986b; Norem & Chang, 2002; 
Spencer & Norem, 1996). Moreover, simply focusing on positive outcomes in of itself is not 
necessarily the most adaptive form of RT, as revealed by the comparison of process versus 
outcome simulations (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin & Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Schneider, 1989; 
Taylor, Pham, Rivkin & Armor, 1998). It is hypothesized that another property that can account 
for whether RT has constructive or unconstructive consequences is the level of construal during 
RT. Research on mental representation in the cognitive and social-cognitive literatures makes a 
distinction between higher level, abstract construals versus lower level, concrete construals (e.g., 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004; Freitas, Salovey, & Liberman, 
2001; Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Markman & McMullen, 2003; Mischel & Shoda, 
1995; Trope, 1989; Trope & Liberman, 2003). High-level construals are abstract, general, 
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superordinate and decontextualized mental representations that convey the essential gist and 
meaning of events and actions, whereas low-level construals are more concrete mental 
representations that include subordinate, contextual, specific, and incidental details of events and 
actions
3
. High-level abstract construals are focused on the desirability and importance of 
outcomes, whereas low-level concrete construals are focused on the feasibility and planning of 
outcomes. Thus, different levels of construal can be adopted when perceiving one’s own and 
other’s behavior: inferences of global traits that are invariant across different situations (e.g., 
laziness) constitute relatively high-level, abstract construals of behavior, whereas inferences of 
situation-specific states (e.g., tiredness), constitute relatively low-level concrete construals of 
behavior (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003). Similarly, actions, events and goals can be 
represented in terms of high-level or low-level construals: representations of the abstract “why” 
aspects of an action and of the ends consequential to an action constitute relatively high-level 
construals, whereas representations of the specific “how” details of the action and of the means 
to the end constitute relatively low-level construals (Frietas, Gollwitzer & Trope, 2004; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). 
Across this review, there is evidence that RT characterized by high-level, more abstract 
construals has more unconstructive consequences relative to RT characterized by low-level, 
more concrete construals, at least when RT is focused on negatively valenced content (to date, 
the majority of studies relevant to level of construal in RT have involved negatively valenced 
RT). First, within experimental studies that manipulate RT, one experimental condition is often 
characterized by lower-level construals that focus on contextual details and the means to desired 
ends (e.g., experiential rumination, Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins 
& Teasdale, 2001, 2004; simulation of the process of how to achieve a goal, Taylor et al., 1998; 
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mindsets involving imagining how things unfold or how to proceed, Moberly & Watkins, 2006; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins, 2004a), whereas the other condition is characterized by 
higher-level construals that focus on meanings and implications (e.g., analytical rumination, 
Ehring et al., 2007; Rimes & Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001, 2004; outcome simulation, Taylor et al., 1998; mindsets involving thinking about causes, 
meanings, consequences, Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins, 
2004a). For example, because representations of desired ends and outcomes sought by an action 
constitute relatively high-level construals, whereas representations of the specific “how” details 
of the action and of the means to the end constitute relatively low-level construals, process 
simulations involve relatively lower level construals than outcome simulations. Critically, the 
manipulations of RT involving lower-level construals produce more constructive consequences 
than the manipulations of RT involving higher level construals, including better social problem 
solving, more specific autobiographical memory, less global negative self-judgments (Rimes & 
Watkins, 2005; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001; 2004), improved self-regulation and academic performance (Pham & Taylor, 1999; Rivkin 
& Taylor, 1999; Taylor & Schneider, 1989; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin & Armor, 1998), better 
emotional recovery from prior failure (Watkins, 2004a) and upsetting images (Ehring et al., 
2007), and reduced emotional vulnerability to subsequent failure (Moberly & Watkins, 2006). 
Importantly, these manipulations of RT are often matched for degree of negative thought 
content, such that the distinct functional consequences cannot be due to differences in valence of 
thought content.  
Second, the form of anticipatory RT within the MMAP focused on low-level construals 
(plan rehearsal) was negatively correlated with depression both concurrently and prospectively, 
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whereas the form of anticipatory RT focused on higher-level construals (problem analysis) was 
associated with increased anxiety (Feldman & Hayes, 2005). Third, the current construal-level 
analysis subsumes the reduced concreteness theory of worry, which proposes that worry is 
predominantly experienced in a more abstract-verbal form rather than in a more concrete-visual 
imagery form, and that this reduced concreteness leads to negative consequences for problem-
solving and affect regulation (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stober, 1998; Stober & Borkovec, 2002; 
Stober, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000). Consistent with this theory, worry seems to be 
predominantly experienced in a verbal form rather than in images (Borkovec & Inz, 1990; 
Borkovec et al., 1993; Borkovec et al., 1998; Borkovec et al., 1983; Freeston, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1996; McLaughlin et al., 2007). Moreover, elaborations of problems about which 
participants worry are independently and blindly rated as more abstract and less concrete than 
problems about which participants do not worry (Borkovec et al., 1998; Stöber, 1998; Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002). Within reduced concreteness theory, concrete thought is defined as “distinct, 
situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular” and abstract thought as “indistinct, cross-
situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated” (Stober & Borkovec, 2002, p.92), which fits within 
the existing conceptualization of low-level versus high-level construals. Furthermore, reduced 
concreteness has been found during RT in currently depressed patients (Cribb, Moulds, & Carter, 
2006; Watkins & Moulds, in press) and during rumination in undergraduates (McLaughlin et al., 
2007), indicating that this analysis applies to other forms of RT than worry. 
Fourth, there is indirect evidence that level of construal could contribute to the beneficial 
effects of defensive pessimism. Defensive pessimists appear to have a strategy of viewing 
negative futures as temporally close, and this strategy predicts improved task performance, 
through the mediator of increased preparation (Sanna, Chang, Carter, & Small, 2006). Temporal 
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construal theory proposes that thinking about distant futures involves more high-level construals, 
whereas thinking about close futures involves more low-level construals (Trope & Liberman, 
2003). Lower-level construals would in turn lead to more specific preparation for an upcoming 
task. 
One mechanism by which the level of construal may influence the consequences of RT is 
by influencing the efficacy of problem solving. Both the reduced concreteness theory (Stober & 
Borkovec, 2002) and the action identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) hypothesize 
that processing at lower level of construal provides more elaborated and contextual detail about 
the specific means, alternatives and actions by which to best proceed when faced with difficult, 
novel or complex situations. Consistent with this hypothesis, lower-level construals are 
associated with better problem solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a). 
A second mechanism by which level of construal may influence the consequences of RT 
is through its effects on self-regulation. Increased focus on a concrete level of construal is 
hypothesized to facilitate self-regulation in situations where elevated self-focused attention and 
deliberate efforts to control behavior may be counter-productive, such as choking under pressure 
and test anxiety (Leary, Adams, & Tate, 2006). Since elevated self-focused attention and 
increased efforts at self-regulation are often characteristic of RT, in particular of rumination and 
worry, RT may become more constructive as thinking becomes more concrete. Leary et al., 
(2006) argued that abstract construals about the evaluative or interpersonal implications of one’s 
behavior interrupt the smooth performance of behaviors, whereas, in contrast, more concrete 
construals benefit self-regulation by (a) focusing attention on the immediate demands of the 
present situation, (b) reducing anxiety, and (c) requiring less effort and thus using up less self-
regulatory resources. For example, a basketball player would perform better when focusing on 
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how to make the shot, rather than when thinking about the implications of missing. Consistent 
with this analysis, the use of concrete construals frees up cognitive resources, reduces anxiety 
and/or improves task performance, whether in the form of  implementation intentions specifying 
how and when an action will be performed (“If I encounter situation X, then I’ll perform 
behavior Y”) or via focusing on the sound of one’s voice (versus trying to be persuasive) when 
giving a speech, especially when the task is considered difficult or occurs under conditions of 
high cognitive load (Brandstatter, Lengfelder, & Gollwitzer, 2001; Gollwitzer, 1999; Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006; Vallacher, Wegner, & Somoza, 1989; Webb & Sheeran, 2003).  
A third mechanism by which the level of construal may influence the consequences of 
RT is by influencing the degree of generalization in response to emotional events. Processing 
characterized by higher-level construals produces mental representations that generalize across 
situations and that do not incorporate specific contextual details. Such generalizations can be 
beneficial by allowing gainful and useful inferences across different situations beyond available 
data and by enabling transfer of learning from one situation to another (Forster & Higgins, 2005; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). However, in negative situations, more abstract construals could 
facilitate negative overgeneralizations where a single failure is explained in terms of a global 
personal inadequacy (e.g. “I am worthless”) rather than in terms of  situation-specific difficulties 
(Hamilton, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Cather, 1993). Such negative generalizations are 
implicated in the development of depression (Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; 
Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 1983; Carver, Lavoie, Kuhl, & Ganellen, 1988). Thus, when 
faced with negative information, more concrete construals are hypothesized to be more adaptive 
by reducing negative overgeneralizations. Consistent with this hypothesis, more concrete 
thinking is found to facilitate the interpretation of the causes of negative events as unstable and 
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controllable (Showers, 1988), voluntarily recalling an emotional event in specific detail produces 
less emotional response than recalling it at a more general level (Philippot, Baeyens, & 
Douilliez, 2006; Philippot, Schaefer, & Herbette, 2003) and practice at recalling specific, 
contextualized autobiographical memories reduces the negative experience to a subsequent 
stressful task relative to practice at recalling general, decontextualized memories (Raes, 
Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2006).  
Evaluating models of repetitive thought 
What theory best accounts for the data and properties described above? A first step 
towards answering this question is to consider the existing theoretical models of RT and evaluate 
how well they account for the different consequences and properties reviewed. Three principal 
approaches can be identified: the response styles approach (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2004b), the cognitive processing approach (Greenberg, 1995; Horowitz, 1985; 
Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004), and the discrepancy-focused control theory approach (Martin & 
Tesser, 1989, 1996)
4
.  
Response Style Theory of Rumination 
Nolen-Hoeksema's (1991; 2000; 2004) seminal Response Styles Theory (RST) 
hypothesizes that rumination is a trait-like style of responding to depressed mood, which has 
been found to be consistent across situations and repeated testing (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993), 
and appears to be a stable individual difference characteristic (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). 
The ruminative response style is hypothesized to be learnt in childhood, either because it was 
modeled by parents who themselves had a passive coping style (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1995) or because the child failed to learn more active coping strategies for 
negative affect as a consequence of overcritical, intrusive and over-controlling parents (Nolen-
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Hoeksema, Mumme, Wolfson, & Guskin, 1995) or early physical/sexual abuse. Retrospective 
studies find that elevated rumination is associated with self-report of over-controlling parents 
(Spasojevic & Alloy, 2002) and reports of physical and sexual abuse (Conway, Mendelson, 
Giannopoulos, Csank, & Holm, 2004), although, like all retrospective studies, current mood, 
memory biases and demand biases could influence the report of past events, raising questions as 
to veridicality.   
The RST provides a detailed analysis of the mechanisms by which RT leads to 
unconstructive outcomes, but was conceived with less explanatory power with regard to 
explaining how RT can be constructive. The RST emphasizes the importance of repeated and 
passive focus on depressed symptoms in determining the negative effects of rumination (e.g., 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2004b). The RST proposes 
that ruminative self-focus in response to a depressed mood amplifies a vicious cycle between 
depressed mood and negative, pessimistic thinking, thereby, exacerbating negative mood and 
negative thinking and impairing problem solving. Research has demonstrated that depressed 
mood has negative effects on thinking by selectively priming mood-relevant information and 
activating mood-congruent memories, beliefs and expectations (Bower, 1981; Teasdale, 1983). 
In turn, these negative cognitions can then further maintain or exacerbate negative mood, 
producing a vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative thinking. RST proposes that 
focus on symptoms further fuels this vicious cycle, consistent with a considerable body of 
research indicating that self-focus can act to amplify the effect of negative mood on thinking 
(Ingram, 1990; Ingram & Smith, 1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). As such RST provides 
a good account of how structural factors such as negatively valenced thought content, current 
dysphoric mood or negative self-beliefs would result in RT with unconstructive consequences. 
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However, a major limitation of the RST was that it was not designed to explain RT with 
constructive outcomes, and, as such, does not directly instantiate how RT could have positive 
consequences. Nonetheless, by logical extension, one can hypothesize that the amplifying effects 
of RT could also work for positive valence, such that RT focused on positive thought content 
would amplify a self-reinforcing cycle between positive mood and more optimistic thinking, 
consistent with the observed influence of thought valence on the consequences of RT. However, 
even with this extension to the RST, it cannot account for the evidence that RT focused on 
negative content can still have constructive consequences, as found in experimental 
manipulations of depressive rumination, defensive pessimism or cognitive processing of 
distressing events. For example, several experimental studies found that RT focused on 
depressive symptoms has constructive consequences (Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001; 2004), inconsistent with the RST. Nor can the RST account for constructive 
consequences of RT that are not tied to increases in positive affect, since the constructive effects 
of RT would depend upon amplifying the reciprocal cycle between positive mood and optimistic 
cognition. For example, improvements in problem-solving following RT that are not associated 
with improvements in mood (e.g., Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), cannot 
be explained by RST. Furthermore, RST cannot account for the influence of process aspects of 
RT on its consequences, in particular, the level of construal adopted during RT. A further 
limitation of RST is that it exclusively focuses on RT in response to sad or depressed mood. 
Although this is an important focus for RT, RT can also be triggered by and focused on other 
negative mood states, unresolved goals and life events (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995; Millar, 
Tesser, & Millar, 1988; Robinson & Alloy, 2003) and on positive content (Martin & Tesser, 
1996).  
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Cognitive Processing Theories 
RT focused on coming to terms with past upsetting events is a key element of the 
cognitive processing literature. Stressful and traumatic events often contain novel information or 
give rise to appraisals that are not consistent with prior mental structures such as the beliefs and 
assumptions that people hold about themselves and the world (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). For 
example, a violent assault and the increased sense of vulnerability it produces would clash with 
prior beliefs such as “the world is basically safe” and “bad things don't happen to good people”. 
Cognitive processing accounts propose that this discrepancy between the meaning of the 
negative event and pre-existing mental structures makes it difficult to integrate this new 
information into current mental structures and leads to distress. Recovery from distressing 
experiences is assumed to require that the person work through and resolve the incongruence 
between the information acquired from the distressing experience and pre-existing mental 
structures representing the world (Horowitz, 1986). Within cognitive processing accounts, the 
discrepancy between the meaning of the event and pre-existing mental structures is proposed to 
produce RT in the form of repeated intrusions and re-experiencing of the distressing event until 
the discrepancy is resolved. Thus, cognitive processing accounts explain the onset and 
maintenance of RT. However, these accounts have not tended to explicitly instantiate what 
determines whether RT has constructive or unconstructive outcomes. Indeed, there is some 
debate as to whether the RT is a necessary and active part of working through the upsetting event 
or simply an epiphenomenon of recovery (Harber & Pennebaker, 1992; Horowitz, 1986; Janoff-
Bulman, 1992; Tait & Silver, 1989).  
Nonetheless, cognitive processing approaches are consistent with structural factors such 
as valence influencing the consequences of RT. Recent cognitive processing accounts emphasize 
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that a focus on finding benefit when thinking about upsetting and traumatic events results in 
better outcomes, consistent with the valence of thought content influencing the consequences of 
RT. In addition, theoretical accounts of cognitive processing suggest that it will be easier to 
organize and make coherent one single event rather than multiple events simultaneously, because 
multiple memories will interfere with the processing of each other, take up more central 
executive resources (Foa & Kozak, 1986) and include more disparate material that does not 
easily fit into the temporal and spatial sequence necessary for the creation of a coherent story, 
which is hypothesized to be essential for effective working through of upsetting events (Foa et 
al., 1995; Klein & Boals, 2001; Pennebaker, 1997; Pennebaker et al., 1997; Pennebaker & 
Seagal, 1999; Sloan & Marx, 2004; Smyth et al., 2001).Thus, because a negative intrapersonal 
context increases the availability and accessibility of negative concerns and negative memories 
(Smith & Petty, 1995; Teasdale, 1983; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993; Teasdale & Dent, 1987) it 
may make it harder to effectively process any particular difficult event. 
However, cognitive processing theories cannot account for how the level of construal 
could influence the consequences of RT. A further limitation of cognitive processing accounts is 
that they have predominantly focused on RT related to traumatic and distressing events, where 
there is a discrepancy between the meaning of the distressing events and existing beliefs. As 
such, cognitive processing theories do not account for different consequences of RT that are 
unrelated to such discrepancies in meaning and emotion, for example, anticipatory RT associated 
with adaptive planning and preparation or the uptake of health-promoting behaviors.  
Control Theory Approaches to Repetitive Thought 
Control theory proposes that all behavior, including mental activities, reflect a process of 
feedback control. Individuals perceive their current state and behavior, and then compare these 
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perceptions with salient reference values such as their goals, standards or desired outcomes. If 
the comparison indicates a discrepancy between actual state and reference value, such as an 
unresolved goal, behavior will be adjusted in order to bring it closer to the reference value 
(Carver & Scheier, 1982; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 1998). In particular, 
discrepancies between expected rates of progress towards goals are hypothesized to influence 
behavior and affect. The original control theory approach to RT emphasized that rumination is 
triggered by a discrepancy in goal progress and that these goals are organized hierarchically 
(Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996). Furthermore, RT focused on the discrepancy in attaining the 
unresolved goal is intended to serve the function of facilitating progress toward the reference 
value. Within this account, the RT will continue either until the goal is met or until the individual 
disengages from and abandons the goal (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Klinger, 1975; Martin, Shrira 
& Startup, 2004; Martin & Tesser, 1989; 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Wells & 
Matthews, 1994)
5
. It is important to recognize that representations of both external stimuli (e.g., 
a physical situation, a concrete outcome) and internal stimuli (e.g., moods, feelings) can act as 
reference values for goals, such that RT can be influenced by discrepancies in representations of 
both external and internal states. 
There is accumulating evidence consistent with this goal-discrepancy control theory 
approach to RT. RT about important people and activities left behind when coming to college 
was positively predicted by the extent to which these activities remained interrupted at college, 
that is, the extent these important goals were not attained (Millar et al., 1988). Abstract goals that 
are more important and meaningful to people, such as attaining happiness, and concrete goals 
that are linked to these important abstract goals, such as being in a romantic relationship, 
produce more RT when not attained (Mcintosh, Harlow, & Martin, 1995; McIntosh & Martin, 
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1992). In a diary study, negative events that were related to personal goals produced more RT 
than goal-unrelated negative events (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995).  
The tendency towards RT seems to depend upon the perseverance of unresolved goal-
related thoughts, as evidenced in the Zeigarnik effect, in which recall of interrupted and 
uncompleted tasks is significantly better than recall of completed tasks (Kuhl & Beckmann, 
1985; Kuhl & Helle, 1986; Zeigarnik, 1938). There is an extensive literature confirming that 
unresolved and blocked goals increase the priming and accessibility of goal-relevant information, 
and the perseverance of goal-related thoughts (Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; Goschke & Kuhl, 
1993; Martin & Tesser, 1989), whereas resolved goals inhibit the priming and accessibility of 
goal-relevant information, consistent with a control process account of how RT would be 
initiated and terminated (Forster, Liberman, & Higgins, 2005; Johnson, Chang, & Lord, 2006).  
 Moreover, principles within control theory can be elaborated to account for the reviewed 
findings. Critically, unlike the other accounts, the control theory account (Martin & Tesser, 
1989; 1996) explicitly hypothesizes that RT can have constructive or unconstructive 
consequences. Within control theory, RT produces constructive consequences if it helps to 
resolve the discrepancy between the intended goal and actual current state, whether by aiding 
progress towards the goal, or by helping to modify or abandon the goal (Klinger, 1975; Martin & 
Tesser, 1989; Martin & Tesser, 1996; Wrosch, Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). In 
contrast, RT becomes unconstructive if a person experiences an inability to progress toward 
reducing the discrepancy and at the same time is unable to give up on the reference value or goal. 
In such a case, RT would only serve to focus attention on the discrepancy between the desired 
goal and the actual situation, making the unresolved discrepancy more salient, perpetuating the 
unresolved issue, and exacerbating negative affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Klinger, 
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1975; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). 
It is important to distinguish between disengaging from efforts at goal pursuit, whether mentally 
or physically, and disengaging from the underlying goal: the former combines a lack of goal 
progress with the ongoing maintenance of the desired but unattained goal, further highlighting 
the unresolved discrepancy, whereas the latter constructively reduces the goal discrepancy. 
 To date, control theory accounts have focused on hypothesizing the mechanisms 
underpinning the onset, frequency and duration of RT, rather than instantiating the mechanisms 
that determine whether RT is constructive or unconstructive. RT was proposed to be beneficial if 
individuals “use a form of rumination that can provide a solution for the type of problem they are 
facing”, although this was not further specified other than to suggest that applying logic to 
insight problems or insight to logic problems may be unhelpful (Martin, Shrira, & Startup, 2004, 
p. 171). Nonetheless, there are principles within control theory that can be elaborated to explain 
how the properties identified in this review can influence the consequences of RT. 
 First, control theory can account for the findings that structural aspects of RT such as 
valence of thought content and intrapersonal context influence the consequences of RT. Within 
control theory, expectancies and beliefs about the self and about the outcomes of behavior are 
hypothesized to play an important role in determining how a person responds to a discrepancy 
between the actual state and the desired state, by influencing persistence at goal pursuit, the 
reference values by which goal progress is judged, the interpretation of feedback, and the 
judgment of when to abandon a goal (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Hyland, 
1987). More negative expectancies, such as doubts about ability to succeed, will lead to attempts 
to disengage from goal pursuit, as well as a greater perceived discrepancy between desired state 
and actual state. As noted above, disengaging from goal pursuit will leave an unresolved 
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discrepancy, which in the absence of abandoning the unresolved goal, will cause RT to have 
unconstructive consequences. Moreover, an individual’s beliefs and moods, particularly those 
relevant to judging self-worth, will influence their goals and reference values, such that more 
extreme beliefs about what is required to achieve self-worth will result in (a) harder-to-attain 
reference values, making discrepancies between the desired state and the actual state harder to 
resolve; (b) harder-to-abandon goals. For example, negative mood can cause individuals to 
increase their standards for success, making it harder to resolve a goal discrepancy (Cervone, 
Kopp, Schaumann, & Scott, 1994), consistent with a control theory account of RT. In the context 
of RT, this analysis suggests that maladaptive beliefs about what is required to be a worthwhile 
person, such as high levels of dysfunctional attitudes, will lead to both harder-to-attain goals and 
reluctance to abandon these goals, trapping an individual in unconstructive RT, consistent with 
the observed findings (e.g., Ciesla & Roberts, in press). 
 Moreover, self-representations can influence the ability of individuals to disengage from 
an unresolved goal by substituting it with positive affirmations on another aspect of self that 
relates to the same superordinate goal. Affirming valued aspects of the self reduces RT about a 
frustrated goal (Koole, Smeets, van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis, 1999). However, individuals 
with reduced self-esteem and more dysfunctional self-beliefs, have reduced self-affirmational 
resources in response to difficulties (Koole et al., 1999; Steele, Spencer, & Lynch, 1993), making 
it harder to disengage from unconstructive RT about an interrupted or incomplete goal and move 
onto more constructive RT (Di Paula & Campbell, 2002; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1985; Kuhl & 
Helle, 1986), or to disengage from unsolvable tasks (Aspinwall & Richter, 1999). Since 
expectancies are examples of positive and negative thoughts, whilst beliefs and mood are 
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elements of intrapersonal context, control theory thus accommodates the structural aspects of RT 
identified earlier.   
 Second, and more pertinently, further elaboration of principles within control theory 
accounts for the finding that process aspects of RT such as level of construal influence the 
consequences of RT. Within control theory, it is hypothesized that goals and behaviors are 
hierarchically organized and can be processed at different levels of abstraction, with more 
abstract, superordinate goals and standards guiding and informing more specific, subordinate 
goals and standards. Within this hierarchical organization, pursuit towards abstract goals occurs 
by specifying reference values at the next lower level of abstraction, all the way down to the 
concrete representations required to specify the actual behaviors needed to progress towards the 
goal  (Broadbent, 1977; Carver & Scheier, 1990; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Emmons, 1992; 
Powers, 1973a; Powers, 1973b; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Carver and Scheier (1990) 
proposed that the most abstract levels represent a global sense of idealized self, which in turn 
sets the broad principles that organize goals and behavioral standards across multiple situations 
(e.g., to be an honest person), corresponding to higher-level construals, whereas the more 
concrete levels represent the specific actions and behavioral programs necessary to implement 
the principles in a particular situation (e.g., telling the truth to a friend), corresponding to lower-
level construals. Thus, this hierarchical organization affords the use of high and low level 
construals, consistent with the distinction between abstract versus concrete processing within 
RT.   
Further, control theory hypothesizes that effective self-regulation requires flexible and 
balanced coordination between the different levels within the goal hierarchy, such that the 
superordinate level of control adaptively varies in response to situational and task demands. 
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Depending on context, a level of control that is too abstract, too concrete or that fails to link 
abstract levels to concrete levels is hypothesized to be detrimental (Carver & Scheier, 1998, 
chapter 13). Elaborating on key principles within control theory suggests that there are a number 
of distinct advantages and disadvantages for self-regulation when the level of control is located 
higher or lower in the goal hierarchy, corresponding to abstract versus concrete levels of 
construal, respectively.  
Thus, one hypothesized advantage of higher-level, abstract control is increased 
consistency and stability of behavior towards long-term goals across time and across different 
situational demands, because higher-level control ensures that subordinate goals and actions 
remain directed towards personally important higher-level goals and minimizes interference from 
incidental influences (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; 1989). In contrast, 
low-level control is hypothesized to be more sensitive to contextual and situational detail 
resulting in increased impulsiveness and distractibility. Consistent with this hypothesis, a 
habitual tendency towards more abstract construals is associated with more persistent and stable 
behavior, greater self-motivation, less impulsiveness and fewer action errors (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1989), and adopting high-level construals produces greater self-control on experimental 
tasks than adopting low-level construals (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006). A 
second hypothesized advantage of higher-level control is that it provides more flexibility in 
responding to relatively low-level goals that are unattained, because processing at a higher-level 
affords more alternative sub-goals and behaviors to resolve the goal discrepancy (Brunstein & 
Gollwitzer, 1996). For example, if an individual is failing to progress on the daily goal of writing 
a poem, control at the level of an abstract subordinate level (e.g. “to be creative”) provides 
alternative goals and means to resolve this discrepancy (e.g., play music, draw, paint) that are not 
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available if the functionally superordinate goal is just to complete a poem. Thus, this analysis 
suggests that under some circumstances, for example, when considering long-term goals, RT 
characterized by higher-level, abstract construals will be constructive. 
However, a logical elaboration from control theory is that higher-level abstract control 
will become disadvantageous under particular circumstances. First, because pursuit towards 
abstract goals occurs by specifying reference values at the next lower level, down to the actual 
concrete behaviors required, the aforementioned advantages of higher-level control/abstract 
construals will only occur when there is sufficiently operationalized specification from the 
higher-levels down to lower-levels of representation (see also Carver & Scheier, 1998). When 
programs and sequences of goal-related behaviors are straightforward, familiar, and practized, an 
individual will have developed extensive procedural knowledge specifying the links between 
goals and behaviors across all levels, making higher-level control of self-regulation effective 
(Anderson, 1983; Vera & Simon, 1993). However, under circumstances of novelty, 
unfamiliarity, difficulty or stress, this specification of reference values down through the control 
hierarchy can break down, such that the advantages of controlling self-regulation at a higher 
level are lost. For example, adopting a high level of control focused on a goal such as “be 
punctual” would not be useful for either a learner driver still getting used to handling a car or for 
an experienced driver in hazardous, unfamiliar driving conditions such as a snowstorm, since in 
both cases, there is not well-established specification of how high-level reference values translate 
into sub-goals and concrete behavior. Instead, control of behavior needs to be located at low-
levels in the hierarchy concerned with concrete and specific actions. Second, when the 
superordinate abstract goal is ill-defined and it is difficult to specify how it might actually be 
achieved, control at a higher-level in the goal hierarchy is going to be problematic. For example, 
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a goal like “be happy” may be too abstract and vague to provide clear guidance as to how an 
individual might specify subgoals towards attaining it. Third, processing at a more abstract level 
may interfere with goal disengagement: the more abstract the level at which a goal is represented 
in the hierarchy, the more important the goal becomes to the general sense of self, and the harder 
it becomes to disengage from the goal (Martin & Tesser, 1996; McIntosh & Martin, 1992; Millar 
et al., 1988). Such abstract construals will be unproblematic when there is sufficient progress 
toward the relevant goal. However, when a goal is difficult or impossible to attain, processing at 
too abstract a level will make it harder to relinquish the goal, trapping the individual in the 
invidious state where he or she can neither make progress toward the goal nor abandon it, 
leading to persistent but unconstructive RT. This analysis therefore suggests that under 
circumstances of novelty, unfamiliarity, difficulty or stress, RT characterized by higher-level, 
abstract construals will be unconstructive as it gives limited guidance as to what to do next. 
The elaborated control theory therefore proposes that for more difficult and novel tasks, 
where full specification through the goal-action hierarchy is lacking, control of behavior at more 
concrete, lower-levels in the hierarchy is more functional. Shifting control down to lower-levels 
of abstraction, which corresponds to a more concrete level of construal, is hypothesized to ensure 
that goals and standards are translated into effective goal pursuit, because processing at a more 
concrete level serves the functions of determining the specific means and actions by which to 
best proceed and focuses attention on the immediate environment (Carver and Scheier, 1998; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Moreover, lower-level construals may provide more concrete 
indicators of progress than high-level construals (Emmons, 1992): it is easier to determine if one 
is being successful at pursuing a lower-level goal like “keeping your desk clean” than the 
associated higher-level goal of “being more organized”.
5 
Further, a more concrete level of 
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construal may make it easier to disengage from an unattainable goal by reducing its personal 
importance and self-relevance.  
Thus, by logically elaborating on principles within control theory, it is hypothesized that 
higher-level, abstract construals promote effective goal progress for unproblematic, familiar or 
positive situations, but that lower-level, concrete construals are more constructive for difficult or 
novel situations and unattainable goals. Therefore, the elaborated control theory hypothesizes an 
interaction between structural aspects (valence) and process aspects (level of construal) in 
determining the consequences of RT. Critically, this account explains the observed pattern of 
findings in which adopting a more concrete level of construal during RT about negative content 
or in the context of negative situations (e.g., focusing on depressed mood, thinking about 
upsetting events, or planning for stressful events like exams) results in more constructive 
outcomes than RT characterized by a more abstract level of construal (e.g., Leary et al., 2006; 
Pham & Taylor, 1999; Vallacher et al., 1989; Watkins & Moulds, 2005a; Watkins & Teasdale, 
2001, 2004; Webb & Sheeran, 2003). However, the corollary prediction that during RT about 
positive content or in the context of positive situations abstract construals will have more 
constructive outcomes than concrete construals, has not been extensively tested. Recent evidence 
consistent with this prediction is the finding that people with low self-esteem (LSE) who are 
induced to think abstractly about a recent compliment from a romantic partner, report greater 
state self-esteem and greater security in their relationship, than LSE people induced to think 
concretely about a recent compliment (Marigold, Holmes, & Ross, 2007). 
A related prediction from the elaborated control theory is that by default individuals will 
adopt more abstract construals, but shift to more concrete construals when faced with difficulties 
(see also Wegner & Vallacher, 1987). Consistent with this hypothesis, individuals tend by 
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default to use more abstract construals, focused on the meanings, consequences and implications 
of actions (Wegner & Vallacher, 1987; Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986; Wegner, 
Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984), yet when faced with difficult, novel or complex 
situations, people often move towards more concrete levels of processing (Beckmann, 1994; 
Vallacher, Wegner, & Frederick, 1987; Wegner et al., 1984; Wong & Weiner, 1981), although 
there are exceptions including the tendency towards depressive rumination in response to sad 
mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and occasions when more abstract construals are adopted in 
response to failure and goal frustration (Wicklund, 1986). Other evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis is the finding that in neutral and happy moods, people adopt a more global, abstract 
processing style but shift into a more local, concrete processing style in response to sad mood 
(Beukeboom & Semin, 2005; Beukeboom & Semin, 2006; Bless et al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 
2002; Isbell, 2004; Kurman, 2003; Storbeck & Clore, 2005b). This hypothesis predicts that RT 
will tend to be characterized by higher-level, abstract construals, when goal progress is 
unproblematic, but that RT will tend to be characterized by lower-level, concrete construals, 
when goal progress is blocked. Because the elaborated control theory hypothesizes that higher-
level control is the default level-of-control, it also accounts for the finding that competence, 
practice, and expertise influence the consequences of RT, for example, the benefit of RT for 
depressive pessimists. When an individual is more familiar and skilled within a domain, he or 
she is more likely to have good specification from high-levels to low-levels in the goal-action 
hierarchy, reducing the likelihood of higher-level control breaking down.  
The Control Theory Account: An Integrative Overview and Novel Predictions 
 One of the main strengths of this elaborated control theory account is its ability to 
account for the findings reviewed regarding the different consequences of RT, in particular, its 
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ability to accommodate both structural approaches to RT (valence, context) and to expand on 
these approaches to explain process approaches to RT (level of construal). Moreover, this control 
theory account of RT is consistent with the extensive literature linking goal discrepancy with RT. 
A further advantage of the control theory approach is that it can integrate the other theoretical 
approaches to RT and their associated findings within its conceptual framework. Control theory 
can explain the findings within cognitive processing accounts, since both theories propose that a 
key mechanism driving RT is the attempt to reduce discrepancies, whether between current 
outcome and desired goals or between current informational state and existing mental structures 
(Martin & Tesser, 1989). Within control theory, the adoption of a higher-level goal such as 
“making sense of events” or “reducing discrepant information” could account for the 
observations within the cognitive processing account, as explicitly outlined within models of 
posttraumatic growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 2004). Moreover, despite initial suggestions that 
discrepancies were not necessary for depressive rumination to occur (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), 
theoretical accounts suggest that focus on the causes and consequences of depressed mood is 
likely to involve focus on unresolved goal discrepancies (e.g., Brunstein & Gollwitzer, 1996; 
Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987). Moreover, recent findings within RST are consistent with the 
predictions of control theory: (a) the content of experimentally-induced rumination is 
characterized by thinking about unresolved personal problems (Lyubomirsky et al., 1999); (b) 
depressive rumination is associated with meta-cognitive beliefs that rumination is useful for 
understanding depression and solving problems, suggesting that depressive rumination is 
adopted with the intention of resolving goal-based or meaning-related discrepancies 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005b); (c) experimentally-induced rumination and discrepancy-
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focused thinking both increase anxiety and depressed mood to an equivalent degree and are 
indistinguishable in terms of flow of thought content (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004a). Indeed, Treynor 
et al (2003, p. 256) interpreted brooding as “a passive comparison of one’s current situation with 
some unachieved standard”, consistent with a control theory account.   
A further advantage of the control theory account is that it can account for the adoption of 
the different structural and process aspects of RT. For example, as noted earlier, there is evidence 
that in response to difficulties, individuals sometimes adopt a more concrete level of construal 
(Vallacher & Wegner, 1987) but sometimes adopt more abstract construals (Wicklund, 1986), as 
exemplified by the abstract RT found during depressive rumination/brooding. Thus, any theory 
of RT needs to explain the mechanisms underpinning whether RT involves (a) negative or 
positive thought content; (b) an abstract or concrete level of construal. Structural factors, such as 
valence, are relatively straightforward to explain across all models of RT: thought valence will 
be determined by the nature of the event and the context in which RT occurs, as well as by 
individual beliefs, expectancies and learning history. In addition, within control theory, goal 
progress at a rate faster than anticipated produces positive mood and cognition, whereas goal 
progress slower than anticipated produces negative valence (Carver & Scheier, 1990).  
The elaborated control theory account hypothesizes that the level-of-construal is 
principally determined by adaptive regulation of level-of-construal in response to situational 
demands, such that construal typically becomes more concrete in response to difficulties, but that 
various situational, motivational, and cognitive factors can interfere with this regulatory process. 
First, the extent to which goal progress is blocked is hypothesized to influence the level of 
construal adopted (Martin & Tesser, 1996): when goal progress is moderately thwarted it is still 
adaptive to shift to lower-level construals (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), whereas more severe 
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blockage, particularly for highly self-relevant goals, leads to higher-level construals (Wicklund, 
1986), as individuals re-orientate to their higher-order concerns. Second, self-related beliefs are 
hypothesized to influence the preference towards more abstract or more concrete levels of 
construal. For example, meta-cognitive beliefs that it is important to understand and make sense 
of feelings and problems would encourage the use of higher-level construals. Likewise, low, 
unstable or contingent self-esteem leads to attempts to pursue self-esteem by trying to validate 
abilities and qualities (Crocker & Knight, 2005; Crocker & Park, 2004; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001), 
which typically involves evaluating one’s self-worth at a trait level, that is, the use of more 
abstract construals (Baumeister & Tice, 1985; Lyubomirsky, 2001). Further, as the perceived 
probability of an event reduces, construals become more abstract (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & 
Alony, 2006) such that more negative expectations would engender more abstract construals. 
Third, effective regulation of level-of-construal in response to situational demands is 
hypothesized to require good cognitive and central executive control. Thus, individuals with 
deficits in executive/inhibitory control, either because of greater cognitive load or reduced 
cognitive resources, would be impaired at effectively regulating level-of-construal in response to 
situational demands. This analysis predicts that individuals with these vulnerability factors will 
be compromised in their ability to flexibly regulate level of construal in response to situational 
demands to the extent that they do not show the functional shift towards lower-level construals 
typically observed in response to difficulties (Bless et al., 1996; Gasper & Clore, 2002; Isbell, 
2004; Kurman, 2003; Storbeck & Clore, 2005a). Given that patients with depression and 
depressive ruminators are observed to have such meta-cognitive beliefs (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 
2005b), reduced self-esteem, and deficits in executive/inhibitory control (Davis & Nolen-
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Hoeksema, 2000; Gotlib, Yue, & Joormann, 2005; Hertel, 1997; Joormann, 2004; Joormann, 
2006), this analysis suggests the level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis, which predicts that 
depression-prone groups will be impaired at regulating their level-of-construal in response to 
difficulties, leading to an overly abstract level-of-construal and to RT that has unconstructive 
consequences. Consistent with this prediction, a recent study found that individuals with mild-to-
moderate depressive symptoms generated counterfactual RT about a negative event characterized 
by more concrete construals than non-depressed individuals, whereas individuals with severe 
depressive symptoms generated counterfactual RT characterized by more abstract construals 
(e.g., global, characterological judgments). Thus, mild depressive symptoms are associated with 
the adaptive regulation of level-of-construal in response to mood, but more extreme depressive 
symptoms are associated with dysregulation of this process (Markman & Miller, 2006). Thus, 
this level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis accounts for why the subset of individuals prone 
to depression and brooding show a tendency to adopt RT characterized by more abstract 
construals, despite it having unconstructive consequences.  
The further test of the scientific utility of this elaborated control theory approach to RT is 
its ability to make unique testable predictions that can be evaluated in future research. The 
current analysis has generated a number of such testable predictions. First, as noted above, the 
level-of-construal dysregulation hypothesis predicts that whereas the majority of individuals will 
preferentially adopt higher-level construals in unproblematic, familiar, positive and neutral 
situations, but shift to lower-level construals in the face of difficulties and negative mood, 
individuals at risk for depression will continue to preferentially adopt higher-level construals 
even in the face of difficulties and negative mood. Second, as noted earlier, the elaborated 
control theory predicts an interaction between level of construal and valence in determining the 
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consequences of RT. Lower-level construals are predicted to be more adaptive during RT 
focused on negative content or occurring within a negative context, whereas higher-level 
construals are predicted to be more adaptive during RT focused on positive content or occurring 
within a positive context. Thus, the use of repeated training paradigms in which individuals learn 
to adopt a more concrete level of construal in response to emotional events would be predicted to 
reduce emotional vulnerability to a subsequent negative event but also to reduce positive 
response to a subsequent positive event. Likewise, since people construe nearer future events in 
more concrete terms than distant future events (Forster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Liberman 
& Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003), focusing on nearer future events during negatively-
valenced RT is predicted to result in more constructive outcomes than focusing on distant future 
events, with the reverse pattern of findings predicted for positively-valenced RT.  
Third, this approach has a number of implications for the treatment of psychological 
disorders, since RT has been demonstrated to contribute to both anxiety and depression (Harvey 
et al., 2004). It suggests that when an individual starts to dwell on a negative event or difficulty, 
shifts in how he does this could potentially move him from RT that exacerbates his difficulties to 
RT that helps his recovery. This analysis suggests that the goal of therapy for people with 
unconstructive RT should not be to reduce their RT, but rather to shift them to more constructive 
forms of RT. Targeting such changes could contribute to more effective and systematic 
treatments for psychological disorders. This analysis predicts that RT with constructive 
consequences can be facilitated by: (1) reducing the extent and accessibility of negative thought 
content, whilst increasing the extent and accessibility of positive thought content; (2) 
encouraging a shift into a more concrete level of construal when focused on difficulties and 
negative mood (see Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995 for a related analysis). These predictions 
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are consistent with a number of psychological therapies empirically shown to be effective in 
treating depression and anxiety. Both cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) and behavioral 
activation implicitly encourage patients to be more concrete, specific and detailed in their 
description and analysis of activities. Further, in both therapies, patients work to build up 
success, mastery and pleasurable activities, and, thereby, improve self-esteem and strengthen and 
make more accessible positive cognition. Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT), which 
has been demonstrated to significantly reduce rates of relapse in people with a history of 
recurrent depression in several trials (Ma & Teasdale, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000), and to reduce 
depressive rumination (Ramel, Goldin, Carmona, & McQuaid, 2004), explicitly uses meditation 
practice to train patients away from abstract levels of processing and into a more concrete mode 
of processing (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002). Moreover, a recent adaptation of CBT that 
explicitly focuses on shifting processing towards lower-level construals has encouraging initial 
results in the treatment of residual depression, reducing symptoms and depressive rumination 
(Watkins et al., 2007).  
These examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Nonetheless, they demonstrate 
how the control theory can generate unique, testable predictions, as well as account for current 
knowledge. The veracity of the account should be subject to evaluation by the rigorous testing of 
these and other relevant predictions. 
Future Research 
Areas for future investigation 
The current review also highlights important gaps in the research on RT. First, the study 
of RT has been predominantly focused on depression, worry, and trauma. Future research needs 
to examine the processes of RT with respect to other psychological disorders, other triggering 
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events and other emotions. Recent findings linking RT prospectively to bulimia and substance 
abuse in female adolescents (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007) and concurrently to bipolar disorder 
(Johnson et al., in press) suggests the value of further RT research in these disorders. Second, 
many of the prospective research of RT related to psychological disorders have not explicitly 
reported or controlled for previous episodes of the relevant disorder (e.g., major depression), 
which could potentially act as a common variable explaining why elevated RT predicts future 
symptoms. Third, there is a preponderance of research on RT with unconstructive consequences, 
which needs to be balanced by more research into the constructive aspects of RT. In particular, 
more prospective longitudinal studies and experimental studies are necessary to investigate the 
constructive consequences of RT, especially in the areas of cognitive processing and 
posttraumatic growth, where most of the evidence is still only cross-sectional. Fourth, such 
research requires behavioral, physiological or observer-rated outcome measures that reduce the 
risk of constructive outcomes resulting from inaccurate, biased or defensive self-reports.  
Fifth, a valuable addition to research in this field will be the development of measures 
that can assess both constructive and unconstructive aspects of RT, as well as RT across a wider 
range of situations and moods. The limitations of the RSQ were noted earlier: Future research 
will usefully assess RT using alternative questionnaires (Siegle, Moore, & Thase, 2004) that do 
not confound RT with the degree of negative affectivity, and that can capture other potentially 
relevant dimensions such as the duration, controllability and repetitiveness of RT. Likewise, the 
assessment of RT through non-self-report measures is a priority, by developing on-line measures 
of RT, such as the use of thought-sampling, or cognitive-experimental and psychophysiological 
indices associated with self-reported RT, such as attentional bias (Joorman et al., 2006), 
sustained pupil dilation to negative information (Siegle, Granholm, Ingram, & Matt, 2001; 
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Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003), or sustained event-related fMRI amygdala 
activity in response to emotional words (Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002). 
Sixth, the process of goal disengagement needs more detailed examination. Goal disengagement 
and goal reengagement is increasingly suggested to be important in determining wellbeing 
(Rasmussen, Wrosch, Scheier, & Carver, 2006; Wrosch, Dunne, Scheier, & Schulz, 2006; 
Wrosch & Heckhausen, 1999; Wrosch et al., 2003; Wrosch, Schulz, & Heckhausen, 2004) and, 
to date, is neglected in the study of RT.  
Other possible moderators of the consequences of RT 
This review focused on factors that were robustly demonstrated to moderate the 
consequences of RT. Nonetheless, there was tentative evidence that several other factors may 
moderate the consequences of RT. First, two correlational studies suggest that the purpose 
motivating RT may moderate its consequences: RT motivated by curiosity and by searching for 
new ideas and experiences was associated with less negative affect/depression than RT 
motivated by neurotic, threat-related concerns or by the need for certainty (Segerstrom et al., 
2003; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). Prospective and experimental studies are necessary to 
explore whether purpose of RT may be a potential moderator. Second, rigidity of thought during 
RT (e.g., perseveration on the same content versus generation of many different ideas) may be a 
potential moderator of the consequences of RT. Several studies suggest that the generation of an 
increased number of different thoughts and ideas is associated with constructive consequences 
for RT (Cantor et al., 1987; El Leithy et al., 2006), whereas RT defined in terms of perseveration 
and stagnant deliberation is associated with increased depression (Ehring, 2007; Feldman & 
Hayes, 2005). Thus, RT that is highly repetitive, “stuck”, and perseverative may be 
unconstructive. This suggestion parallels Ingram’s (1990) proposal that pathological self-focus is 
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characterized by excessive frequency, sustained duration and rigidity. By extension, it may be 
useful to investigate whether frequency, duration, and repetitiveness of RT moderate the 
consequences of RT.  
Conclusion 
The analysis outlined here builds on many others and represents ongoing efforts to 
identify the key mechanisms that influence the different consequences of RT. In this article, I 
have reviewed evidence indicating that RT can have unconstructive and constructive 
consequences. In the course of reviewing the literature on RT, three factors emerged to account 
for the differential consequences of RT: the valence of thought content, the intrapersonal and 
situational context of the individual engaged in RT, and the construal level of the RT. Table 3 
describes how each of the major classes of RT reviewed earlier can be characterized in terms of 
these moderating factors. Thus, depressive rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) is characterized 
by negatively valenced thought content (RT about depression), a negative intrapersonal context 
(depressed mood, negative self-beliefs) and an abstract level-of-construal (thinking about 
meanings and implications), with accompanying unconstructive consequences. Several classes of 
RT have inclusive and broad definitions, such that they cannot be characterized by a particular 
value for each factor (e.g., Martin & Tesser’s definition of rumination encompasses positive vs. 
negative content, abstract vs. concrete construals). Worry has been described as having 
unconstructive consequences and constructive consequences. Within the current analysis, all 
worry is characterized by negative valence (thoughts of a real or potential problem), but worry 
characterized by a concrete level-of-construal is constructive, whereas worry characterized by an 
abstract level-of-construal and negative intrapersonal context (e.g., low problem-solving 
confidence) is unconstructive. Moreover, although the valence of the context typically matches 
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the valence of thought content, there are exceptions; for example, in problem solving and 
defensive pessimism, thought content is negative (thoughts of a problem) but intrapersonal 
context is positive, reflecting high levels of optimism and positive self-belief. This analysis also 
suggests that there may be two routes by which cognitive processing could be constructive: 
Following a stressful event (negative situational context), it could be useful to either focus on 
finding benefits (positive content) in as abstract a way as possible, or to focus on the negative 
experience (negative content) in as concrete and detailed a way as possible. It is important to 
acknowledge that, although this mapping of function to classes of RT is consistent with all the 
evidence reviewed, it is not a definitive account, but rather a preliminary framework to organize 
findings across the RT literature, inform re-analysis of extant findings, and generate further 
hypotheses.  
The key messages of this article are twofold. First, the article extends the explanatory 
power of previous theorizing about RT by elaborating on the original control theory account of 
rumination, and suggests that the process of RT can be best understood within this framework. 
As well as providing a theoretical framework to guide future research, this approach has 
considerable implications for understanding how thinking, action, and emotional state interact. 
Second, this analysis is of particular relevance to answering the important theoretical and applied 
question of how RT about upsetting events sometimes leads to effective cognitive processing and 
problem solving, yet at other times exacerbates depression and anxiety.  
This review was not meant to be, and clearly, could not be, exhaustive. Given the breadth 
of the literature relevant to RT, it is likely that other factors not mentioned here are compatible 
with this analysis, or could influence the consequences of RT. Furthermore, this review has 
focused on the processes and mechanisms most directly linked to the different consequences of 
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RT, at the loss of detailed consideration of other factors potentially linked to RT. In particular, 
biological, interpersonal, neuropsychological and neurological factors, such as the role of 
neurotransmitters, functional deficits in inhibitory processes, and functional neuroanatomy have 
not been reviewed (e.g., Mayberg, 2006; Ray et al., 2005; Siegle et al., 2001). This is not to 
argue that these factors do not play a role in influencing RT; it is probable that they do; rather it 
reflects the fact that there is currently little evidence that these processes influence the 
consequences of RT, which was the focus of this review. Future research would usefully 
examine these factors in relationship to the consequences of RT and, in particular, with reference 
to the control theory elaborated here. Nonetheless, I hope that the integrative framework 
elucidated here provides a novel and useful theoretical organization that will facilitate research 
on the mechanisms underpinning RT, and provides the first tentative answers to the highly 
significant question of “What determines whether RT leads to constructive or unconstructive 
consequences?” 
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Footnotes 
 1
Experiential rumination has some overlap with mindfulness meditation, conceptualized 
as “paying attention in a particular way, on purpose, in the present moment, non-judgementally” 
(Kabat-Zinn, 1990). However, it differs from mindfulness in that it does not involve a focus on 
acceptance, compassion or decentering (viewing thought and feelings as mental events), nor an 
explicit grounding in body state (focus on the breath or scanning the body). Moreover, this brief 
manipulation lacks the extensive formal and informal practice recognized as critical in engaging 
fully with the experience of mindfulness. Further, whilst mindfulness meditation can involve RT, 
it need not necessarily do so. Thus, these studies compare different forms of RT, rather than 
rumination to mindfulness. 
 2
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this distinction between 
structural versus process aspects of RT. 
 3
It is important to note that the distinction between abstract and concrete levels of 
representation used here differs from accounts in which concrete levels of representation are 
associated with “hot” emotionally-arousing representations, whereas abstract levels of 
representation are associated with “cool”, less arousing representations (Ayduk, Mischel, & 
Downey, 2002 ; Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005 who report that distanced, non-emotionally 
immersed processing can be adaptive when focused on anger; for theoretical account see 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). The level-of-construal and level of goal hierarchy accounts 
discussed here do not make links between level of processing and emotional arousal, rather 
degree of emotional arousal/distance is conceptualized as a separate dimension.  
 4
Several theories of cognition and emotion share with the control theory account an 
emphasis on (a) self-related discrepancies driving RT, and (b) different levels of processing and 
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mental representation, notably the Self-Regulatory Executive Function model (SREF; 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Wells & Matthews, 1994) and the Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems theory (ICS; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993). As many of the predictions and principles 
of these models can be subsumed within the broader control theory framework and are not 
exclusive to each particular theory, in the interests of conciseness, these theories are not further 
elaborated here. 
 5
I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting how more concrete levels-of-
construal would facilitate the monitoring of goal progress. 
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si
ti
v
e 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
: 
B
ip
o
la
r 
>
 M
D
D
 =
 n
o
 m
o
o
d
 d
is
o
rd
er
. 
P
o
si
ti
v
e 
ru
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 h
y
p
o
m
a
n
ia
 
  
  
Jo
o
rm
an
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
6
4
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
R
S
Q
, 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 f
ac
ia
l 
d
o
t-
p
ro
b
e 
B
ro
o
d
in
g
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 a
tt
e
n
ti
o
n
al
 b
ia
s 
to
w
ar
d
s 
sa
d
 f
ac
e
s 
  
  
K
o
co
v
sk
i 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
5
5
 h
ig
h
 v
s.
 5
7
 l
o
w
 s
o
ci
al
ly
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
u
/g
’s
 
V
ig
n
et
te
s 
o
f 
p
u
b
li
c 
m
is
ta
k
e
s 
R
ep
o
rt
 o
f 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
: 
H
ig
h
 s
o
ci
al
ly
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
>
 l
o
w
 s
o
ci
al
ly
 
an
x
io
u
s 
   
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
2
9
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
K
u
y
k
en
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
H
ig
h
 v
s.
 l
o
w
 r
is
k
 v
s.
 M
D
D
; 
3
2
6
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
 (
ag
e 
1
4
-1
8
) 
 
E
P
Q
-N
, 
B
D
I,
 R
S
Q
, 
P
H
Q
-A
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
: 
M
D
D
 >
 a
t 
ri
sk
  
(h
ig
h
 N
) 
>
 n
o
t 
at
 r
is
k
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 i
n
 M
D
D
 g
ro
u
p
 
  
  
L
a
m
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
3
) 
1
0
9
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 A
S
Q
, 
D
A
S
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 s
co
re
s,
 n
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
as
t 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 e
p
is
o
d
es
 
  
  
L
y
u
b
o
m
ir
sk
y
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
R
et
ro
sp
ec
ti
v
e,
 7
0
 b
re
as
t 
ca
n
ce
r 
su
rv
iv
o
rs
 
R
S
Q
, 
d
el
a
y
 i
n
 s
ee
k
in
g
 
h
el
p
 
T
im
e 
to
 p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
: 
H
ig
h
 r
u
m
in
at
o
rs
 >
 l
o
w
 r
u
m
in
at
o
rs
 (
o
n
 
av
er
ag
e 
3
9
 d
ay
s 
lo
n
g
er
) 
  
  
M
ar
k
m
an
 &
 M
il
le
r 
(2
0
0
6
) 
5
8
 u
/g
s 
d
iv
id
ed
 i
n
to
 s
ev
er
e 
d
e
p
re
ss
io
n
, 
m
il
d
-t
o
-
m
o
d
er
at
e 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
n
o
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
g
en
er
at
ed
 
co
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
a
ls
 a
b
o
u
t 
re
ce
n
t 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
ac
ad
e
m
ic
 
ev
en
t 
 
C
o
d
in
g
 o
f 
co
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
a
ls
, 
ra
ti
n
g
 
o
f 
n
e
g
at
iv
e 
ev
e
n
t 
 
G
re
at
er
 r
ed
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 R
T
 f
o
r 
le
ss
 
d
ep
re
ss
ed
. 
U
n
co
n
tr
o
ll
ab
le
, 
ch
ar
ac
te
ro
lo
g
ic
al
 
co
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
a
ls
: 
se
v
er
e 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 =
 n
o
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 >
 m
il
d
-
to
-m
o
d
er
at
e 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
. 
  
  
  
M
el
li
n
g
s 
&
 A
ld
en
 (
2
0
0
0
) 
5
8
 s
o
ci
al
ly
 a
n
x
io
u
s;
 5
8
 n
o
n
-a
n
x
io
u
s 
F
re
q
u
en
c
y
 o
f 
p
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
R
T
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
o
ci
al
 
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
 
F
re
q
u
en
c
y
 o
f 
p
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
R
T
: 
S
o
ci
al
ly
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
>
 n
o
n
-
an
x
io
u
s.
 R
T
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 r
ec
al
l 
o
f 
n
e
g
at
iv
e 
se
lf
-r
el
at
ed
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
, 
n
eg
a
ti
v
e 
se
lf
-j
u
d
g
m
e
n
ts
 w
h
e
n
 a
n
ti
ci
p
at
in
g
 a
 
fu
rt
h
er
 s
o
ci
al
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
  
  
  
M
ey
er
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
0
) 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
4
0
5
 u
/g
’s
 
P
S
W
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 S
T
A
I 
W
o
rr
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
n
d
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
&
 J
ac
k
so
n
 (
2
0
0
1
) 
7
4
0
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 s
a
m
p
le
 
R
S
Q
, 
b
el
ie
fs
 r
e 
co
n
tr
o
ll
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
s,
 m
as
te
ry
 o
f 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
e
v
en
ts
 
B
el
ie
fs
 a
b
o
u
t 
co
n
tr
o
ll
ab
il
it
y
 o
f 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
s,
 m
as
te
ry
 o
f 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
e
v
en
ts
 m
ed
ia
te
d
 g
en
d
er
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 
  
  
P
ap
ad
ak
is
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
2
2
3
 g
ir
ls
 b
et
w
ee
n
 7
th
-1
2
th
 g
ra
d
e 
R
S
Q
, 
d
is
cr
ep
an
c
y
 
b
et
w
ee
n
 a
ct
u
al
 &
 i
d
ea
l 
se
lf
, 
B
D
I 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 i
n
te
ra
ct
ed
 w
it
h
 d
is
cr
ep
an
c
y
 t
o
 p
re
d
ic
t 
co
n
cu
rr
en
t 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
P
er
in
i 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
H
ig
h
 v
s.
 l
o
w
 s
o
ci
al
ly
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
g
ro
u
p
s 
 
P
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
R
T
 f
o
r 
1
 w
k
 
af
te
r 
sp
ee
ch
 
P
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
: 
S
o
ci
al
ly
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
>
 l
o
w
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
3
0
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
R
ac
h
m
a
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
1
3
0
 u
/g
’s
 
B
D
I,
 s
o
ci
al
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 
in
v
e
n
to
ry
, 
p
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
R
T
 
P
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
R
T
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 s
o
ci
al
 
an
x
ie
ty
 a
n
d
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
R
ic
h
m
o
n
d
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
1
) 
1
4
5
 u
/g
’s
 
ID
D
, 
R
S
Q
 
In
cr
ea
se
d
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 g
re
at
er
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
c
u
rr
en
t 
an
d
 p
as
t 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
  
  
R
is
o
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
3
) 
O
u
tp
at
ie
n
ts
: 
4
2
 d
y
st
h
y
m
ia
; 
2
7
 n
o
n
c
h
ro
n
ic
 M
D
D
; 
2
4
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
S
C
ID
, 
D
A
S
, 
A
S
Q
, 
R
S
Q
, 
ID
S
 
R
u
m
in
at
iv
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
 s
ty
le
: 
D
y
st
h
y
m
ia
 =
 n
o
n
c
h
ro
n
ic
 M
D
D
 >
 n
ev
er
-i
ll
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
  
  
R
o
b
er
ts
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
8
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
1
3
 C
D
; 
1
3
 P
D
; 
1
9
 N
D
; 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
2
4
 C
D
; 
 8
7
 P
P
D
; 
1
4
9
 B
P
D
; 
3
5
6
 N
D
 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 I
D
D
, 
ID
D
-L
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
: 
cu
rr
en
tl
y
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
(C
D
) 
=
 
p
re
v
io
u
sl
y
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
(P
D
) 
>
 n
ev
er
-d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
(N
D
) 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
: 
C
D
 =
 p
ro
lo
n
g
ed
 P
D
 >
 b
ri
ef
 P
D
 >
 
N
D
. 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
: 
fe
m
al
e
s 
>
 m
al
es
. 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 m
ed
ia
te
s 
ef
fe
c
ts
 o
f 
g
en
d
er
 &
 N
 o
n
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a.
 
  
  
R
u
d
e 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
2
3
2
 u
/g
’s
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
4
6
3
 u
/g
’s
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
R
S
Q
, 
S
T
A
I,
 
S
el
f-
ra
ti
n
g
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
sc
al
e,
 S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
n
o
n
-
ju
d
g
in
g
 R
S
Q
, 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I 
S
tu
d
y
 1
 &
 2
: 
b
o
th
 b
ro
o
d
in
g
 &
 r
ef
le
ct
io
n
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
an
x
ie
ty
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
n
o
n
-j
u
d
g
in
g
 
re
fl
ec
ti
o
n
 n
o
t 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
. 
  
  
S
ch
lo
tz
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
) 
2
1
9
 p
ts
  
W
o
rr
y
 &
 w
o
rk
 
o
v
er
lo
ad
, 
sa
li
v
a 
o
n
 
a
w
a
k
in
g
 &
 a
t 
3
0
, 
4
5
, 
6
0
 
m
in
s 
fo
r 
6
 d
ay
s 
In
cr
ea
se
d
 w
o
rr
y
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 g
re
at
er
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 a
n
d
 e
le
v
a
te
d
 
m
ea
n
 l
e
v
el
s 
o
f 
co
rt
is
o
l 
o
n
 w
ee
k
d
a
y
s 
  
  
S
ch
w
ar
tz
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
re
co
v
er
y
 a
ft
er
 a
n
g
er
 r
ec
al
l;
 3
0
 g
en
er
al
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
T
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 
an
g
er
 r
ec
al
l,
 B
P
 
S
lo
w
er
 B
P
 r
ec
o
v
er
y
 a
ft
er
 a
n
g
e
r 
re
ca
ll
 i
n
 w
o
m
en
 o
n
ly
 
  
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
3
1
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
S
eg
er
st
ro
m
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
1
1
0
 u
/g
’s
; 
4
0
 C
B
T
 o
u
tp
at
ie
n
ts
 
 
M
ea
su
re
 o
f 
R
T
, 
R
S
Q
, 
P
S
W
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 B
A
I 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
R
T
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 R
S
Q
, 
P
S
W
Q
, 
an
x
ie
ty
 &
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
 
  
  
S
m
al
lw
o
o
d
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
3
0
 u
/g
’s
. 
E
x
a
m
in
ed
 m
in
d
 w
a
n
d
er
in
g
 v
ia
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
p
ro
b
es
 d
u
ri
n
g
 v
ig
il
a
n
ce
 a
n
d
 w
o
rd
 e
n
co
d
in
g
 t
as
k
s 
 
C
E
S
-D
 
M
in
d
 w
an
d
er
in
g
 (
ta
sk
 u
n
re
la
te
d
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
d
u
ri
n
g
 p
ro
b
es
) 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
S
m
al
lw
o
o
d
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
7
) 
3
7
 u
/g
’s
 s
p
li
t 
in
to
 h
ig
h
 v
s.
 l
o
w
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c,
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
p
ro
b
es
 
d
u
ri
n
g
 w
o
rd
 e
n
co
d
in
g
 v
s.
 w
o
rd
 s
h
ad
o
w
in
g
 f
o
ll
o
w
ed
 b
y
 
w
o
rd
 f
ra
g
m
e
n
t 
co
m
p
le
ti
o
n
 r
ec
o
g
n
it
io
n
 t
as
k
 
C
E
S
-D
, 
R
S
Q
 
D
u
ri
n
g
 w
o
rd
 e
n
co
d
in
g
, 
h
ig
h
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
g
ro
u
p
 s
h
o
w
ed
 a
n
 
in
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 m
in
d
 w
an
d
er
in
g
 r
e
la
ti
v
e 
to
 l
o
w
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
g
ro
u
p
. 
M
in
d
 w
an
d
er
in
g
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 s
lo
w
er
 r
ea
ct
io
n
 t
im
es
, 
p
o
o
re
r 
re
co
g
n
it
io
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
e
n
co
d
in
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
. 
 
  
  
S
te
il
 &
 E
h
le
rs
 (
2
0
0
0
) 
2
 S
tu
d
ie
s:
 1
5
9
 &
 1
3
8
 R
T
A
 s
u
rv
iv
o
rs
 
P
S
S
, 
co
g
n
it
iv
e 
st
ra
te
g
ie
s 
in
c
l.
 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 P
T
S
D
 s
ev
er
it
y
 
  
  
S
u
ch
d
a
y
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
) 
4
0
 m
al
e 
st
u
d
e
n
ts
 
R
ec
o
v
er
y
 o
f 
B
P
 a
ft
er
 
p
ro
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
, 
an
g
ry
 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
A
n
g
ry
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 s
lo
w
er
 r
ec
o
v
er
y
 o
f 
B
P
 
  
  
T
h
o
m
se
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
3
) 
1
2
6
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 
E
C
Q
-R
, 
P
O
M
S
, 
P
S
Q
I 
R
T
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e,
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
&
 a
n
g
ry
 
m
o
o
d
, 
p
o
o
re
r 
sl
ee
p
 q
u
al
it
y
, 
lo
n
g
er
 s
le
ep
-o
n
se
t.
  
  
  
T
ra
p
n
el
l 
&
 C
a
m
p
b
el
l 
(1
9
9
9
) 
3
 s
a
m
p
le
s 
u
/g
’s
, 
n
 =
 4
4
1
, 
n
 =
 5
7
0
, 
n
 =
 7
1
0
 
R
R
Q
, 
N
E
O
-F
F
, 
B
D
I 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 s
ca
le
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
tl
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
(r
 =
 .
3
8
, 
r 
=
 .
3
6
) 
an
d
 n
eu
ro
ti
ci
sm
 (
r 
=
.6
4
) 
  
  
V
er
p
la
n
k
en
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
7
) 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
1
4
2
 u
/g
’s
; 
st
u
d
y
 3
: 
9
7
 u
/g
’s
 
H
IN
T
, 
A
T
Q
, 
R
S
E
 
H
ab
it
u
al
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
se
lf
-t
h
in
k
in
g
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
ly
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
, 
lo
w
 s
el
f-
es
te
e
m
 (
st
u
d
y
 2
, 
3
),
  
  
  
Z
ie
g
er
 &
 K
a
st
n
er
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
2
0
1
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
 
R
S
Q
, 
C
D
I 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 e
le
v
at
ed
 i
n
 g
ir
ls
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a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
et
 a
l.
 (
1
9
9
7
) 
T
2
 =
 1
 y
ea
r;
 3
0
 g
a
y
 m
e
n
, 
w
h
o
se
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
d
ie
d
 f
ro
m
 A
ID
S
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 
tr
an
sc
ri
p
ts
, 
IE
S
, 
C
E
S
-D
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 d
is
tr
es
s 
(i
n
tr
u
si
v
e 
&
 
av
o
id
an
t 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
) 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
al
th
o
u
g
h
 n
o
t 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 T
1
 I
E
S
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
et
 a
l.
 (
1
9
9
9
) 
T
2
 =
 1
 y
ea
r 
la
te
r;
 1
,1
3
2
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 a
d
u
lt
s 
B
D
I,
 H
R
S
D
, 
R
S
Q
, 
ch
ro
n
ic
 s
tr
ai
n
, 
m
as
te
ry
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
, 
ch
ro
n
ic
 s
tr
ai
n
, 
&
 m
as
te
ry
 m
ed
ia
te
d
 g
en
d
er
 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
. 
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
&
 M
o
rr
o
w
 (
1
9
9
1
) 
T
2
 =
 1
0
 d
ay
s 
a
ft
er
 q
u
ak
e 
(n
=
1
3
7
),
 T
3
 =
 7
 w
k
s 
af
te
r 
q
u
ak
e 
(n
=
4
1
);
 2
5
0
 u
/g
’s
 2
 w
k
s 
b
ef
o
re
 1
9
8
9
 L
o
m
o
 P
ri
et
a 
ea
rt
h
q
u
a
k
e 
 
R
S
Q
, 
ID
D
, 
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
n
d
 P
T
S
D
 s
tr
es
s 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
at
 T
2
 a
n
d
 T
3
, 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
T
1
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s.
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
b
o
u
t 
ea
rt
h
q
u
a
k
e 
at
 T
2
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 s
tr
es
s 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
at
 T
3
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
et
 a
l.
 (
1
9
9
3
) 
7
9
 u
/g
’s
  
3
0
 d
ay
 d
ia
ry
 o
f 
m
o
o
d
 &
 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
M
o
re
 r
u
m
in
a
ti
v
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
p
re
d
ic
te
d
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
d
ep
re
ss
ed
 m
o
o
d
, 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
in
it
ia
l 
se
v
er
it
y
 o
f 
m
o
o
d
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
et
 a
l.
 (
1
9
9
4
) 
 
T
2
 =
 6
 m
th
s;
 2
5
3
 a
d
u
lt
s,
 1
 m
th
 a
ft
er
 d
ea
th
 o
f 
lo
v
ed
 o
n
e 
 
R
S
Q
, 
H
R
S
D
,B
D
I,
 
S
o
ci
al
 s
u
p
p
o
rt
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
  
at
 T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
at
 T
2
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 T
1
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
an
n
u
al
ly
 f
o
r 
4
 y
rs
; 
4
9
6
 f
e
m
al
e
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
, 
1
1
-1
5
 y
rs
 o
ld
 
R
S
Q
, 
S
A
D
S
 f
o
r 
C
h
il
d
re
n
, 
E
at
in
g
 
D
is
o
rd
er
 
E
x
a
m
in
at
io
n
, 
su
b
st
a
n
ce
 a
b
u
se
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
b
u
li
m
ia
 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
&
 s
u
b
st
an
ce
 a
b
u
se
 o
v
er
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 y
r;
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 
fo
r 
1
 y
ea
r 
la
g
 o
f 
sy
m
p
to
m
s.
 D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
n
d
 b
u
li
m
ic
 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
p
re
d
ic
te
d
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 o
v
er
 y
r.
 
  
  
R
ae
s 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
T
2
 =
 7
 m
th
s;
 2
8
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
R
S
S
, 
B
D
I,
 H
R
S
D
, 
A
M
T
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 o
n
 s
ad
n
e
ss
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 B
D
I 
at
 T
2
 &
 
m
ed
ia
te
d
 r
el
at
io
n
sh
ip
 b
et
w
ee
n
 m
e
m
o
ry
 s
p
ec
if
ic
it
y
 &
 B
D
I 
 
  
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
3
6
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 
S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
R
ec
to
r 
&
 R
o
g
er
 (
1
9
9
6
) 
T
1
 s
ta
rt
 o
f 
te
rm
, 
T
2
  
=
 8
 w
k
s 
la
te
r,
 1
2
1
 1
st
 y
ea
r 
u
/g
’s
  
E
C
Q
-R
, 
G
H
C
, 
Y
o
rk
 
se
lf
-e
st
ee
m
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
 
A
n
x
ie
ty
, 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
in
so
m
n
ia
 o
n
 G
H
C
 a
t 
T
2
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 
b
y
 r
e
h
ea
rs
al
 a
t 
T
1
 
  
  
R
o
b
in
so
n
 &
 A
ll
o
y
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
T
2
 =
 2
.5
 y
rs
; 
 
1
4
8
 u
/g
’s
 a
t 
 h
ig
h
 a
n
d
 l
o
w
 c
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
ri
sk
 
S
tr
es
s-
re
ac
ti
v
e 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
, 
R
S
Q
, 
 
B
D
I,
 D
A
S
, 
C
S
Q
, 
S
A
D
S
-L
 
S
tr
es
s-
re
ac
ti
v
e 
ru
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 f
u
tu
re
 M
D
E
 a
t 
T
2
 i
n
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
s 
w
it
h
 h
ig
h
 D
A
S
, 
C
S
Q
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
lo
w
 D
A
S
, 
C
S
Q
 
  
  
R
o
el
o
fs
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
T
2
 =
 6
 m
th
s;
 3
3
1
 a
t 
T
1
, 
7
3
 a
t 
T
2
 u
/g
’s
 
R
S
Q
, 
R
R
S
, 
Z
u
n
g
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 s
ca
le
, 
S
T
A
I 
Jo
in
t 
fa
ct
o
r 
“r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 o
n
 c
a
u
se
s 
o
f 
sa
d
n
e
ss
” 
in
te
ra
ct
ed
 
w
it
h
 T
1
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 t
o
 p
re
d
ic
t 
T
2
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 T
1
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 &
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
R
o
g
er
 &
 N
aj
ar
ia
n
 (
1
9
9
8
) 
T
1
 =
 i
m
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 a
ft
er
 e
x
a
m
, 
T
2
  
=
 3
 w
k
s 
la
te
r;
 5
1
 s
tu
d
e
n
t 
n
u
rs
es
  
E
C
Q
-R
, 
u
ri
n
ar
y
 
co
rt
is
o
l 
In
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 c
o
rt
is
o
l 
T
1
 t
o
 T
2
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 
R
T
  
  
  
R
o
h
an
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
3
) 
T
1
 =
 O
ct
-N
o
v
, 
T
2
 =
 J
an
-F
eb
; 
2
0
 S
A
D
 w
o
m
e
n
; 
2
0
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 S
C
ID
, 
H
R
S
D
 
In
 S
A
D
, 
R
T
 a
ss
es
se
d
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 w
in
te
r 
at
 T
2
, 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
T
1
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
S
ak
a
m
o
to
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
1
) 
T
2
 =
 2
 m
th
s;
 9
8
 u
/g
’s
  
R
S
Q
, 
S
el
f-
R
a
ti
n
g
 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 S
ca
le
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
ts
 r
u
m
in
at
iv
e 
re
sp
o
n
se
s 
a
n
d
 
co
g
n
it
iv
e 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
o
f 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
2
 
  
  
S
ar
in
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
5
) 
T
1
 =
 g
ra
d
in
g
 o
f 
d
if
fi
c
u
lt
 m
id
te
rm
 e
x
a
m
; 
T
2
 =
 4
-8
 h
rs
 l
at
er
, 
T
3
 =
 
4
 d
ay
s 
la
te
r;
 8
7
 u
/g
’s
  
R
S
Q
, 
M
A
S
Q
  
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
ts
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
t 
T
2
 a
n
d
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 b
o
th
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 &
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 a
t 
T
3
 
  
  
S
ch
m
al
in
g
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
2
) 
co
u
rs
e 
o
f 
tr
ea
tm
e
n
t;
 9
6
 d
y
st
h
y
m
ia
 /
 m
in
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
  
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 H
R
S
D
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 p
re
d
ic
ts
 m
o
re
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
/p
o
o
r 
tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
sp
o
n
se
 a
cr
o
ss
 a
ll
 3
 t
re
at
m
e
n
t 
co
n
d
it
io
n
s:
 P
S
T
, 
p
ar
o
x
et
in
e 
o
r 
p
la
ce
b
o
 
  
  
S
ch
w
ar
tz
 &
 K
o
en
ig
 (
1
9
9
6
) 
T
2
 =
 6
 w
k
s;
 3
9
7
 a
d
o
le
sc
en
ts
 
R
S
Q
, 
A
S
Q
, 
C
D
I 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
2
 
  
  
S
eg
er
st
ro
m
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
8
) 
2
, 
8
, 
1
5
 w
ee
k
s 
a
ft
er
 N
o
rt
h
ri
d
g
e 
ea
rt
h
q
u
ak
e 
1
9
9
4
; 
4
7
 h
o
sp
it
al
 
w
o
rk
er
s 
 
P
S
W
Q
, 
IE
S
, 
P
O
M
S
, 
N
K
 c
el
ls
 
N
K
 c
el
ls
: 
L
o
w
 w
o
rr
ie
rs
 >
 h
ig
h
 w
o
rr
ie
rs
 
In
tr
u
si
v
e 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
: 
H
ig
h
 w
o
rr
ie
rs
 >
 l
o
w
 w
o
rr
ie
rs
 
  
  
S
eg
er
st
ro
m
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
T
1
 =
 p
ri
o
r 
m
id
te
rm
 e
x
a
m
; 
T
2
 =
 1
 w
k
 p
o
st
-e
x
a
m
; 
9
0
 
u
/g
’s
 
M
ea
su
re
 o
f 
R
T
, 
R
S
Q
, 
P
S
W
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 B
A
I 
sh
ar
ed
 v
ar
ia
n
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n
 R
S
Q
 &
 P
S
W
Q
 (
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t)
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 m
ai
n
te
n
an
c
e 
o
f 
an
x
ie
ty
, 
a
ft
er
 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
T
1
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 (
p
 <
 .
0
7
) 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
3
7
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
S
ie
g
le
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
9
) 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
o
u
tc
o
m
e;
 5
3
 M
D
D
 o
r 
d
y
st
h
y
m
ia
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
R
S
Q
, 
w
ee
k
ly
 B
D
I 
d
u
ri
n
g
 C
B
T
  
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 w
as
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 s
lo
w
er
 r
ec
o
v
er
y
 f
ro
m
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
in
 p
ar
t 
m
ed
ia
te
d
 b
y
 i
n
it
ia
l 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
S
m
it
h
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
T
2
 =
 2
.5
 y
rs
; 
1
3
7
 u
/g
’s
 w
it
h
 h
ig
h
 v
s.
 l
o
w
 c
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
ri
sk
 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 D
A
S
, 
C
S
Q
, 
h
o
p
el
es
sn
e
ss
, 
su
ic
id
al
 i
d
ea
ti
o
n
 
P
re
se
n
ce
 &
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 o
f 
su
ic
id
al
 i
d
ea
ti
o
n
 a
t 
T
2
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 b
y
 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 a
t 
T
1
, 
w
it
h
 t
h
is
 e
ff
ec
t 
p
ar
ti
al
ly
 m
ed
ia
te
d
 b
y
 
h
o
p
el
es
sn
es
s 
  
  
S
p
as
o
je
v
ic
 &
 A
ll
o
y
 (
2
0
0
1
) 
A
ss
es
se
d
 e
v
er
y
 6
 w
ee
k
s 
fo
r 
2
.5
 y
ea
rs
; 
1
3
7
 u
/g
’s
 w
it
h
  
h
ig
h
 v
s.
 
lo
w
 c
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
ri
sk
 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I,
 D
A
S
, 
C
S
Q
, 
S
A
D
S
-L
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 m
ed
ia
te
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
d
y
sf
u
n
ct
io
n
al
 a
tt
it
u
d
es
, 
p
as
t 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
se
lf
-c
ri
ti
c
is
m
 o
n
 o
n
se
t 
o
f 
M
D
E
. 
  
  
S
ta
n
to
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
T
1
 =
 2
0
 w
k
s 
af
te
r 
tr
ea
tm
e
n
t,
 T
2
 =
 3
 m
th
s 
la
te
r;
 9
2
 f
e
m
al
e 
b
re
as
t 
ca
n
ce
r 
p
at
ie
n
ts
 
C
O
P
E
, 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 
p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
 &
 
ex
p
re
ss
io
n
, 
P
O
M
S
 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 h
ig
h
er
 d
is
tr
es
s 
sc
o
re
s 
at
 T
2
, 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 T
1
 d
is
tr
es
s 
an
d
 e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 
ex
p
re
ss
io
n
  
  
  
T
h
o
m
so
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
a)
 
T
2
 =
 1
 y
ea
r;
 9
6
 2
0
-3
5
 y
r 
o
ld
s,
 1
1
0
 7
0
-8
5
 y
r 
o
ld
s 
E
C
Q
-R
, 
se
lf
-
re
p
o
rt
ed
 p
h
y
si
ca
l 
p
ro
b
le
m
s 
R
T
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 s
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
 p
h
y
si
ca
l 
h
ea
lt
h
 
o
n
ly
 f
o
r 
2
0
-3
5
 y
r 
o
ld
s 
  
  
T
h
o
m
se
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
b
) 
im
m
u
n
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
m
ea
su
re
s 
7
-1
4
 d
ay
s 
af
te
r 
T
1
, 
fo
ll
o
w
-u
p
 1
 y
r;
 
1
9
6
 2
0
-3
5
 y
r 
o
ld
s;
 3
1
4
 7
0
-8
5
 y
r 
o
ld
s 
E
C
Q
-R
, 
P
O
M
S
, 
M
M
S
E
, 
sl
ee
p
 
q
u
al
it
y
. 
H
ea
lt
h
 c
ar
e 
u
se
  
R
T
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 s
ad
 m
o
o
d
 &
 p
o
o
r 
sl
ee
p
 q
u
al
it
y
. 
In
 7
0
-8
5
 y
r 
o
ld
s,
 R
T
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 n
u
m
b
er
s 
o
f 
le
u
k
o
c
y
te
s 
a
n
d
 
ly
m
p
h
o
c
y
te
s,
 a
n
d
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 h
e
al
th
 c
ar
e 
u
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
, 
es
p
. 
te
le
p
h
o
n
e 
co
n
su
lt
at
io
n
 
  
  
T
re
y
n
o
r 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
T
2
 =
 1
 y
r;
 1
1
3
0
  
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
 s
a
m
p
le
 
R
S
Q
, 
B
D
I 
B
ro
o
d
in
g
 s
u
b
sc
al
e 
at
 T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 m
o
re
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
2
 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
1
 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
3
8
 
 T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
V
er
p
la
n
k
en
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
7
) 
T
2
 =
 9
 m
th
s;
 1
1
0
2
 N
o
rw
e
g
ia
n
 c
it
iz
en
s 
H
IN
T
, 
H
A
D
S
, 
D
A
S
, 
li
fe
 e
v
e
n
ts
 
C
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
T
1
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s,
 d
y
sf
u
n
ct
io
n
al
 a
tt
it
u
d
es
 &
 l
if
e 
ev
en
ts
, 
h
ab
it
u
al
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
se
lf
-t
h
in
k
in
g
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 &
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
2
 
  
  
Y
o
u
n
g
 &
 A
za
m
 (
2
0
0
3
) 
S
ep
t 
to
 N
o
v
 (
T
1
);
 J
an
 t
o
 M
ar
ch
 (
T
2
);
 1
8
 S
A
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
1
4
 d
ay
 d
ia
ry
 o
f 
m
o
o
d
 &
 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
, 
B
D
I 
D
ia
ry
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ru
m
in
a
ti
o
n
 i
n
 t
h
e 
fa
ll
 (
T
1
) 
p
re
d
ic
te
d
 
w
in
te
r 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
2
, 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
T
1
 B
D
I 
E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
st
u
d
ie
s 
 
 
 
  
  
A
n
d
re
w
s 
&
 B
o
rk
o
v
ec
 (
1
9
8
8
) 
V
el
te
n
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
s:
 w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 v
s.
 s
o
m
at
ic
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 
v
s.
 n
e
u
tr
al
; 
1
2
8
 u
/g
’s
 
M
A
A
C
L
 
F
o
r 
M
A
A
C
L
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
: 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 =
 W
o
rr
y
 =
 S
o
m
at
ic
 
an
x
ie
ty
 >
 n
eu
tr
al
. 
F
o
r 
M
A
A
C
L
 a
n
x
ie
ty
: 
S
o
m
at
ic
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 >
 
w
o
rr
y
 >
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 >
 n
e
u
tr
al
 
  
  
B
eh
ar
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
5
) 
5
-m
in
 c
o
u
n
te
rb
al
an
ce
d
 w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 t
ra
u
m
a 
re
ca
ll
 v
s.
 r
el
ax
at
io
n
; 
u
/g
’s
 S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
7
8
; 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
4
3
 +
/-
 G
A
D
, 
P
T
S
D
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s 
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 &
 
an
x
ie
ty
 r
at
in
g
s 
S
tu
d
y
 1
, 
2
: 
W
o
rr
y
 =
 v
er
b
al
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t,
 t
ra
u
m
a 
re
ca
ll
 
=
im
a
g
er
y
. 
F
o
r 
an
x
ie
ty
: 
w
o
rr
y
 >
=
 t
ra
u
m
a 
re
ca
ll
 >
 r
el
ax
at
io
n
. 
F
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
: 
tr
au
m
a 
re
ca
ll
 >
 w
o
rr
y
 >
 r
el
ax
at
io
n
. 
 
  
  
B
la
g
d
en
 &
 C
ra
sk
e 
(1
9
9
6
) 
A
n
x
io
u
s 
m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 t
h
e
n
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
, 
ac
ti
v
it
y
 v
s.
 
p
as
si
v
it
y
; 
4
4
 u
/g
’s
 
P
O
M
S
 
A
n
x
io
u
s 
m
o
o
d
: 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 >
 D
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 
  
  
B
o
rk
o
v
ec
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
3
) 
3
0
s 
re
la
x
at
io
n
 v
s.
 g
e
n
er
al
-w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t-
w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 i
m
a
g
e-
w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 a
ff
ec
t-
w
o
rr
y
, 
th
en
 p
u
b
li
c 
sp
ea
k
in
g
 i
m
ag
e 
x
 1
0
; 
7
5
 
fe
m
al
e 
h
ig
h
 s
p
ee
ch
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
u
/g
’s
  
H
R
, 
fe
ar
 r
at
in
g
 
H
R
 d
u
ri
n
g
 t
h
re
at
 i
m
ag
e:
 R
el
a
x
at
io
n
 >
 T
h
o
u
g
h
t-
w
o
rr
y
: 
o
th
er
 
3
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
b
et
w
ee
n
 b
u
t 
n
s 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
. 
F
ea
r 
ra
ti
n
g
 d
u
ri
n
g
 
p
u
b
li
c 
sp
ea
k
in
g
 i
m
a
g
e:
 A
ll
 W
o
rr
y
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
>
 R
el
a
x
at
io
n
 
  
  
B
o
rk
o
v
ec
 &
 H
u
 (
1
9
9
0
) 
D
a
y
 1
: 
N
eu
tr
al
 v
s.
 r
el
ax
a
ti
o
n
 v
s.
 w
o
rr
y
, 
d
a
y
 2
: 
im
a
g
in
e 
p
u
b
li
c 
sp
ea
k
in
g
 x
 1
0
 t
ri
al
s;
 4
5
 f
e
m
al
e 
h
ig
h
 s
p
ee
c
h
 a
n
x
io
u
s 
u
/g
’s
 
H
R
, 
fe
ar
 r
at
in
g
 
H
R
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 t
o
 i
m
a
g
er
y
: 
R
el
a
x
at
io
n
 >
 n
eu
tr
al
 >
 w
o
rr
y
. 
F
ea
r 
re
p
o
rt
 t
o
 i
m
a
g
e
s:
 W
o
rr
y
 >
 n
e
u
tr
al
 
  
  
B
o
rk
o
v
ec
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
8
3
) 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
0
 v
s.
 1
5
-m
in
 v
s.
 3
0
-m
in
 w
o
rr
y
 p
er
io
d
s,
 w
it
h
 p
re
- 
&
 
p
o
st
- 
m
a
n
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 f
o
cu
s-
b
re
at
h
in
g
 t
a
sk
s;
 6
0
 u
/g
 w
o
rr
ie
rs
 v
s.
 
n
o
n
w
o
rr
ie
rs
 
M
A
A
C
L
, 
H
R
  
A
n
x
ie
ty
, 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
h
o
st
il
it
y
: 
W
o
rr
ie
rs
 >
 n
o
n
w
o
rr
ie
rs
 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
d
is
tr
ac
ti
n
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
: 
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 1
5
-m
in
 w
o
rr
y
, 
d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 0
-m
in
, 
3
0
-m
in
 w
o
rr
y
 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
3
9
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
B
ro
ss
ch
o
t 
&
 v
a
n
 d
en
 D
o
ef
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
P
o
st
p
o
n
e 
w
o
rr
y
 t
o
 3
0
-m
in
 p
er
io
d
 d
ai
ly
 v
s.
 n
o
 i
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
; 
1
7
1
 
h
ig
h
 s
c
h
o
o
l 
st
u
d
en
ts
 
6
 d
ay
 l
o
g
 o
f 
w
o
rr
y
, 
so
m
at
ic
 s
y
m
p
to
m
s 
fo
r 
3
 d
ay
s 
p
re
-
/p
o
st
-i
n
te
rv
e
n
ti
o
n
 
P
o
st
p
o
n
er
s 
fe
w
er
 s
o
m
at
ic
 c
o
m
p
la
in
ts
 t
h
a
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
g
ro
u
p
, 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
b
as
el
in
e 
co
m
p
la
in
ts
, 
w
it
h
 w
o
rr
y
 d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 
ac
ti
n
g
 a
s 
m
ed
ia
to
r 
  
  
 B
u
sh
m
a
n
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
A
n
g
er
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 (
in
su
lt
 f
ro
m
 o
th
er
 p
t)
, 
th
en
 h
it
ti
n
g
 p
u
n
c
h
b
ag
 
th
in
k
in
g
 a
b
o
u
t 
o
th
er
 (
ru
m
in
at
io
n
) 
v
s.
 t
h
in
k
in
g
 a
b
o
u
t 
g
et
ti
n
g
 f
it
 
(d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
) 
v
s.
 c
o
n
tr
o
l;
  
6
0
2
 u
/g
’s
 
M
A
A
C
L
-a
n
g
er
, 
P
A
N
A
S
, 
 
A
g
g
re
ss
io
n
 
m
ea
su
re
: 
n
o
is
e 
d
ir
ec
te
d
 t
o
 o
th
er
  
A
n
g
er
: 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 >
 d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 =
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
A
g
g
re
ss
io
n
: 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 >
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
  
  
B
u
sh
m
an
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
5
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
 P
ro
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
, 
th
e
n
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 v
s.
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
m
o
o
d
, 
th
en
 
tr
ig
g
er
 v
s.
 n
o
 t
ri
g
g
er
 f
o
r 
ir
ri
ta
ti
o
n
 (
p
o
o
r 
v
s.
 g
o
o
d
 p
er
fo
rm
a
n
c
e 
o
f 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
ss
is
ta
n
t)
; 
4
2
 u
/g
’s
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
P
ro
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
 v
s.
 n
o
 
p
ro
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
, 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
, 
tr
ig
g
er
 v
s.
 n
o
 t
ri
g
g
er
 (
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
v
s.
 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
e
v
al
u
at
io
n
s 
fr
o
m
 o
th
er
 p
t)
; 
3
8
5
 u
/g
’s
. 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
p
ro
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
 t
h
en
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 n
o
-r
u
m
in
at
io
n
, 
th
e
n
 8
h
r 
la
te
r 
tr
ig
g
er
 
v
s.
 n
o
 t
ri
g
g
er
; 
9
3
 u
/g
’s
  
an
g
er
 r
at
in
g
s,
 
ag
g
re
ss
io
n
 m
ea
su
re
 
(e
v
al
u
at
io
n
 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
ss
is
ta
n
t/
 
h
o
t 
sa
u
ce
 a
ll
o
ca
te
d
 
to
 c
o
n
fe
d
er
at
e/
 
n
o
is
e 
d
ir
ec
te
d
 a
t 
o
th
er
) 
A
n
g
er
: 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 >
 d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 i
n
 a
ll
 3
 s
tu
d
ie
s 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
A
ft
er
 t
ri
g
g
er
, 
ag
g
re
ss
io
n
 i
n
 R
U
M
 >
 D
IS
 =
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
m
o
o
d
; 
n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 a
ft
er
 n
o
 t
ri
g
g
er
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
P
ro
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
 X
 R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 X
 T
ri
g
g
er
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
: 
fo
r 
p
ro
v
o
k
ed
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
, 
in
 t
h
e 
p
re
se
n
ce
 o
f 
tr
ig
g
er
, 
m
o
re
 
h
o
t 
sa
u
ce
 a
ll
o
ca
te
d
 i
n
 R
U
M
 t
h
an
 D
IS
, 
w
it
h
 t
h
is
 e
ff
ec
t 
m
ed
ia
te
d
 b
y
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
af
fe
ct
 i
n
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 t
o
 t
ri
g
g
er
. 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
A
ft
er
 t
ri
g
g
er
, 
ag
g
re
ss
io
n
 i
n
 R
U
M
 >
n
o
-r
u
m
, 
n
o
 
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
f 
n
o
 t
ri
g
g
er
 
  
  
C
ie
sl
a 
&
 R
o
b
er
ts
 (
in
 p
re
ss
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
fo
ll
o
w
ed
 b
y
 n
o
-t
as
k
 d
el
a
y
 
p
er
io
d
; 
1
2
6
 u
/g
’s
; 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
n
e
g
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
th
e
n
 R
U
M
 
v
s.
 D
IS
; 
1
3
2
 u
/g
’s
 
 
B
D
I,
 M
A
A
C
L
, 
R
S
Q
, 
R
S
S
, 
R
S
E
, 
D
A
S
, 
A
S
Q
 
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
R
T
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 p
o
st
-d
el
a
y
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a,
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 f
o
r 
p
o
st
-i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a 
b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 i
n
 l
o
w
 s
el
f-
es
te
e
m
/h
ig
h
 
D
A
S
 p
ts
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
lo
w
er
 s
el
f-
e
st
ee
m
/h
ig
h
er
 D
A
S
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 
h
ig
h
er
 l
e
v
el
s 
o
f 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a,
 t
h
is
 e
ff
ec
t 
st
ro
n
g
er
 i
n
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 
D
IS
. 
 
  
  
C
o
n
w
a
y
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
th
e
n
 n
o
 d
el
ay
 v
s.
 5
-m
in
 d
el
a
y
; 
3
7
 h
ig
h
 
v
s.
 2
4
 l
o
w
 R
S
S
 s
co
re
rs
  
R
S
S
, 
d
is
tr
e
ss
 a
b
o
u
t 
cu
rr
en
t 
co
n
ce
rn
, 
B
D
I 
h
ig
h
 R
S
S
 s
co
re
rs
 m
o
re
 d
is
tr
es
se
d
 i
n
 d
el
a
y
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
 t
h
a
n
 
n
o
-d
el
a
y
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
0
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
D
o
n
al
d
so
n
 &
 L
a
m
 (
2
0
0
4
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
3
6
 M
D
D
, 
3
6
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
m
o
o
d
, 
M
E
P
S
 
In
 M
D
D
 (
n
o
t 
co
n
tr
o
ls
),
 m
o
re
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 a
n
d
 p
o
o
re
r 
p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
s 
in
 R
U
M
>
D
IS
. 
 
  
  
G
ly
n
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
2
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 v
s.
 n
o
n
e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 s
tr
es
so
r,
 h
ig
h
 v
s.
 l
o
w
 
re
ac
ti
v
it
y
 t
as
k
, 
fo
ll
o
w
ed
 b
y
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 (
=
 r
ec
al
l 
st
re
ss
o
r 
v
iv
id
ly
);
 7
2
 u
/g
’s
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
m
e
n
ta
l 
ar
it
h
m
et
ic
 t
as
k
, 
th
e
n
 l
0
 m
in
s 
d
el
ay
 (
p
o
te
n
ti
al
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
) 
v
s.
 D
IS
; 
2
0
 u
/g
’s
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
B
P
, 
H
R
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
B
P
, 
H
R
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
E
le
v
at
ed
 B
P
 d
u
ri
n
g
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
n
d
 s
lo
w
er
 B
P
 
re
co
v
er
y
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 t
h
e 
e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 s
tr
es
so
r 
co
n
d
it
io
n
s 
(m
en
ta
l 
ar
it
h
m
et
ic
, 
sh
o
ck
 a
v
o
id
an
ce
) 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 n
o
n
-
e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 s
tr
es
so
rs
 (
p
h
y
si
ca
l 
ex
er
ci
se
, 
co
ld
-p
re
ss
o
r)
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
S
p
ee
d
 o
f 
B
P
 r
ec
o
v
er
y
: 
D
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 >
 R
T
  
  
  
G
u
as
te
ll
a 
&
 M
o
u
ld
s 
(2
0
0
7
) 
E
v
en
in
g
 a
ft
er
 m
id
-s
es
si
o
n
 e
x
a
m
  
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
5
9
 h
ig
h
 v
s.
 5
5
 l
o
w
 t
ra
it
 r
u
m
in
at
o
rs
 
R
S
Q
, 
IE
S
, 
S
le
ep
 
D
is
tu
rb
an
ce
  
P
re
-s
le
ep
 i
n
tr
u
si
v
e 
th
o
u
g
h
ts
: 
H
ig
h
-t
ra
it
 r
u
m
in
at
o
rs
 >
 l
o
w
-
tr
ai
t 
ru
m
in
at
o
rs
, 
R
U
M
 >
 D
IS
; 
S
le
ep
 q
u
al
it
y
: 
h
ig
h
-t
ra
it
 
ru
m
in
at
o
rs
 i
n
 R
U
M
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
 <
 o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s 
  
  
H
az
le
tt
-S
te
v
e
n
s 
&
 B
o
rk
o
v
ec
 
(2
0
0
1
) 
R
el
ax
a
ti
o
n
 v
s.
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
s.
 w
o
rr
y
 p
ri
o
r 
to
 s
p
ee
ch
; 
  
4
2
 s
p
ee
ch
-a
n
x
io
u
s 
u
/g
’s
 
A
n
x
ie
ty
, 
H
R
, 
M
S
D
 
o
f 
IB
I 
A
n
x
ie
ty
 b
e
fo
re
 a
n
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 f
ir
st
 s
p
ee
ch
: 
w
o
rr
y
 >
co
n
tr
o
l 
>
 
re
la
x
at
io
n
. 
H
R
, 
M
S
D
 o
f 
IB
I 
n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 a
cr
o
ss
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
  
  
H
er
te
l 
(1
9
9
8
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 v
s.
 w
ai
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
; 
3
6
 D
y
s 
v
s,
 5
4
 N
o
n
-d
y
s 
u
/g
’s
 
B
D
I,
 s
te
m
-
co
m
p
le
ti
o
n
 
m
e
m
o
ry
 t
es
t 
 
C
o
n
tr
o
ll
ed
 r
et
ri
ev
al
 o
f 
ta
rg
et
 w
o
rd
s:
  
In
 D
y
s,
 D
IS
 >
 w
ai
ti
n
g
 
=
 R
U
M
; 
n
o
 d
if
fe
re
n
ce
 i
n
 N
o
n
-d
y
s 
  
  
Jo
o
rm
an
 &
 S
ie
m
er
 (
2
0
0
4
) 
(S
tu
d
y
 1
):
 P
o
si
ti
v
e 
v
s.
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
th
en
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 
D
IS
; 
1
1
9
 u
/g
’s
, 
D
y
s 
v
s.
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
o
n
 C
E
S
-D
 
m
o
o
d
 r
at
in
g
s,
 t
im
e 
to
 r
ec
al
l 
m
e
m
o
ri
es
 
to
 +
/-
 c
u
es
 
A
ft
er
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
in
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
N
o
n
-D
y
s 
(n
o
t 
D
y
s)
 w
h
o
 
ru
m
in
at
ed
 r
ec
al
le
d
 m
o
o
d
-i
n
co
n
g
ru
en
t 
(p
o
si
ti
v
e)
 m
e
m
o
ri
es
 
fa
st
er
. 
A
ft
er
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
in
d
u
ct
io
n
, 
D
y
s 
w
h
o
 r
u
m
in
at
ed
 r
ec
al
le
d
 
m
o
o
d
-c
o
n
g
ru
e
n
t 
(p
o
si
ti
v
e)
 m
e
m
o
ri
e
s 
sl
o
w
er
 t
h
an
 N
o
n
-D
y
s.
 
  
  
K
ao
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
3
3
 D
y
s 
u
/g
’s
 (
B
D
I>
1
4
);
 3
3
 N
o
n
-d
y
s 
u
/g
’s
 
(B
D
I<
6
) 
m
o
o
d
, 
M
E
P
S
, 
m
e
m
o
ry
 r
ec
al
l 
d
u
ri
n
g
 M
E
P
S
 
P
o
st
-m
a
n
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a:
 D
y
s 
ru
m
in
at
o
rs
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 
g
ro
u
p
s.
 E
ff
ec
ti
v
e
n
es
s 
o
f 
p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lv
in
g
: 
D
y
s 
ru
m
in
at
o
rs
 <
 
o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s.
 C
at
e
g
o
ri
c 
m
e
m
o
ri
e
s:
 D
y
s 
ru
m
in
at
o
rs
 =
 D
y
s 
d
is
tr
ac
te
rs
 >
 o
th
er
 2
 g
ro
u
p
s 
 
  
  
K
as
h
d
an
 &
 R
o
b
er
ts
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
P
er
so
n
al
 s
el
f-
d
is
cl
o
su
re
 v
s.
 s
m
al
l 
ta
lk
; 
8
3
 u
/g
’s
 
S
o
ci
al
 a
n
x
ie
ty
, 
p
o
st
-e
v
e
n
t 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
, 
B
D
I,
 
P
A
N
A
S
 
A
t 
h
ig
h
er
 l
e
v
el
s 
o
f 
so
ci
al
 a
n
x
ie
ty
, 
p
o
st
-e
v
en
t 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 i
n
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
af
fe
ct
 f
o
ll
o
w
in
g
 
p
er
so
n
al
 d
is
cl
o
su
re
, 
b
u
t 
d
ec
re
as
es
 i
n
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
af
fe
ct
 
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
 s
m
al
l 
ta
lk
. 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
1
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
L
av
e
n
d
er
 &
 W
at
k
in
s 
(2
0
0
4
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
3
0
 M
D
D
 v
s.
 3
0
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
F
u
tu
re
 t
h
in
k
in
g
 
ta
sk
, 
 S
C
ID
 
W
it
h
in
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
, 
n
o
. 
o
f 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
fu
tu
re
 e
v
en
ts
 
g
en
er
at
ed
, 
R
U
M
 >
 D
IS
; 
n
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
in
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
  
  
L
y
o
n
fi
el
d
s 
et
 a
l.
 (
1
9
9
5
) 
w
it
h
in
-s
u
b
je
ct
, 
b
as
el
in
e 
v
s.
 w
o
rr
y
 i
m
ag
er
y
 v
s.
 v
er
b
al
 w
o
rr
y
; 
1
5
 
G
A
D
 v
s.
 1
5
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
H
R
, 
M
S
D
 o
f 
IB
I,
 
an
x
ie
ty
 r
at
in
g
s 
V
ag
al
 (
p
ar
as
y
m
p
at
h
e
ti
c)
 t
o
n
e 
(M
S
D
 o
f 
IB
I)
: 
G
A
D
 <
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
. 
L
it
tl
e 
ch
a
n
g
e 
in
 v
ag
a
l 
to
n
e 
ac
ro
ss
 t
as
k
s 
in
 G
A
D
 
g
ro
u
p
, 
b
u
t 
d
ec
li
n
e 
in
 v
a
g
al
 t
o
n
e 
ac
ro
ss
 t
as
k
s 
in
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
. 
A
n
x
ie
ty
: 
v
er
b
al
 w
o
rr
y
 >
 w
o
rr
y
 i
m
a
g
er
y
 
  
  
L
y
u
b
o
m
ir
sk
y
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
3
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 v
s.
 p
la
n
n
in
g
, 
4
5
 D
y
s 
(B
D
I>
1
5
) 
v
s.
 4
6
 
N
o
n
-D
y
s 
(B
D
I 
<
3
) 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
, 
2
8
 D
y
s 
v
s.
 2
6
 N
o
n
-D
y
s.
 S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
R
U
M
 
v
s.
 D
IS
, 
3
3
 D
y
s 
v
s.
 3
2
 N
o
n
-D
y
s.
 
  
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
C
IQ
, 
re
ad
in
g
 t
as
k
, 
S
tu
d
y
 
2
: 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
o
n
 
v
id
eo
ta
p
ed
 l
ec
tu
re
. 
S
tu
d
y
 3
:C
IQ
 
d
u
ri
n
g
 p
u
zz
le
, 
p
ro
o
f-
re
ad
in
g
  
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
m
o
o
d
, 
ti
m
e 
sp
en
d
 r
ea
d
in
g
 p
as
sa
g
e,
 
in
te
rf
er
in
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 i
n
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 o
th
er
 4
 
g
ro
u
p
s.
 S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
m
o
o
d
, 
ti
m
e 
an
sw
er
in
g
 q
u
e
st
io
n
s 
in
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
d
sy
p
h
o
ri
c 
m
o
o
d
, 
in
te
rf
er
in
g
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
, 
p
o
o
re
r 
p
ro
o
f-
re
ad
in
g
 i
n
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s 
 
  
  
L
y
u
b
o
m
ir
sk
y
 &
 N
o
le
n
- 
  
  
H
o
ek
se
m
a 
(1
9
9
5
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
, 
D
y
s 
(B
D
I-
S
F
>
7
) 
v
s.
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
(B
D
I-
S
F
 <
3
);
 D
y
s 
v
s.
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
u
/g
’s
 -
 S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
3
3
 v
s.
 3
6
; 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
3
6
 v
s.
 3
7
; 
 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
3
6
 v
s.
 3
3
  
M
o
o
d
 r
at
in
g
s.
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
C
B
Q
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
fu
tu
re
 
p
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s.
 S
tu
d
y
 
3
: 
M
E
P
S
 
A
ll
 s
tu
d
ie
s 
- 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
m
o
o
d
: 
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 
o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s.
 S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
d
ep
re
ss
ed
-d
is
to
rt
ed
 t
h
o
u
g
h
ts
, 
p
es
si
m
is
ti
c 
at
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
s:
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 
g
ro
u
p
s.
 S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
 o
f 
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
fu
tu
re
 e
v
e
n
ts
: 
D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 <
 o
th
er
 3
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s.
 S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
p
ro
b
le
m
-
so
lv
in
g
 e
ff
ec
ti
v
en
e
ss
: 
D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 <
 o
th
er
 3
 
g
ro
u
p
s 
  
  
L
y
u
b
o
m
ir
sk
y
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
8
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
, 
D
y
s 
v
s.
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
th
en
 (
S
tu
d
y
 1
) 
fr
ee
 r
ec
al
l 
m
e
m
o
ry
 t
as
k
; 
(S
tu
d
y
 2
) 
cu
ed
 m
e
m
o
ry
 t
as
k
; 
(S
tu
d
y
 3
) 
fr
eq
u
e
n
c
y
 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
fo
r 
ev
e
n
ts
; 
(S
tu
d
y
 4
) 
th
in
k
 a
lo
u
d
 d
u
ri
n
g
 m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
. 
D
y
s 
v
s.
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
u
/g
’s
 -
 S
tu
d
y
 1
:3
8
 v
s.
 3
4
 ;
 S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
2
5
 v
s.
 2
4
; 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
3
9
 v
s.
 3
3
; 
S
tu
d
y
 4
: 
2
0
 v
s.
 2
0
  
M
o
o
d
 r
at
in
g
s 
M
e
m
o
ry
 m
ea
su
re
s 
S
tu
d
y
 1
, 
2
, 
4
: 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a,
 n
eg
a
ti
v
it
y
 o
f 
a
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 
m
e
m
o
ri
e
s 
in
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
a,
 r
ep
o
rt
ed
 f
re
q
u
en
c
y
 o
f 
n
e
g
at
iv
e 
ev
e
n
ts
 
in
 D
y
s-
ru
m
in
at
iv
e 
g
ro
u
p
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
2
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
M
cL
au
g
h
li
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
7
) 
w
it
h
in
-s
u
b
je
ct
, 
w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 c
o
u
n
te
rb
al
a
n
ce
d
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
6
0
 u
/g
’s
. 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
3
4
 w
o
rr
ie
r 
/r
u
m
in
at
o
r,
 4
0
 
ru
m
in
at
o
r,
 3
5
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
 
B
D
I,
 P
S
W
Q
, 
M
A
S
Q
, 
P
A
N
A
S
, 
an
x
ie
ty
 &
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 r
at
in
g
s 
In
 S
tu
d
y
 1
 &
 2
, 
b
o
th
 w
o
rr
y
 &
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
a
ff
ec
t,
 a
n
x
ie
ty
, 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 &
 r
ed
u
ce
d
 p
o
si
ti
v
e 
af
fe
c
t.
 B
o
th
 i
n
v
o
lv
e 
a 
p
re
d
o
m
in
an
ce
 o
f 
th
o
u
g
h
t 
(v
er
su
s 
im
a
g
er
y
).
 
  
  
M
o
b
er
ly
 &
 W
at
k
in
s 
(2
0
0
6
) 
R
ep
ea
te
d
 f
o
cu
s 
o
n
 e
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 s
ce
n
ar
io
s,
 a
b
st
ra
ct
 v
s.
 
co
n
cr
et
e,
 p
ri
o
r 
to
 f
ai
lu
re
; 
6
1
 u
/g
’s
 
P
A
N
A
S
, 
A
C
S
-P
, 
B
D
I 
A
ft
er
 f
a
il
u
re
, 
h
ig
h
er
 l
ev
e
ls
 o
f 
tr
ai
t 
R
T
 w
er
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
it
h
 l
o
w
er
 l
ev
e
ls
 o
f 
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
a
ff
ec
t,
 b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 i
n
 a
b
st
ra
ct
 
co
n
d
it
io
n
, 
n
o
t 
in
 c
o
n
cr
et
e 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 
  
  
M
o
rr
o
w
 &
 N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
(1
9
9
0
) 
sa
d
 m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 t
h
e
n
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
, 
ac
ti
v
e 
v
s.
 p
as
si
v
e 
ta
sk
; 
3
5
 m
al
e,
 3
4
 f
e
m
al
e 
u
/g
’s
  
sa
d
n
es
s,
 h
o
st
il
it
y
 &
 
an
x
ie
ty
 r
at
in
g
s 
R
ed
u
ct
io
n
 i
n
 s
ad
n
es
s 
p
o
st
-i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 t
o
 p
o
st
-t
as
k
: 
D
is
tr
ac
ti
n
g
-a
ct
iv
e>
d
is
tr
ac
ti
n
g
-p
as
si
v
e>
ru
m
in
at
iv
e
-
ac
ti
v
e>
ru
m
in
at
iv
e
-p
as
si
v
e 
  
  
N
el
so
n
 &
 H
ar
v
e
y
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
S
p
ee
ch
 t
h
re
at
 p
ri
o
r 
to
 b
ed
, 
th
in
k
 a
b
o
u
t 
sp
ee
ch
 v
er
b
al
ly
 
(w
o
rr
y
) 
v
s.
 i
m
a
g
er
y
; 
3
1
 i
n
so
m
n
ia
 p
ts
 
D
is
tr
es
s,
 s
le
ep
-
o
n
se
t 
la
te
n
c
y
 
In
it
ia
l 
d
is
tr
es
s:
 I
m
a
g
er
y
 >
 V
er
b
al
 w
o
rr
y
 
S
le
ep
-o
n
se
t 
la
te
n
c
y
: 
Im
a
g
er
y
 <
 v
er
b
al
 w
o
rr
y
 
  
  
N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
&
 M
o
rr
o
w
 (
1
9
9
3
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
2
4
 D
y
s 
v
s.
 2
4
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
u
/g
’s
  
M
o
o
d
 r
at
in
g
s 
D
ep
re
ss
ed
 m
o
o
d
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 f
o
r 
D
y
s 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
 w
h
o
 
ru
m
in
at
ed
, 
b
u
t 
d
ec
re
as
ed
 i
n
 o
th
er
 3
 g
ro
u
p
s 
  
  
P
ar
k
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
A
d
o
le
sc
e
n
ts
: 
7
5
 1
st
 e
p
is
o
d
e 
M
D
D
; 
2
6
 n
o
n
-
d
ep
re
ss
ed
 p
sy
c
h
ia
tr
ic
 p
ts
; 
3
3
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
  
D
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
A
M
T
 
In
 M
D
D
 g
ro
u
p
, 
n
e
g
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 a
n
d
 c
at
eg
o
ri
c 
au
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 m
e
m
o
ri
es
: 
R
U
M
 >
 D
IS
 
  
  
P
ea
sl
ey
-M
ik
lu
s 
&
 V
ra
n
a 
(2
0
0
0
) 
W
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 r
el
a
x
at
io
n
 t
h
e
n
 f
ea
re
d
 i
m
a
g
er
y
 f
o
r 
2
4
 t
ri
al
s;
 5
1
 
F
ea
rf
u
l 
fe
m
al
e 
u
/g
’s
 
H
R
, 
fa
ci
al
 E
M
G
 
D
u
ri
n
g
 1
st
 p
h
as
e 
fo
r 
H
R
: 
w
o
rr
y
 >
 r
el
ax
at
io
n
 
D
u
ri
n
g
 i
m
a
g
er
y
 p
h
a
se
 f
o
r 
H
R
: 
re
la
x
at
io
n
>
 w
o
rr
y
 
  
  
R
u
st
in
g
 &
 N
o
le
n
-H
o
ek
se
m
a 
(1
9
9
8
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
a
n
g
ry
 m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
c
ti
o
n
, 
th
e
n
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
; 
4
1
 
u
/g
’s
. 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
an
g
er
 i
n
d
u
c
ti
o
n
 t
h
e
n
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
is
 v
s.
 
th
o
u
g
h
t-
li
st
in
g
; 
6
0
 u
/g
’s
 
an
g
er
, 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
an
x
ie
ty
 r
at
in
g
s 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
R
U
M
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 a
n
g
e
r,
  
D
IS
 n
o
 c
h
an
g
e 
in
 a
n
g
er
 
S
tu
d
y
 3
 f
o
r 
an
g
er
: 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 >
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
(t
h
o
u
g
h
t-
li
st
in
g
) 
>
 d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 
  
  
S
eg
er
st
ro
m
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
9
) 
E
x
p
o
su
re
 t
o
 p
h
o
b
ic
 s
ti
m
u
lu
s 
v
s.
 n
o
 e
x
p
o
su
re
; 
S
n
a
k
e/
sp
id
er
 f
ea
rf
u
l:
 7
 w
o
rr
ie
rs
, 
8
 n
o
n
-w
o
rr
ie
rs
. 
6
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
P
S
W
Q
, 
S
C
L
, 
H
R
, 
im
m
u
n
e 
fu
n
ct
io
n
 
In
cr
ea
se
d
 S
C
L
, 
H
R
 b
o
th
 w
o
rr
y
 g
ro
u
p
s;
 i
n
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 N
K
 
ce
ll
s 
in
 r
es
p
o
n
se
 t
o
 f
ea
r 
o
n
ly
 i
n
 n
o
rm
a
l 
w
o
rr
y
 g
ro
u
p
 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
3
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
T
h
a
y
er
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
6
) 
B
as
el
in
e 
v
s.
 r
el
ax
at
io
n
 v
s.
 w
o
rr
y
; 
3
4
 G
A
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
, 
3
2
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
H
R
, 
IB
Is
, 
(M
S
D
) 
o
f 
IB
Is
 
C
ar
d
ia
c 
IB
Is
: 
G
A
D
 <
 c
o
n
tr
o
ls
. 
W
o
rr
y
 <
 b
as
el
in
e 
=
 
re
la
x
at
io
n
. 
W
o
rr
y
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 l
o
w
er
 c
ar
d
ia
c 
v
ag
al
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
  
  
T
h
o
m
se
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
4
c)
 
m
o
o
d
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
; 
5
6
 u
/g
’s
  
E
C
Q
-R
, 
m
o
o
d
 r
at
in
g
s 
 
T
ra
it
 R
T
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 p
o
st
-i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 s
tr
es
s,
 
an
x
ie
ty
, 
a
n
g
er
 &
 h
el
p
le
ss
n
es
s,
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 p
re
-i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
 
m
o
o
d
 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
(2
0
0
4
a)
 
F
ai
lu
re
 t
h
en
 3
 x
 e
x
p
re
ss
iv
e 
w
ri
ti
n
g
, 
ab
st
ra
ct
 (
w
h
y
?
) 
v
s.
 
co
n
cr
et
e 
(h
o
w
?
);
 6
9
 c
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
 s
a
m
p
le
 
A
C
S
-P
, 
B
D
I,
 
M
A
A
C
L
, 
IE
S
 
H
ig
h
er
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
tr
ai
t 
R
T
 a
ss
o
c
ia
te
d
 w
it
h
 h
ig
h
er
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 1
2
 h
r 
af
te
r 
fa
il
u
re
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ab
st
ra
ct
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
th
e 
co
n
cr
et
e 
w
ri
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
  
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 B
ro
w
n
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
W
it
h
in
 s
u
b
je
ct
, 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 c
o
u
n
te
rb
al
an
ce
d
; 
1
4
 M
D
D
, 
1
4
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
R
an
d
o
m
 n
u
m
b
er
 
g
en
er
at
io
n
 t
as
k
 
F
o
r 
co
u
n
t 
sc
o
re
 (
in
d
ex
 o
f 
le
ss
 r
an
d
o
m
n
e
ss
),
 M
D
D
 
ru
m
in
at
o
rs
 >
 o
th
er
 3
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
s 
i.
e.
, 
D
IS
 i
m
p
ro
v
ed
 
ra
n
d
o
m
n
e
ss
 i
n
 M
D
D
 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 T
ea
sd
al
e 
(2
0
0
1
) 
A
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 v
s.
 
ab
st
ra
ct
io
n
; 
3
6
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
A
M
T
 
p
re
-,
 p
o
st
- 
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 
P
o
st
 m
a
n
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
: 
A
n
al
y
ti
ca
l,
 E
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 
R
U
M
 (
h
ig
h
 s
el
f-
fo
c
u
s)
 >
 D
IS
, 
ab
st
ra
ct
io
n
 (
lo
w
 s
el
f-
fo
cu
s)
. 
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 s
p
ec
if
ic
it
y
 o
f 
au
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 
m
e
m
o
ry
: 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
, 
D
IS
 (
lo
w
 a
n
al
y
ti
ca
l)
 >
 a
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
, 
ab
st
ra
ct
io
n
 (
h
ig
h
 a
n
a
ly
ti
ca
l)
 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 T
ea
sd
al
e 
(2
0
0
4
) 
A
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
; 
2
8
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
A
M
T
  
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 s
p
ec
if
ic
it
y
 o
f 
a
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 m
e
m
o
ry
 p
re
-t
o
 
p
o
st
 m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
: 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
 >
 A
n
a
ly
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
0
) 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 ;
 4
8
 D
y
s 
sa
m
p
le
 
d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
A
M
T
  
 
P
o
st
-m
a
n
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
 d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
: 
R
U
M
 >
 D
IS
. 
In
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 s
p
ec
if
ic
it
y
 o
f 
a
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 m
e
m
o
ry
 p
re
 t
o
 p
o
st
-
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
: 
D
IS
 >
 R
U
M
 
  
  
W
el
ls
 &
 P
ap
ag
eo
rg
io
u
 (
1
9
9
5
) 
W
at
ch
 u
p
se
tt
in
g
 f
il
m
, 
th
e
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
s.
 i
m
a
g
er
y
 v
s.
 d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 
v
s.
 w
o
rr
y
 a
b
o
u
t 
fi
lm
 v
s.
 w
o
rr
y
 u
su
al
 c
o
n
ce
rn
s;
 7
0
 u
/g
’s
  
P
S
W
Q
, 
S
T
A
I,
 
an
x
ie
ty
 V
A
S
, 
in
tr
u
si
v
e 
im
a
g
e 
d
ia
ry
 
n
ex
t 
3
 d
a
y
s 
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
in
tr
u
si
v
e 
im
ag
e
s:
 w
o
rr
y
 a
b
o
u
t 
fi
lm
 >
 c
o
n
tr
o
l,
 
al
l 
o
th
er
 g
ro
u
p
s 
n
o
t 
si
g
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
 d
if
fe
re
n
t 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
4
 
T
ab
le
 1
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
Y
o
rk
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
8
7
) 
V
el
te
n
 i
n
d
u
ct
io
n
s 
w
o
rr
y
 v
s.
 s
o
m
at
ic
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 v
s.
 n
eu
tr
al
, 
th
en
 
b
re
at
h
in
g
-f
o
c
u
s 
ta
sk
; 
3
6
 u
/g
’s
 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
in
tr
u
si
o
n
s,
 
M
A
A
C
L
, 
H
R
 
In
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
in
tr
u
si
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 b
re
at
h
in
g
-f
o
cu
s:
 
W
o
rr
y
 >
 N
eu
tr
al
, 
S
o
m
at
ic
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 n
s 
d
if
fe
re
n
t 
fr
o
m
 b
o
th
. 
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 H
R
: 
W
o
rr
y
=
S
o
m
at
ic
 A
n
x
ie
ty
 >
 N
e
u
tr
al
 
 N
o
te
. 
A
C
S
-P
 =
 A
ct
io
n
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
S
ca
le
-P
re
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
; 
A
M
T
 =
 A
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 M
em
o
ry
 T
es
t;
 A
S
Q
 =
 A
tt
ri
b
u
ti
o
n
al
 S
ty
le
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
A
T
Q
 =
 A
u
to
m
at
ic
 
T
h
o
u
g
h
ts
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
B
A
I 
=
 B
ec
k
 A
n
x
ie
ty
 I
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
B
D
I 
=
 B
ec
k
 D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 I
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
B
P
 =
 b
lo
o
d
 p
re
ss
u
re
; 
B
P
D
 =
 b
ri
ef
 p
re
v
io
u
s 
d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
g
ro
u
p
; 
C
B
Q
 
=
 C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
b
ia
se
s 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
C
B
T
 =
 c
o
g
n
it
iv
e-
b
eh
av
io
ra
l 
th
er
ap
y
; 
C
D
 =
 c
u
rr
en
tl
y
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
g
ro
u
p
; 
C
D
I 
=
 C
h
il
d
re
n
s 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 I
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
C
D
R
S
-R
 =
 
C
h
il
d
re
n
’s
 D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 R
at
in
g
 S
ca
le
-R
ev
is
ed
; 
C
E
S
-D
 =
 C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
E
p
id
em
io
lo
g
ic
al
 S
u
rv
e
y
-D
ep
re
ss
io
n
; 
C
H
D
 =
 c
o
ro
n
ar
y
 h
ea
rt
 d
is
ea
se
; 
C
IQ
 =
 C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
In
te
rf
er
en
ce
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
C
O
P
E
 =
 t
h
e 
C
O
P
E
 s
ca
le
; 
C
S
Q
 =
 C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
S
ty
le
s 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
D
A
S
 =
 D
y
sf
u
n
ct
io
n
al
 A
tt
it
u
d
es
 S
ca
le
; 
D
IS
 =
 d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
; 
D
y
s 
=
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
E
C
Q
-R
 =
 E
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
-R
eh
ea
rs
al
; 
E
P
Q
-N
 =
 E
y
se
n
ck
 P
er
so
n
al
it
y
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
-N
eu
ro
ti
ci
sm
 
sc
al
e;
 E
S
M
 =
 E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 S
am
p
li
n
g
 M
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
; 
G
A
D
 =
 g
en
er
al
iz
ed
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 d
is
o
rd
er
; 
G
H
C
 =
 g
en
er
al
 h
ea
lt
h
 c
h
ec
k
li
st
; 
G
H
Q
 =
 G
en
er
al
 H
ea
lt
h
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
G
R
S
 =
 G
lo
b
al
 R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 S
ca
le
; 
H
A
D
S
 =
 H
o
sp
it
al
 A
n
x
ie
ty
 a
n
d
 D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 S
ca
le
; 
H
IN
T
 =
 H
ab
it
 i
n
d
ex
 o
f 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
th
in
k
in
g
; 
H
R
 =
 h
ea
rt
-r
at
e;
 H
R
S
D
 =
 
H
am
il
to
n
 R
at
in
g
 S
ca
le
 f
o
r 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
; 
ID
D
 =
 I
n
v
en
to
ry
 t
o
 D
ia
g
n
o
se
 D
ep
re
ss
io
n
; 
ID
S
 =
 I
n
v
en
to
ry
 o
f 
D
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
S
y
m
p
to
m
s;
 I
E
S
 =
 I
m
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
v
en
t 
S
ca
le
; 
L
E
S
 
=
 L
if
e 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
s 
S
u
rv
ey
; 
M
A
A
C
L
 =
 M
u
lt
ip
le
 A
ff
ec
t 
A
d
je
ct
iv
e 
ch
ec
k
li
st
; 
M
A
S
Q
 =
 M
o
o
d
 a
n
d
 A
n
x
ie
ty
 S
y
m
p
to
m
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
M
D
E
 =
 m
aj
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
ep
is
o
d
e;
 M
D
D
 =
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 w
it
h
 m
aj
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
d
is
o
rd
er
; 
M
E
P
S
 =
 M
ea
n
s 
E
n
d
s 
P
ro
b
le
m
 S
o
lv
in
g
 t
as
k
; 
M
M
A
P
 =
 M
ea
su
re
 o
f 
M
en
ta
l 
A
n
ti
ci
p
at
o
ry
 P
ro
ce
ss
es
; 
M
M
S
E
 =
 m
in
i-
m
en
ta
l 
st
at
e 
ex
am
in
at
io
n
; 
M
S
D
 o
f 
IB
I 
=
 M
ea
n
 S
u
cc
es
si
v
e 
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s 
o
f 
H
ea
rt
 I
n
te
rb
ea
t 
In
te
rv
al
s;
 N
 =
 n
eu
ro
ti
ci
sm
; 
N
D
 =
 n
ev
er
-d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
g
ro
u
p
; 
N
E
O
-F
F
I 
=
 N
E
O
-f
iv
e 
fa
ct
o
r 
in
v
en
to
ry
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
al
it
y
; 
N
K
 =
 n
at
u
ra
l 
k
il
le
r 
ce
ll
s;
 N
o
n
-D
y
s 
=
 n
o
n
-d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
P
A
N
A
S
 =
 P
o
si
ti
v
e 
&
 N
eg
at
iv
e 
A
ff
ec
t 
S
ca
le
; 
P
C
I 
=
 P
ai
n
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
In
v
en
to
ry
; 
P
D
 =
 p
re
v
io
u
sl
y
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c;
 P
O
M
S
 =
 P
ro
fi
le
 o
f 
M
o
o
d
 S
ta
te
s 
sc
al
e;
 P
P
D
 =
 p
ro
lo
n
g
ed
 p
re
v
io
u
sl
y
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
g
ro
u
p
; 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
5
 
P
S
E
-1
0
 =
 P
re
se
n
t 
S
ta
te
 E
x
am
in
at
io
n
-1
0
; 
P
S
S
 =
 p
o
st
-t
ra
u
m
at
ic
 s
tr
es
s 
sy
m
p
to
m
 s
ca
le
; 
P
S
T
 =
 P
ro
b
le
m
-s
o
lv
in
g
 t
h
er
ap
y
; 
P
S
Q
I 
=
 P
it
ts
b
u
rg
h
 S
le
ep
 Q
u
al
it
y
 I
n
d
ex
; 
P
S
W
Q
 =
 P
en
n
 S
ta
te
 W
o
rr
y
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
p
ts
 =
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
R
R
Q
 =
 R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 &
 R
ef
le
ct
io
n
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
S
E
 =
 R
o
se
n
b
er
g
 S
el
f-
E
st
ee
m
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
S
Q
 =
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 S
ty
le
s 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
S
S
 =
 R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 o
n
 S
ad
n
es
s 
S
ca
le
; 
R
T
 =
 r
ep
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t;
 R
T
A
s 
=
 r
o
ad
 t
ra
ff
ic
 a
cc
id
en
ts
; 
R
U
M
 =
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
; 
S
A
D
 =
 s
ea
so
n
al
 a
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
d
is
o
rd
er
; 
S
A
D
S
-L
 =
 S
ch
ed
u
le
 f
o
r 
A
ff
ec
ti
v
e 
D
is
o
rd
er
s 
an
d
 S
ch
iz
o
p
h
re
n
ia
 –
L
if
et
im
e;
 S
C
ID
 =
 S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 C
li
n
ic
al
 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 f
o
r 
D
S
M
; 
S
C
L
 =
 s
k
in
 c
o
n
d
u
ct
an
ce
; 
S
P
S
I-
R
 =
 s
o
ci
al
 p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lv
in
g
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
-r
ev
is
ed
; 
S
T
A
I 
=
 s
ta
te
 t
ra
it
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
T
C
Q
 =
 T
h
o
u
g
h
t 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
T
1
 =
 i
n
it
ia
l 
b
as
el
in
e 
as
se
ss
m
en
t,
 T
2
 =
 f
o
ll
o
w
-u
p
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t,
 u
/g
’s
 =
 u
n
d
er
g
ra
d
u
at
es
; 
V
A
S
 =
 v
is
u
al
 a
n
al
o
g
u
e 
sc
al
e 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
6
 
 
T
ab
le
 2
 
S
tu
d
ie
s 
d
em
o
n
st
ra
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 
 A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
a
l 
st
u
d
ie
s 
 
 
 
  
  
B
el
ze
r 
et
 a
l.
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
3
5
3
 u
/g
’s
 
P
S
W
Q
, 
C
at
as
tr
o
p
h
ic
 
w
o
rr
y
 q
u
e
st
io
n
n
ai
re
, 
S
T
A
I,
 S
P
S
I 
 
R
at
io
n
al
 p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lv
in
g
 (
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e)
 &
 
im
p
u
ls
iv
en
e
ss
/c
ar
el
e
ss
n
es
s 
(u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e)
 p
o
si
ti
v
e
ly
 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 w
o
rr
y
, 
af
te
r 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 t
ra
it
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 &
 
p
ro
b
le
m
 o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
 
  
  
C
al
h
o
u
n
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
0
) 
5
4
 u
/g
’s
 w
it
h
 t
ra
u
m
at
ic
 e
v
e
n
t 
in
 p
as
t 
3
 y
rs
 
P
T
G
I,
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 
(i
te
m
s 
d
er
iv
ed
 e
x
is
ti
n
g
 
m
ea
su
re
s)
 
E
ar
ly
 e
v
e
n
t-
re
la
te
d
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 a
ft
er
 t
ra
u
m
a 
p
o
si
ti
v
e
ly
 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 p
o
st
-t
ra
u
m
at
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 
  
  
C
ry
d
er
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
4
6
 c
h
il
d
re
n
 e
v
ac
u
a
te
d
 f
o
r 
H
u
rr
ic
an
e 
F
lo
y
d
 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
, 
co
m
p
et
e
n
c
y
 b
el
ie
fs
, 
P
T
G
I 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 w
it
h
 c
o
m
p
et
e
n
c
y
 b
el
ie
fs
 
b
u
t 
n
o
t 
w
it
h
 p
o
st
-t
ra
u
m
at
ic
 g
ro
w
th
, 
al
th
o
u
g
h
 c
o
m
p
et
e
n
c
y
 
b
el
ie
fs
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 p
o
st
-t
ra
u
m
a
ti
c 
g
ro
w
th
 
  
  
D
av
e
y
 e
t 
al
.,
 (
1
9
9
2
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
:1
0
5
 u
/g
’s
; 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
1
0
8
 u
/g
’s
; 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
9
4
 u
/g
’s
 &
 
p
/g
’s
 
A
ll
 s
tu
d
ie
s:
 S
T
A
I,
 
S
tu
d
e
n
t 
W
o
rr
y
 S
ca
le
. 
S
tu
d
y
 1
, 
2
: 
C
o
p
in
g
 w
it
h
 
st
re
ss
, 
 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
M
il
le
r 
B
eh
av
io
ra
l 
S
ty
le
 s
ca
le
-
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
, 
2
: 
W
o
rr
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 t
ra
it
 a
n
x
ie
ty
. 
W
h
e
n
 
tr
ai
t 
an
x
ie
ty
 c
o
n
tr
o
ll
ed
, 
w
o
rr
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 s
el
f-
re
p
o
rt
ed
 s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
o
f 
ac
ti
v
e 
b
e
h
av
io
ra
l 
co
p
in
g
, 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
-s
ee
k
in
g
, 
af
fe
ct
iv
e
 r
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
. 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
W
h
en
 
tr
ai
t 
an
x
ie
ty
 h
el
d
 c
o
n
st
a
n
t,
 w
o
rr
y
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 
m
o
n
it
o
ri
n
g
 
  
  
E
l 
L
ei
th
y
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
4
6
 v
ic
ti
m
s 
o
f 
p
h
y
si
ca
l 
a
ss
a
u
lt
 
IE
S
-R
, 
fl
u
en
c
y
 &
 
fr
eq
u
en
c
y
 o
f 
co
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
a
ls
  
F
lu
e
n
c
y
 o
f 
co
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
al
 t
h
in
k
in
g
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 
w
it
h
 g
en
er
at
io
n
 o
f 
b
eh
a
v
io
ra
l 
p
la
n
s 
  
  
F
el
d
m
a
n
 &
 H
a
y
e
s 
(2
0
0
5
) 
S
tu
d
y
 3
; 
3
2
5
 u
/g
’s
. 
 
M
M
A
P
, 
R
e
fl
ec
ti
o
n
, 
S
P
S
I-
R
, 
M
A
S
Q
 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
P
la
n
 r
eh
ea
rs
al
 n
e
g
at
iv
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
el
l-
b
ei
n
g
. 
  
  
  
P
er
k
in
s 
&
 C
o
rr
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
6
8
 s
al
es
p
eo
p
le
 
P
S
W
Q
, 
ab
il
it
y
, 
jo
b
 
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 
W
o
rr
y
 c
o
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 b
et
te
r 
jo
b
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 b
u
t 
o
n
ly
 i
n
 
h
ig
h
 a
b
il
it
y
 i
n
d
iv
id
u
al
s 
  
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
7
 
T
ab
le
 2
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
S
ch
o
rr
 &
 R
o
e
m
er
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
1
4
1
 s
tu
d
en
ts
 r
ep
o
rt
in
g
 t
ra
u
m
a/
lo
ss
 
P
G
T
I,
 “
se
ar
ch
in
g
 f
o
r 
a 
w
a
y
 t
o
 m
a
k
e 
se
n
se
 o
f 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
” 
A
tt
e
m
p
ts
 t
o
 m
a
k
e 
se
n
se
 (
R
T
) 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 p
o
st
-t
ra
u
m
a
ti
c 
g
ro
w
th
 
  
  
S
eg
er
st
ro
m
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
3
) 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
9
7
8
 u
/g
’s
; 
S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
2
5
 u
/g
’s
  
S
tu
d
y
 3
:6
2
 w
o
m
e
n
 i
n
 b
re
as
t 
c
an
ce
r 
p
re
v
en
ti
o
n
 t
ri
al
 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
E
m
o
ti
o
n
al
 
p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
, 
IE
S
, 
P
S
W
Q
, 
R
S
Q
, 
R
R
Q
, 
N
E
O
-F
F
I 
S
tu
d
y
 2
, 
3
: 
se
lf
-
g
en
er
at
ed
 d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
s 
o
f 
R
T
, 
ra
ti
n
g
s 
o
f 
af
fe
ct
 
S
tu
d
y
 3
, 
C
E
S
-D
, 
q
u
al
it
y
 o
f 
li
fe
, 
IE
S
, 
S
T
A
I 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
M
u
lt
id
im
e
n
si
o
n
a
l 
sc
a
li
n
g
 r
ev
ea
le
d
 V
al
e
n
ce
 
d
im
en
si
o
n
 (
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
v
s.
 n
e
g
at
iv
e)
, 
P
u
rp
o
se
 d
im
e
n
si
o
n
 
(o
p
en
n
es
s 
to
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 v
s.
 c
la
ri
ty
 &
 w
o
rr
y
).
 S
tu
d
y
 2
: 
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t 
so
rt
in
g
 o
f 
d
es
cr
ip
ti
o
n
s 
re
su
lt
ed
 i
n
 
d
im
en
si
o
n
s 
o
f 
V
al
e
n
ce
 (
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
v
s.
 n
e
g
at
iv
e)
, 
C
o
n
te
n
t 
(a
ch
ie
v
e
m
e
n
t 
v
s.
 i
n
te
rp
er
so
n
a
l)
, 
P
u
rp
o
se
 (
se
ar
ch
in
g
 v
s.
 
so
lv
in
g
).
 V
al
e
n
ce
 d
im
e
n
si
o
n
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 a
ff
ec
t 
ra
ti
n
g
s.
 
S
tu
d
y
 3
: 
M
o
re
 n
e
g
at
iv
e 
R
T
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 m
o
re
 n
eg
at
iv
it
y
, 
w
o
rs
e 
m
en
ta
l 
h
ea
lt
h
, 
m
o
re
 a
n
x
ie
ty
, 
m
o
re
 p
h
y
si
ca
l 
sy
m
p
to
m
s.
 W
h
en
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t 
v
al
e
n
ce
 p
o
si
ti
v
e,
 s
ea
rc
h
in
g
 
d
ec
re
as
ed
 r
at
in
g
s 
o
f 
p
h
y
si
ca
l 
h
ea
lt
h
 a
n
d
 p
o
si
ti
v
it
y
; 
w
h
e
n
 
th
o
u
g
h
t 
v
al
e
n
ce
 n
e
g
at
iv
e,
 s
ea
rc
h
in
g
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 r
at
in
g
s 
o
f 
p
h
y
si
ca
l 
h
ea
lt
h
 a
n
d
 p
o
si
ti
v
it
y
 
  
  
S
za
b
o
 &
 L
o
v
ib
o
n
d
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
3
9
 u
/g
’s
  
7
 d
ay
 d
ia
ry
 o
f 
w
o
rr
y
 
ep
is
o
d
es
  
A
 l
ar
g
e 
%
 o
f 
w
o
rr
y
 i
n
v
o
lv
ed
 p
ro
b
le
m
-s
o
lv
in
g
 a
tt
e
m
p
ts
, 
so
m
et
im
es
 l
ea
d
in
g
 t
o
 s
at
is
fy
in
g
 s
o
lu
ti
o
n
s 
  
  
T
ra
p
n
el
l 
&
 C
a
m
p
b
el
l 
(1
9
9
9
) 
u
/g
’s
: 
n
 =
 4
4
1
, 
n
 =
 5
7
0
, 
n
 =
 7
1
0
 
R
R
Q
, 
N
E
O
-F
F
, 
B
D
I 
R
ef
le
c
ti
o
n
 s
ca
le
 n
o
t 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
p
to
m
s 
(r
 =
 .
0
4
, 
r 
=
 .
0
8
) 
b
u
t 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
it
h
 o
p
en
n
es
s 
to
 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
 (
r 
=
.6
1
) 
  
  
V
er
h
ae
g
en
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
5
) 
9
9
 u
/g
’s
  
R
ef
le
c
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 R
S
Q
, 
 
C
E
S
-D
 
R
ef
le
c
ti
v
e 
p
o
n
d
er
in
g
 r
el
at
ed
 t
o
 c
u
rr
en
t 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
, 
se
lf
-
ra
te
d
 c
re
at
iv
e 
in
te
re
st
s 
&
 c
re
at
iv
e 
fl
u
e
n
c
y
 o
ri
g
in
al
it
y
 a
n
d
 
el
ab
o
ra
ti
o
n
. 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
4
8
 
T
ab
le
 2
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
L
o
n
g
it
u
d
in
a
l 
st
u
d
ie
s 
 
 
 
  
  
B
o
w
er
 e
t 
al
. 
(1
9
9
8
) 
B
er
ea
v
e
m
en
t 
in
te
rv
ie
w
 a
t 
T
1
, 
th
en
 b
lo
o
d
 s
a
m
p
le
s 
e
v
er
y
 6
 
m
th
s 
fo
r 
2
-3
 y
ea
rs
. 
4
0
 H
IV
 s
er
o
p
o
si
ti
v
e 
m
e
n
 a
ft
er
 A
ID
S
-
re
la
te
d
 b
er
ea
v
em
e
n
t 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 t
ra
n
sc
ri
p
ts
: 
co
g
n
it
iv
e 
p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
, 
d
is
co
v
er
y
 o
f 
m
ea
n
in
g
, 
C
E
S
-D
, 
C
D
4
 T
-c
el
ls
, 
m
o
rt
a
li
ty
 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
p
ro
ce
ss
in
g
 s
ig
n
if
ic
a
n
tl
y
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 w
it
h
 
d
is
co
v
er
y
 o
f 
m
ea
n
in
g
. 
D
is
co
v
er
y
 o
f 
m
ea
n
in
g
 a
t 
T
1
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 r
at
e 
o
f 
C
D
4
 d
ec
li
n
e 
T
1
 t
o
 T
2
 a
n
d
 
d
ec
re
as
ed
 r
at
e 
o
f 
A
ID
S
-r
el
at
e
d
 m
o
rt
al
it
y
. 
  
  
C
an
to
r 
et
 a
l.
 (
1
9
8
7
) 
T
ra
n
si
ti
o
n
 t
o
 c
o
ll
eg
e.
 T
1
 =
 1
st
 s
e
m
e
st
er
, 
T
2
 =
 2
n
d
 s
em
e
st
er
; 
1
4
7
 u
/g
’s
 
D
P
Q
, 
G
P
A
, 
re
fl
ec
ti
v
it
y
 
=
 n
o
. 
o
f 
id
ea
s 
g
e
n
er
at
ed
 
fo
r 
co
p
in
g
 p
la
n
s 
R
ef
le
c
ti
v
it
y
 a
t 
T
1
 p
o
si
ti
v
el
y
 a
ss
o
ci
at
ed
 G
P
A
 a
t 
T
2
; 
h
ig
h
er
 r
ef
le
c
ti
v
it
y
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 h
ig
h
er
 G
P
A
 i
n
 D
P
 b
u
t 
lo
w
er
 
G
P
A
 i
n
 O
P
. 
  
  
C
ie
sl
a 
&
 R
o
b
er
ts
 (
2
0
0
2
) 
re
sp
o
n
se
 t
o
 g
ro
u
p
 t
re
at
m
e
n
t;
 3
2
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
 
R
S
Q
, 
D
A
S
, 
R
S
E
, 
B
D
I 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 i
n
te
ra
ct
ed
 w
it
h
 c
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
st
y
le
 t
o
 p
re
d
ic
t 
ch
an
g
e 
in
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
: 
in
 h
ig
h
 s
el
f-
e
st
ee
m
, 
lo
w
 D
A
S
 
g
ro
u
p
, 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 b
et
te
r 
o
u
tc
o
m
e 
  
  
D
ij
k
st
ra
 &
 B
ro
ss
ch
o
t 
(2
0
0
3
) 
T
2
 =
 8
 m
th
s;
 3
8
0
 s
m
o
k
er
s,
 3
2
4
 e
x
-s
m
o
k
er
s 
T
1
: 
w
o
rr
y
 a
b
o
u
t 
h
ea
lt
h
, 
se
lf
-e
ff
ic
ac
y
, 
d
is
en
g
ag
e
m
e
n
t 
b
el
ie
fs
. 
T
2
 s
m
o
k
in
g
 b
eh
av
io
r 
In
 s
m
o
k
er
s,
 i
n
cr
ea
se
d
 w
o
rr
y
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 m
o
re
 q
u
it
 
at
te
m
p
ts
 T
1
 t
o
 T
2
, 
m
o
re
 s
o
 i
n
 g
ro
u
p
 w
it
h
 h
ig
h
 s
el
f-
ef
fi
ca
c
y
. 
In
 e
x
-s
m
o
k
er
s,
 w
o
rr
y
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 r
el
ap
se
, 
es
p
ec
ia
ll
y
 i
n
 l
o
w
 
se
lf
-e
ff
ic
ac
y
, 
h
ig
h
 d
is
e
n
g
ag
e
m
en
t 
b
el
ie
fs
 g
ro
u
p
  
  
  
F
el
d
m
a
n
 &
 H
a
y
e
s 
(2
0
0
5
) 
S
tu
d
y
 4
. 
T
1
 s
ta
rt
 o
f 
1
st
 s
e
m
es
te
r;
 T
2
 e
n
d
 o
f 
1
st
 s
em
e
st
er
 a
ft
er
 
1
3
 w
ee
k
s;
 1
1
0
 1
st
-y
ea
r 
la
w
 s
tu
d
en
ts
. 
M
M
A
P
, 
R
e
fl
ec
ti
o
n
, 
S
P
S
I-
R
, 
M
A
S
Q
 
S
tu
d
y
 4
: 
p
la
n
 r
e
h
ea
rs
al
 a
t 
T
1
 p
re
d
ic
te
d
 r
ed
u
ce
d
 
d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 a
t 
T
2
, 
al
th
o
u
g
h
 n
o
 l
o
n
g
er
 s
ig
n
 w
h
e
n
 
co
n
tr
o
ll
in
g
 T
1
 d
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
  
  
H
ay
 e
t 
al
. 
(2
0
0
6
) 
M
et
a-
a
n
al
y
si
s 
o
f 
1
2
 p
ro
sp
ec
ti
v
e 
st
u
d
ie
s;
 3
3
4
2
 h
ig
h
-r
is
k
 &
 
g
en
er
al
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 w
o
m
e
n
. 
B
re
as
t 
ca
n
ce
r 
w
o
rr
y
 a
t 
T
1
, 
T
2
 b
re
as
t 
ex
a
m
in
at
io
n
, 
m
a
m
m
o
g
ra
p
h
y
 u
se
 
B
re
as
t 
ca
n
ce
r 
w
o
rr
y
 h
a
s 
sm
al
l 
b
u
t 
re
li
ab
le
 (
r 
=
 0
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at
io
n
 w
it
h
 b
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b
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 l
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l.
 (
2
0
0
6
) 
T
1
 =
 l
a
w
 s
c
h
o
o
l 
o
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
; 
T
2
 =
 1
 m
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 p
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 p
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 m
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 o
ra
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 f
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 p
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 c
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 b
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 b
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ra
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p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
, 
&
 h
ig
h
er
 s
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p
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ef
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b
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 c
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 m
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 p
at
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at
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at
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 p
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 d
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b
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 D
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 p
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 D
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at
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 p
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 d
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d
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at
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b
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ra
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b
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 p
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 f
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 l
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T
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 l
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 b
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 c
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 r
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 d
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n
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 v
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at
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 p
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 D
P
 v
s.
 1
1
 
O
P
 
D
P
Q
. 
S
tu
d
y
 1
: 
P
O
M
S
, 
S
T
A
I,
 m
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 d
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d
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ac
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 p
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d
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at
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 p
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 f
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 p
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 d
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 d
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p
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d
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 c
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 c
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 b
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p
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ra
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ro
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b
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ro
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ro
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ra
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R
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p
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 p
at
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at
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b
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 p
at
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b
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 d
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at
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 p
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at
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re
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 c
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at
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c
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c
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 m
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p
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p
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p
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u
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 b
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 c
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b
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at
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ra
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ro
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re
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at
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 c
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p
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p
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ra
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h
 h
ig
h
er
 l
ev
el
s 
o
f 
n
eg
at
iv
e 
m
o
o
d
 1
2
 h
r 
af
te
r 
fa
il
u
re
 i
n
 t
h
e 
ev
al
u
at
iv
e 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 b
u
t 
n
o
t 
in
 t
h
e 
co
n
cr
e
te
 w
ri
ti
n
g
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
  
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 B
ar
ac
ai
a 
(2
0
0
2
) 
n
o
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
v
s.
 a
b
st
ra
ct
 W
h
y
?
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
v
s.
 c
o
n
cr
et
e,
 
p
ro
ce
ss
, 
H
o
w
?
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
s 
d
u
ri
n
g
 c
o
n
cu
rr
en
t 
M
E
P
S
; 
3
2
 C
D
; 
2
6
 R
D
; 
2
6
 N
D
  
S
C
ID
, 
B
D
I,
 R
S
Q
, 
M
E
P
S
 
P
ro
b
le
m
-s
o
lv
in
g
 e
ff
ec
ti
v
e
n
es
s:
 I
n
 n
o
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
, 
n
ev
er
-d
ep
re
ss
ed
 (
N
D
)=
 r
ec
o
v
er
ed
 d
ep
re
ss
ed
 (
R
D
) 
>
cu
rr
en
tl
y
 d
ep
re
ss
ed
 (
C
D
).
 I
n
 a
b
st
ra
ct
 W
h
y
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
, 
N
D
 >
 R
D
=
C
D
 
In
 c
o
n
cr
et
e,
 p
ro
ce
ss
 c
o
n
d
it
io
n
, 
N
D
=
R
D
=
C
D
 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 M
o
u
ld
s 
(2
0
0
5
a)
 
ab
st
ra
ct
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 c
o
n
cr
et
e 
R
U
M
; 
4
0
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
; 
4
0
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
M
E
P
S
 
In
 M
D
D
 g
ro
u
p
, 
fo
r 
p
ro
b
le
m
-s
o
lv
in
g
 e
ff
ec
ti
v
e
n
es
s,
 
co
n
cr
et
e 
R
U
M
 >
 a
b
st
ra
ct
 R
U
M
. 
N
o
 e
ff
ec
t 
o
f 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 i
n
 
co
n
tr
o
ls
 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 T
ea
sd
al
e 
(2
0
0
1
) 
A
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
 v
s.
 D
IS
 v
s.
 
ab
st
ra
ct
io
n
; 
3
6
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
  
d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
A
M
T
, 
B
D
I 
D
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
: 
A
n
a
ly
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
, 
ex
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
 (
h
ig
h
 
se
lf
-f
o
cu
s)
 >
 D
IS
, 
ab
st
ra
ct
io
n
 (
lo
w
 s
el
f-
fo
c
u
s)
. 
In
cr
ea
se
 
in
 s
p
ec
if
ic
it
y
 o
f 
a
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 m
e
m
o
ry
: 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 
R
U
M
, 
D
IS
 (
lo
w
 a
n
al
y
ti
ca
l)
 >
 a
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
, 
ab
st
ra
ct
io
n
 (
h
ig
h
 a
n
al
y
ti
ca
l)
 
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
5
2
 
 T
ab
le
 2
 (
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
).
 
 
A
u
th
o
r 
D
es
ig
n
 &
 S
a
m
p
le
 
M
ea
su
re
s 
M
ai
n
 F
in
d
in
g
s 
  
  
W
at
k
in
s 
&
 T
ea
sd
al
e 
(2
0
0
4
) 
A
n
al
y
ti
ca
l 
R
U
M
 v
s.
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
; 
2
8
 M
D
D
 p
at
ie
n
ts
  
d
es
p
o
n
d
en
c
y
, 
A
M
T
  
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 s
p
ec
if
ic
it
y
 o
f 
a
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 m
e
m
o
ry
: 
E
x
p
er
ie
n
ti
al
 R
U
M
 >
 A
n
a
ly
ti
c
al
 R
U
M
 
 N
o
te
. 
A
C
S
-P
 =
 A
ct
io
n
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
S
ca
le
-P
re
o
cc
u
p
at
io
n
; 
A
M
T
 =
 a
u
to
b
io
g
ra
p
h
ic
al
 m
em
o
ry
 t
es
t;
 A
S
Q
 =
 A
tt
ri
b
u
ti
o
n
al
 S
ty
le
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
B
D
I 
=
 B
ec
k
 D
ep
re
ss
io
n
 
In
v
en
to
ry
; 
C
D
 =
 c
u
rr
en
tl
y
 d
ep
re
ss
ed
 g
ro
u
p
; 
C
E
S
-D
 =
 C
en
tr
e 
fo
r 
E
p
id
em
io
lo
g
ic
al
 S
u
rv
e
y
-D
ep
re
ss
io
n
; 
C
IQ
 =
 C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
In
te
rf
er
en
ce
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
C
O
P
E
 =
 
C
O
P
E
 c
o
p
in
g
 m
ea
su
re
; 
D
A
S
 =
 D
y
sf
u
n
ct
io
n
al
 A
tt
it
u
d
es
 S
ca
le
; 
D
IS
 =
 d
is
tr
ac
ti
o
n
 m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
; 
D
P
 =
 D
ef
en
si
v
e 
p
es
si
m
is
t;
 D
P
Q
 =
 D
ef
en
si
v
e 
P
es
si
m
is
m
 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
D
y
s 
=
 d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
E
S
M
 =
 e
x
p
er
ie
n
ce
 s
am
p
li
n
g
 m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
; 
G
O
I 
=
 G
o
al
 O
ri
en
ta
ti
o
n
 I
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
H
R
S
D
 =
 H
am
il
to
n
 R
at
in
g
 S
ca
le
 f
o
r 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
; 
IE
S
 =
 I
m
p
ac
t 
o
f 
E
v
en
t 
S
ca
le
; 
M
A
A
C
L
 =
 M
u
lt
ip
le
 A
ff
ec
t 
A
d
je
ct
iv
e 
ch
ec
k
li
st
; 
M
A
S
Q
 =
 M
o
o
d
 a
n
d
 A
n
x
ie
ty
 S
y
m
p
to
m
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
M
D
E
 =
 m
aj
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
ep
is
o
d
e;
 M
D
D
 =
 m
aj
o
r 
d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
d
is
o
rd
er
; 
M
E
P
S
 =
 M
ea
n
s 
E
n
d
s 
P
ro
b
le
m
 S
o
lv
in
g
 t
as
k
; 
M
M
A
P
 =
 M
ea
su
re
 o
f 
M
en
ta
l 
A
n
ti
ci
p
at
o
ry
 P
ro
ce
ss
es
; 
N
D
 =
 
n
ev
er
-d
ep
re
ss
ed
 g
ro
u
p
; 
N
E
O
-F
F
I 
=
 N
E
O
-f
iv
e 
fa
ct
o
r 
in
v
en
to
ry
 o
f 
p
er
so
n
al
it
y
; 
N
L
E
Q
 =
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
li
fe
 e
v
en
ts
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
N
o
n
-D
y
s 
=
 n
o
n
-d
y
sp
h
o
ri
c 
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
O
P
 =
  
O
p
ti
m
is
t;
 P
A
N
A
S
 =
 P
o
si
ti
v
e 
&
 N
eg
at
iv
e 
A
ff
ec
t 
S
ca
le
; 
P
O
M
S
 =
 P
ro
fi
le
 o
f 
M
o
o
d
 S
ta
te
s 
sc
al
e;
 P
S
W
Q
 =
 P
en
n
 S
ta
te
 W
o
rr
y
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
p
ts
 
=
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
; 
P
T
G
I 
=
 P
o
st
-t
ra
u
m
at
ic
 g
ro
w
th
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
R
D
=
 r
ec
o
v
er
ed
 d
ep
re
ss
ed
 g
ro
u
p
; 
R
P
A
 =
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 t
o
 P
o
si
ti
v
e 
A
ff
ec
t 
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
R
Q
 =
 R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 
&
 R
ef
le
ct
io
n
 Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
S
E
 =
 R
o
se
n
b
er
g
 S
el
f-
E
st
ee
m
 q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
S
Q
 =
 R
es
p
o
n
se
 S
ty
le
s 
Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
ai
re
; 
R
T
 =
 r
ep
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t;
 R
U
M
 =
 r
u
m
in
at
io
n
 
m
an
ip
u
la
ti
o
n
; 
S
C
ID
 =
 S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
 C
li
n
ic
al
 I
n
te
rv
ie
w
 f
o
r 
D
S
M
; 
S
P
S
I-
R
 =
 s
o
ci
al
 p
ro
b
le
m
 s
o
lv
in
g
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
-r
ev
is
ed
; 
S
T
A
I 
=
 s
ta
te
 t
ra
it
 a
n
x
ie
ty
 i
n
v
en
to
ry
; 
T
1
 =
 
in
it
ia
l 
b
as
el
in
e 
as
se
ss
m
en
t,
 T
2
 =
 f
o
ll
o
w
-u
p
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t,
 u
/g
’s
 =
 u
n
d
er
g
ra
d
u
at
es
; 
V
A
S
 =
 v
is
u
al
 a
n
al
o
g
u
e 
sc
al
e.
 
C
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
re
p
et
it
iv
e 
th
o
u
g
h
t 1
5
3
 
T
ab
le
 3
. 
 
M
a
jo
r 
cl
a
ss
es
 o
f 
R
T
 c
la
ss
if
ie
d
 b
y 
va
le
n
ce
, 
co
n
te
xt
, 
a
n
d
 l
ev
el
-o
f-
co
n
st
ru
a
l 
 
C
la
ss
 o
f 
R
T
 
V
al
en
ce
 
C
o
n
te
x
t 
C
o
n
st
ru
al
 
C
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
 
D
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
- 
- 
A
 
- 
R
u
m
in
at
io
n
 (
M
ar
ti
n
 &
 T
es
se
r)
 
+
/-
 
+
/-
 
A
/C
 
+
/-
 
W
o
rr
y
 
- - 
- +
/-
 
A
 
C
 
- +
 
P
er
se
v
er
at
iv
e 
co
g
n
it
io
n
 
- 
- 
A
 
- 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e/
em
o
ti
o
n
al
 
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
 
+
 
- 
- - 
A
 
C
 
+
 
+
 
P
la
n
n
in
g
/p
ro
b
le
m
-s
o
lv
in
g
 
- 
+
 
C
 
+
 
C
o
u
n
te
rf
ac
tu
al
s 
+
/-
 
+
/-
 
A
/C
 
+
/-
 
D
ef
en
si
v
e 
p
es
si
m
is
m
 
- 
+
 
C
 
+
 
R
ef
le
ct
io
n
 
+
 
+
 
A
 
+
?
 
M
in
d
 w
an
d
er
in
g
 
+
/-
 
+
/-
 
A
/C
 
+
/-
 
P
o
st
-e
v
en
t 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
- 
- 
A
 
- 
P
o
si
ti
v
e 
ru
m
in
at
io
n
 
+
 
+
 
+
 B
P
D
 
+
 
A
?
 
A
 
- +
 
H
ab
it
u
al
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
se
lf
-
th
in
k
in
g
 
- 
- 
A
 
- 
 N
o
te
: 
V
al
en
ce
 =
 v
al
en
ce
 o
f 
th
o
u
g
h
t 
co
n
te
n
t.
 C
o
n
te
x
t 
=
 s
it
u
at
io
n
al
 a
n
d
/o
r 
in
tr
ap
er
so
n
al
 c
o
n
te
x
t.
 C
o
n
st
ru
al
 =
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
co
n
st
ru
al
. 
C
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
=
 c
o
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s 
o
f 
R
T
. 
- 
re
fe
rs
 t
o
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
v
al
en
ce
/c
o
n
te
x
t 
o
r 
u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
; 
+
 r
ef
er
s 
to
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
v
al
en
ce
/c
o
n
te
x
t 
o
r 
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
, 
+
/-
 m
ea
n
s 
th
at
 v
al
en
ce
, 
co
n
te
x
t,
 o
r 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
 i
s 
m
ix
ed
 o
r 
u
n
d
er
sp
ec
if
ie
d
, 
e.
g
.,
 c
la
ss
 o
f 
R
T
 c
an
 h
av
e 
b
o
th
 c
o
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
an
d
 u
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
iv
e 
co
n
se
q
u
en
ce
s.
 A
 =
 a
b
st
ra
ct
 l
ev
el
-o
f-
co
n
st
ru
al
, 
C
 =
 c
o
n
cr
et
e 
le
v
el
-o
f-
co
n
st
ru
al
, 
?
 =
 
u
n
cl
ea
r/
u
n
k
n
o
w
n
, 
B
P
D
 =
 v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
 t
o
 b
ip
o
la
r 
d
is
o
rd
er
. 
